OUTLINES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

P. T. SRINIVASA IYENGAR

Outlines

OF

Indian Philosophy.

BY

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NOTE. This index refers to chap. II and III and deals only with technical terms that have different meanings or refer to things named differently in different schools. The nos. refer to pages.

The following contractions are used in this Index. A. Advaita; V. Viṣishṭâdvaita; D. Dvaita S. Sâṅkhya; Y. Yoga; Va. Vaiṣeshika; N. Nyâya; Ṣ. Ṣaiva Siddhânta; Pa. Pâsupata; Pr. Pratyabhijñâ; Ṣa. Ṣâkta; Vai. Vaishṇava; M. Mîmânsâ.

also is Aṇu, 203, 204, 208; conception of, 256; (2) Individual self, (Ṣ.), because he imagines himself to be infinitely small, 156, 294. cor. Jivâtma (A), chit (V.), etc.

Asat: non—being: proto-matter, root of matter, that state of matter when it cannot be distinguished as matter, a vedic term, 72, 73, 282 *n.* treated in the upanishads sometimes as Param Brahma, 283; Cor. Mûlaprakṛiti (S).

Âtmâ: original meaning unknown: (1) name of the substance, Ego, (Va, N.), 200, (2) a class of tattvas (Ṣa.) 289.

Avidyâ: ignorance; (1) ignorance of the non-duality of the Jivâtmâ and Paramâtmâ (A.), 87, 89; (2) consciousness of finiteness (Ṣa), 156.

Avyakta: indistinguishable, undivided, undifferentiated; 78; (1) identical with Avidyâ, which in the *manifested* world causes the sense of separation of the individual from the Supreme Self (A.), 89; (2) indistinguishable state of individual selves and matter when there is no *manifestation* (V.) 94.

Bhûta: being; objects (of the world) (Y.) 114; *also,* elements, subtle (Sûkshma), 271, and gross (Mahâ), 273. (S.).

Buddhi: knowledge; (1) the first stage of differentiated consciousness (S.), 267-269. (2) intellection (M.) 223, 236.

Chit: Orig. mean. unknown: conscious, individual

self (V.) 93, (Pr.) 172. Cor. Jîvâtmâ (A.), Purusha (S.), etc. The derivative Chaitanya (Ṣa. 152-153, Pr.) 170; another derivative, chiti-Ṣakti, used in Y., 113.

Chitta: probably derived from chit, but refers not to the pure consciousness, but (1) to the inner organ (Y.) 111, 113-114, 115; (2) memory (later A.), *ib*; (3) discriminative procedure of knowledge (P.), 150.

Dharma: What is established: (1) quality (Y.), 114, 276; (2) Vedic ritual (M.), 222.

Drashṭâ: Seer: the 'subject' (Y.), 111; Cor. Purusha (S.), chit (V.), Âtmâ (Va., N.)

Dṛiṣi: Sight: cognition (Y.), 111, 112; Cor. Prakâṣa, or chit-Ṣakti (S.), jñâna (S.), Chaitanyam (Pr.)

Dṛiṣya: Seen: 'object' (Y.), 111, 112; Cor. prakṛiti (S.)

Guṇa: strand: (1) three fundamental properties of the 'object' (S.), 105-107; (2) six special qualities of the Supreme. (Vai.), 181-182; (3) any quality of any object (Va., N.), 196.

Idamtâ: this-ness: 'object' (Ṣa.), 141, 143, 144; Cor, Prakṛiti (S.), drîṣya (Y).

Îṣvara: ruler: (1) the omniscient being, author of creation, dependent on Avidyâ, but different from it (A.), 87—89; (2) an ever-free Purusha (Y.), 115; (3) Paramâtmâ, (Vai, esp. later), 186, 189; (4) Moral Governor of the universe (N.), 208; (5) God, the creator etc, (later N.), 261-262.

J i v â t m â : self living (in the manifested world) : individual self (A.), 86 ; frequently contracted into jîva, especially in later A., and D. ; Cor. chit (V), aṇu (Ṣ), paṣu (P., Ṣ), purusha (S.), drashṭâ (Y.), Âtmâ (Va. N.)

K a l â : small part : (1) insentient matter (P.) 149-150 ; (2) that which manifests chaitanya partially (Ṣa), 290.

K â r a ṇ â v a s t h â : causal condition : Param-Brahma during pralaya (V.) 94 ; Cor. Param Âtma (A.).

K â r y â v a s t h â : Effected condition : Param-Brahma during Kalpa (V.), 94 ; Cor. Iṣvara (A.).

K r i y â : action, usual sense everywhere : Rajas (Y.), 112.

K s h e t r a j ñ a : knower of the field : Individual soul (Vai., Bhag. Gitâ), 184 ; Cor. Jîvâtmâ (A.), chit (V.), etc.

M â y â : power of causing illusion : (1) a power of Îṣvara (A.), 88 ; same as Avidyâ (A.), 89 ; (2) treated as an entity (later A.), *ib* ; (3) the womb of the world (Ṣa), 158 ; of two kinds (Ṣa.) 158—161.

M û l a p r a k ṛ i t i : root- matter : Nomuenon of material objects (S), 103-5 in some respects like Param Brahma also asat of the Vedanta, ether of science. *ib* ; Cor : Aliṅga (Y.), idaṃtâ (Ṣa), achit (V.), avidyâ (A.), avyakta (A.),

N i r v i ṣ e s h a B r a h m a : Brahma free from specific attributes : word used by Râmânuja, 92, and

Srîkara, 162, in referring to the Param Brahma of A., frequently called especially in later A., Nirguṇa Brahma.

P a r a m B r a h m a : Supreme Being : used chiefly in Vedânta ; in Rigveda, 72 ; in Bhag. Gita, 72, 244 ; in Upanishads, 74 ; in Vedanta Sûtras ; 77, in (A.), 86 ; in (V.) 92-94 ; in (D.), 97-98 ; Cor. Prakâṣa (Ṣa.), Nârâyaṇa (Vai), Ṣiva (S.)

P â ṣ a : fetter : (Ṣ) 155-6, vaguely corresponds to prakṛiti.

P a ṣ u: cattle: individual self (P.), 149, (Ṣ), 154-155; 161-162 ; Cor., Jivâtmâ (A., D.), chit (V., Vai.).

P a t i : Lord : Supreme Lord (P), 149, (Ṣ), 153 ; Cor. Param Brahma (Vedânta), also, Îṣvara of various schools.

P r a k â ṣ a : light : (1) light of consciousness (Ṣ.), 291, also generally used ; (2) Sattva Guṇa (Y.), 112 ; (3) the Supreme, (Ṣa.) 141, 143, 144, Cor. Param Brahma.

P r a d h â n a : chief : Syn. of M û l a p r a k ṛ i t i (S.,) q. v.

Prakṛiti : [?] how a thing is made : the 'object' (S.), 101 ; used by most schools also.

P u r u s h a : orig. mean. unknown : male : the 'subject' (S.), 101 ; used by most schools also.

S a k a l a : with parts : (I) a class of individual souls (Ṣ.), 161 ; (2) the gross forms of Nârâyaṇa (Vai.), 177.

S a t : being : (1) differentiated consciousness, conscious

being (Vedânta), 72, 74, 81, etc; (2) the Supreme (V.), 92.

Ṣîlâ: Syn. of Guṇa (Y.), 112.

Sthiti: rest: (1) name of Tamas (Y.), 112 (2) maintenance of the world (Vai.) 183.

Spanda: Vibration: Name of the Supreme (Pr.), 170: Cor. Param Brahma, etc.

Vidyâ: knowledge: (1) cognition of the identity of the individual and supreme self (A.), 87: (2) method of meditation (upanishads), 120; (3) Sentiency (P.), 149; (4) a class of tattvas (Ṣa.), 292; (5) the 30th tattva (Ṣa.), 291.

Vikriti: Alteration: (1) effect (S.), 103; (2) Param âtamâ (Vai.), 178.

Viṣesha: difference: (1) species (Va.), 197; (2) elements that produce bodies (S), 273.

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PREFACE.

I have, in the following pages, attempted to separate the varied threads of the tangled skein of modern Hindu philosophical thought and religious beliefs. Each school of ancient thought was based on a special point of view of its own and was promulgated for the purpose of emphasizing the particular standpoint which appealed to the persons that founded and elaborated that school. But "as the water that rains from the sky goes all to the ocean" and once mixed with the ocean, the countributory streams become indistinguishable from one another, so modern Hinduism has received the tribute of the Upanishads, the Sâṅkhya-yoga, the Vaiṣeshika-n'yâya and the triple Âgamas, and its wonderful tolerance has intricately mixed up all these

elements. I have endeavoured to separate all these elements and exhibit separately the teachings of these ancient systems.

In doing so, I have attempted to discuss the ideas of the earliest available exposition of each school. In India, thinkers, however independent they may be, whatever new vistas of thought they may open up, are compelled by inexorable orthodoxy to father their opinions on the ancients. The boldest thinker this country has produced, Ṣañkara, felt it necessary to seek the sanction of orthodoxy by deriving his new ideas from the old Brahma Sûtras and the older Upanishads. Being a philosopher, he had to pretend to be a scholiast. Obversely, each commentator on an older philosophical work, while professing to expound his author, imports some of his own ideas in the comment and thus unconciously helps on the movement of thought. Thus, to take an illustration from modern schools, when the canon may be expected to be definitely fixed, Sureṣvara, the premier disciple of Ṣañkara, slightly alters the Advaita of his master. The author of Bhâmati, Vâch-

aspati Misra, gives it another twist; after him, Vidyâraṇya gives another; and so thought goes on ever changing, though not always for the better. So, too, the Viṣishtâdvaita; of Yâmuna, Râmânuja, Pillai (Lokâchârya), Vedânta Deṣika and Maṇavâla, each has introduced some alteration in the scheme of thought. Similarly, the early Vaiṣeshika Sûtras ignore a creator or a distributor of rewards and punishments: but the modern Tarka school it wedded to a thorough going theism. Hence in discussing the opinions of each school I have relied on the earliest available book and not on the commentaries thereon. * In the case of the Brahma Sûtras, I have made an attempt (the first, I believe, by any one) to indicate what I imagine to be the author's position distin-

* How much even European scholars have succumbed to the influence of the commentator is proved by the fact that Max Müller, in translating certain passages of the upanishads has put into the text matter found only in Saṅkara Bhâshya; Deussen's recent exposition of the philosophy of the Upanishads is vitiated by his identification of the position of the Rishis with that of Ṣaṅkara. Is it any wonder that the average Hindu, to whom the seer and the scholiast are both prophets sees revelation in both text and commentaries!

guishable from that of the 'three' schools of interpretation, called the "three creeds" (trimata) which have engulphed it.

Though the Hindu venerates the Veda as self-revealed and takes great pride in calling himself a Vedânti and has recently proposed to himself to carry the light of Vedânta to the West, yet the living religion of India, what one may call the 'working faith' of the Hindus of today, is based on the Âgamas, Ṣaiva, Ṣâkta, or Vaishṇava; less than a thousand years ago, the Âgamas were looked on as unauthoritative and Yâmuna, in founding the modern Vaishṇava Viṣishṭâdvaita school felt it necessary to write the *Agamaprâmâṇya,* the authoritativeness of the Âgamas. To-day, however freely scraps of the Upanishads are quoted in discussions, the actual opinions and religious practices of the Hindus are taken entirely from the Âgamas. For this and other reasons, the Âgamas have been kept secret. I have attempted to give an account of them and their fundamental ideas, quoting from unpublished or untranslated works. I hope that this will

direct the attention of scholars to a vast virgin soil of investigation likely to yield valuable results. *

In discussing the various schools my aim has been to combine the sympathetic insight which is possible only to one born and bred within the Hindu religious fold and the critical and impartial judgment of one who has shaken himself free from the shackles of sectarian animosity and partizan enthusiasm. Whether and how far I have succeeded it is for the reader to judge. The only other works that can be compared with this one in scope are the *Sarva Darsana Sañgraha* of Mâdhavâchârya and the *Sarva Vedânta Siddhantasâra*, attributed to Ṣañkarâchârya, but a late work. The former though written with a degree of impartiality very creditable in a Hindu of five centuries ago, has for its aim not the exposition of the fundamental tenets of the many Indian systems of thought, so much as the glorification of the Advaita

* Prof. Garbe alone of European scholars has realized the value of the Âgamas, but he does not seem to have done much for their elucidation.

as superior to the rest. Moreover Mâdhava uses each school only to demolish the previous one and his exposition of every darṣana (system) is limited by this circumstance, those only of the fundamental ideas being referred to which help him in his object. His account of the Âgama schools is very meagre; in fact he does not mention the Ṣâkta Âgmas at all; possibly because he himself, being the reputed founder of the Sṛiṇgeri mutt, was a Ṣâkta as so many Advaitîs are and regarded its mysteries too sacred to be desecrated by being revealed to the public. Of the second work, I could get only a part. It is now being edited by Professor Rangâchârya of the Madras Presidency College. Its treatment of Mîmâmsa is good. The rest does not seem to be valuable.

In dealing with Sanskrit technical terms, I have preferred not to employ English substitutes especially in the 2nd and 3rd chapters. If Indian philosophy is at all to be understood by English-speaking peoples, they must learn to associate with Sanskrit terms their special connotations. No Sanskrit

philosophical term can be equated to any English word. The word 'manas', for instance is usually translated 'mind', but the connotations of the two words are by no means identical. 'Manas' to a Hindu is a material, objective thing: it is not the brain, for the brain is 'gross', whereas 'manas' is subtle matter. But even a crass Western materialist who regards mind as a secretion of the brain will not admit mind to be matter in any sense of the word; he may deny its separate existence as an entity, but to him it is subjective and not objective. Hence the translation of manas as mind cannot but raise obstructive associations in the mind of the reader. The word 'Buddhi', again, is absolutely untranslateable. Ahamkâra is self-consciousness, the basis of the cognitions, 'I am the doer of this', but Ahamkâra to the Hindu, is a function of matter, the object, and not that of Self, the subject. Another fruitful source of confusion caused by translating technical words is due to the fact that different schools of thought use the same word in different senses: thus, 'viveka' to the

Advaitî is the distinction between the subject and the object; to the Viśishṭâdvaitî, it is the choice of the proper food that leads to spiritual enlightenment. The word 'mûrta' in the Upanishads means that which has form and in the Vaiśeshika it means that which moves. Obversely different words have been used for the same idea in different schools and this has contributed to the accentuation of their differences. It has therefore been thought that the synopsis given at the end of the book of such terms would be more useful than an index mechanically constructed. Yet no new Sanskrit technical term has been introduced in the text without some sort of explanatory word (suiting the context, but not pretending to be a translation) being added, for the use of readers who may not care for the subtle shades of difference but may like to acquaint themselves with the general trend of thought of the various systems discussed. One English philosophical word alone, I have taken the liberty to use freely, *viz.*, 'consciousness' This word I have used not in its usual connotation, in psychological works, of

'mental states', but in the sense of one's awareness of those states apart from the states themselves.' Without realizing this sharp separation of the operations of the mind from the concurrent awareness of them, it is hopeless to understand Hindu philosophy. Huxley and the French School of psychologists headed by Ribot and Binet approximate to this use of the word and theirs is my authority for appropriating this word in this sense.

My system of transliteration is practically the same as that of most European scholars (barring, of course, Max Müller's quaint system adopted in the "Sacred Text-books of the East"); but I must apologize to my readers for sundry inconsistencies in the transliteration due to the fact that the Tara Press has been trained to use a peculiar system of transliteration whereby, in violation of phonetics, the values of ṭ and t etc. are reversed; I must also beg the indulgence of the reader for errors due to defective proof-reading.

I cannot close this preface without refer-

ring to the invaluable help rendered me by my friend, Mr. Govinda Dâsa of Benares both by his criticism and suggestions and by his giving and procuring loans of Mss., by the encyclopœdic scholar, Professor Gañganâth Jhâ of Allahabad in the sections on Mîmân-sa and Vaiseshika, and by Mr. P. Bhaṭṭanâtha swami of Vizagapatam, without whose help I could not have deciphered or interpreted parts of my Mss. material.

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OUTLINES OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

CYCLE OF IDEAS COMMON TO ALL PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS OF INDIA.

AS it was in ancient Greece and Rome so it is in modern Europe and America; various schools of Philosophy are being propounded, each challenging every fundamental principle of the rest. Not so in India, where though the different Darṣanas disagree about important questions, the ideas common to all these systems are so many and so vital that these deserve to be formulated by themselves under the name of Hindu Philosophy.

These ideas are as a rule assumed and not definitely expounded in the literature of the different schools; each school being naturally anxious to explain and justify by argument, the special points of doctrine and discipline which constitute its individuality, and differentiate it from its sister philosophies. These philosophical schools are commonly enumerated as six, called the Shaḍ-

Darsanas. Two of them are wholly based on the Vedic texts and are called the two Mîmâmsâs;* they are Pûrva and Uttara (Earlier and Latter), otherwise, Karma Mîmâmsâ and Brahma Mîmâmsâ, investigation of Dharma and of Brahma. The other four are based on reasoning and while paying homage to the supreme authority of the Veda do not derive their substance from Vedic texts, viz: Sâṅkhya, Yoga, Nyâya, and Vaişeshika, the disciplines of Enumeration, Effort, Reasoning and Definition respectively. Mâdhava, in his *Sarva-darşana-saṅgraha* however, classifies the schools of his time as sixteen, viz, Chârvâka, Bauddha, Ârhata, Râmânuja, Pûrṇaprajña, Nakulîṣa-pâṣupata, Ṣaiva, Pratyabhijñâ Raseṣvara, Vaiṣeshika, Akshapâda, Jaiminîya, Pâṇinîya Sâṅkhya, Pâtañjala and Ṣâṅkara.† He professes to explain the specific teachings of each school, but one gets lost in this forest of philosophical systems and forgets that in them there is very

* Râmânuja defines '*mîmâṃsâ*' to be "a discussion of sentences of the Veda for the purpose of specially determining the *nature* and modes of (the things referred to in the Veda)."

† Mâdhava's chapter on Ṣâṅkara darṣana, so long believed by all scholars to be identical with the book called *Pañchadaşî* has been discovered in the Tanjore Library by Govinda Dâsa of Benares and incorporated in the recently published Anandâṣrama edition of the *Sarvadarṣanasangraha.*

much more community of opinion than diversity, which alone Mâdhava emphasises. We shall discuss in this chapter these fundamental assumptions of Hindu thought, so as to prepare the way for the consideration of the different teachings of the various schools with regard to individual problems and to methods of philosophical training.

Philosophy to all modern western thinkers, is chiefly a matter of speculation; to them its interest is mainly intellectual, in that it solves problems that have troubled the mind; but to the Hindu as to the ancient Greek and Roman, philosophy has besides this theoretical, a practical interest, the regulation of life. "In ancient times," says Dr. Bussel, "The pursuit of wisdom was practical and implied adherence to a definite rule of life" *(Personal Idealism, P. 342)*; and so it is in India even to-day. Philosophy has never been in India dissociated from life; hence each school sets about its investigations with the specific aim of discovering the means of man's attainment of a state of perfection called M o k s h a. This is the *raison d' etre* of each school. Unless it embodies a definite method of intellectual, ethical and spiritual training, leading a man up to perfection, it has according to Hindu ideas no justification for existence.

The only modern European philosopher that recognises this to be the function of philosophy is

the semi-oriental Spinoza. The opening sentence of his *De Intellectus Emendatione* (Transl. Elwes), says, "After experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to enquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else; whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness."

As to Spinoza, so to all Hindus, philosophy begins with V a i r â g y a, estimation of pleasures and pains at their proper value, and ends with M o k s h a. The first impulse to philosophy is not intellectual but emotional and moral. "'What hast thou to do with riches? What hast thou to do with kin? how shall wives bestand thee, son! that shalt surely die? seek the Âtman, that which lieth hidden in the cave. Where are gone thy father, and the fathers of thy father?' Such was the teaching, still more ancient, addressed by an ancient Indian father to an ancient Indian son—addressed by Vyâsa to his son Shuka—Shuka who grew to be greater even than his great father. And such used to be the origin of philosophy in olden India."

(Bhagavân Dâs, *Science of the Emotions, p. 9.*)

And such ought to continue to be always the power that inspires philosophy if it is to be something more than arid logomachy, laboured pounding of husk, fruitless and only too often leading to hypocrisy, to pharisaic self-righteousness, to pompous protestations and poor performance. The world has a moral value and philosophy ought to serve a nobler purpose than merely securing to its devotee the feeling of intellectual satisfaction in the acquisition of an idea by the path of speculation.

Philosophy, therefore, to a Hindu means not merely a body of opinions to be believed, but a life to be lived, a training to be undergone for attaining a state of release from bondage.* It is therefore unfair to these schools to judge of them as western writers invariably do, as theories to be argued about, apart from the practical training that they prescribe.

All these disciplines, except the school of crude philosophical Nihilism as expounded in the *Sarva-darşanasañgraha* under the name Chârvâka and attributed to Bŗihaspati, are agreed about the truth of the following propositions regarding the

* Even the Pûrva Mîmâmsâ, though this is not commonly recognized, proposes to lead to a state that can be properly called Moksha for, as Nachiketas says,—"Those who live in the Heaven world reach immortality." *Kaṭhopanishat*, i. 13. *vide* Yama's reply, *Ib.* i. 17-18.

constitution of the cosmos, the nature of man, and the goal of human evolution.

(1) Man is a complex of consciousness, mind and body.

(2) The Âtmâ is of the nature of consciousness and is immutable.

(3) Mind (a n t a ḥ-k a r a ṇ a), though an inner organ is material and is other than the Âtmâ.

(4) Psychic life obeys fixed laws and hence all mental events are determinable.

(5) The five sense-organs (j ñ â n e n d r i y a s) and the five action-organs (k a r m e n- d r i y a s) are, like the mind, made of subtle matter.

(6) The eleven organs inhere in a l i ṅ g a d e h a or subtle body, which is relatively permanent.

(7) The l i ṅ g a d e h a is periodically connected with a body of flesh and blood, which provides man with sense-organs and action-organs of gross matter.

(8) Matter (p r a k ṛ i t i) is mutable but increate and obeys fixed laws.

(9) The world history is made up of alternating periods of activity (k a l p a) and rest (p r a l a y a).

10) The subtle elements that make up all objects are five, corresponding to the five senses.

(11) All energy in the universe is personal, *i. e.* bound up with consciousness of varying degrees of intensity.

(12) This energy is prâṇa, which is intermediate between spirit and matter.

(13) The law of causation—karma—is supreme in the physical and mental worlds.

(14) Samsâra, the course of karma, is anâdi, had no beginning.

(15) Moksha is the goal of human life and results from the training of the mind, and hence reaching the state of moksha is a definite mental event.

It is curious that these fundamental doctrines upon which all schools of Hindu philosophy are absolutely agreed, deal with questions about which western philosophers have been hopelessly divided from the time of Aristotle to modern days. It is also worthy of note that in this long list of propositions about which all these schools are agreed, there is no reference to God or to His relations with the cosmos. For while the Vedânṭa is a school of Pantheism, all the rest are, as expounded by their founders, what the European thinker would regard as atheistic; while all of them

recognize the existence of the many powers of Nature, they exclude the conception of one Universal Being. The earlier Sâṅkhya, Vaiṣeshika and Mîmâṃsâ works are frankly atheistic. The Y o g a and the N y â y a S û t r a s refer to a Deity, but the former makes him but an ancient teacher, and the latter but an adjuster of rewards and punishments and no more. The later expounders of all these systems have given a theistic twist to them, because in later days, the Vedânta became popular and hence the name N i r î ṣ v a r a, atheistic, became a term of reproach.

We shall now discuss the fifteen propositions which are common to all these schools.

(1) *Man is a complex of consciousness, mind and body.*

In western philosophy the concepts 'consciousness' and 'mind' are not mutually exclusive. They are sometimes used synonymously; as when 'states of consciousness' and 'states of the mind' are used as the names of the successive phases of the flux of the inner life; at other times 'consciousness' is treated as a quality or adjunct of mental life; but in Eastern philosophy these two concepts indicate two things absolutely distinct from each other; consciousness is S a m v i t the enlightener of the mind and the senses and their operations; whereas mind, a n t a ḥ-k a r a ṇ a, is j a d a, unconscious. In other words, mind is matter

and consciousness is spirit. Samvit, pure consciousness, is what manifests to the man himself the operations of his mind and of his senses. To borrow an analogy from the senses, the eyes see the world when opened and directed towards objects. Similarly when Samvit, consciousness, is turned on mental processes, the spirit *sees* or *knows* the functioning of his mind. It is as if a ray of light proceeded from the spirit and enlightened the processes of perception, reasoning, etc. These mental functions exist whether consciousness accompanies them or not, just as the world exists whether beings see it or not. Sight manifests them to the individual; so the light of consciousness manifests the functions of perception, reasoning and conation to the man. Consciousness is not thought, for the latter is a procession of images, and the former the manifestation of them to the man himself. Even Hiṇḍu writers sometimes confound the two, for the word jñâna is used for thought as well as for consciousness; nor is the word chaitanya devoid of ambiguity, because the idea of motion (which is a function of material objects) is associated with it.

'Pure consciousness' has to be distinguished from 'personal consciousness.' This latter is investigated by Prof. James in chap. xii of his *Text-book of Psychology*. He subdivides it into two parts (1) the self as known, the 'Empirical Ego', or the *me* and (2) the self as the knower, the

'Pure Ego', or the I. The former he subdivides into (1) the 'material me,' the body, etc, (2) the 'social me,' the recognition one gets from his mates, and (3) the 'spiritual me', the entire collection of one's states of consciousness ; the 'pure Ego' he defines as the Thinker, the Agent behind the passing 'states of consciousness,' whose existence psychology has nothing to do with. This is the best commentary on the proposition that man is a complex. But elaborate as this classification is, it does not distinguish between 'pure consciousness' that is unchanging light and 'personal consciousness' which is mind as illuminated by the spirit, between chit-ṣakti, and chitta-vṛtti as the Yogî terms them. 'Personal consciousness' is Aham, an ideal construction from experience, just as the world is an ideal construction and belongs to the conceptual plane. 'Pure consciousness' is Âtmâ, a fact underlying all that is given by experience. The pure consciousness of the Puruṣha is that of which the personal consciousness bound up with mental or bodily activities, with which alone we are normaly acquainted, is a reflection in matter. When we move the muscles of the body we are conscious of pleasure and pain, of perception, conation, or judgment and we are conscious of ourselves as separate from the objects outside us. These are states of personal consciousness, each state beirg a complex. From it let us eliminate whatever is

contributed by the body and by the mind. What remains is the consciousness that accompanies all mental processes, first differentiated by Plotinus among western philosophers and called the accompaniment—parakolonthesis—of the mental activities by the soul. This is the light of consciousness which manifests both the mental and the physical worlds. It is the power of pure intelligence—chit-ṣakti—which being unchangeable, cannot become the seat of perception, for this latter belongs to the mind. We have thus reached a vague idea of pure consciousness as separate from mental activity, by abstraction from the personal consciousness. Pure consciousness however, is not an abstraction but a reality, the greatest reality attainable by man. The realization of this life of the Âtmâ is the aim of all schools of Indian philosophy.

What is called the inner life of man is termed 'the stream of consciousness' in western philosophy. Prof. James notes the following four characteristics in the flowing 'states of mind':—

(1) Every 'state' or thought is part of a personal consciousness.

(2) Within each personal consciousness states are always changing.

(3) Each personal consciousness is sensibly continuous.

(4) It is interested in some part of its object

to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects —chooses from among them. (*Text-book of Psychology*, chap. xi.) In this description, the conceptions of 'state', and of ' change ' belong to matter; those of 'continuity' and 'choice' belong to the Puruṣha and personal consciousness is due to the union of the two. Matter presents itself as a series of changing states, and spirit, whose light is continuous, chooses a few of them and illuminates or manifests them to himself by *seeing* them. Only we must regard all states of the mind—all cognitions, desires and actions as states of matter that is always in a flux, and not as belonging to the spirit, whose life is continuous and unbroken. Prof. James explains that the third of the above four propositions "means two things: (a) That even where there is a time-gap the consciousness after it feels as if it belonged together with the consciousness before it, as another part of the same self; (b) That the changes from one moment to another in the quality of the consciousness are never absolutely abrupt." (*Ib.*) This continuity is explicable only if consciousness is regarded as separate from mental states, and the relation between the two to be similar to that between a light and a procession of objects illuminated by the light. There is no change in the 'quality' of consciousness, but to strain the analogy a little, the *object*, in this case a state of mind, goes to the outermost fringe of the field of illumination and

hence looks dim and no more.

G. F. Stout (*Manual of Psychology*, p. 8) notes two uses of the word consciousness:— (1) To indicate all mental states whether we have cognizance of them or not (2) the awareness we have of ourselves and of our own experiences, as states of the Self—an inner sense—the function by which we perceive the mind and its processes, as sight perceives material facts. Father Maher distinguishes three meanings generally attached to this word. (1) To indicate the sum total of our psychical existence, all cognitive, emotional and appetitive states which are capable of being apprehended. (2) The mind's direct, intuitive, or immediate knowledge either of its own operations or of something other than itself acting upon it; in other words, the energy of the cognitive act, and not the emotional or volitional acts as cognized. (3) The reflex operation by which the mind attends to its states and recognizes them as its own. (*Psychology*, pp. 26–27.) The second meaning of consciousness, according to Stout and Maher approximates to some extent to the Hindu idea of it. Perception, Emotion and Conation are functions of the mind that take place according to mental laws, whether they are, or are not, illuminated by the light of the spirit and manifested to it. In ordinary psychic experience this consciousness of the spirit is inextricably and compulsorily bound

up with the life of the mind ; and can be understood only when it can be separated from the mind and contemplated apart from its mental colouring. This pure consciousness being the immaterial part of man is called Purusha—Man, *par excellence.* It is also called Jña, the knower, for he knows or becomes conscious of the functions of the mind, the senses, and the muscles and of himself as the Âtmâ. Purusha is Svayam-prakâșa, manifesting his own being. He knows himself to be, unlike the mind and the body whose existence is manifested only when cognized by some conscious being. Hence consciousness is frequently compared in Hindu books to light. The light of the sun reveals itself to us directly and when it beats against any object it manifests the existence of that object also. So the Purusha reveals his existence to himself and also illuminates a mind or a body he is in contact with, which otherwise would be unconscious, unknown, unmanifested to him. European Idealism makes the existence of matter depend on its being made manifest by the mind. It holds that whether there be a noumenon behind what we cognize as matter or no, it is certain that sensations exist and that as sensations are mental modifications, no objective existence can be manifested in the absence of mind. Constructive Idealism represented by John Stuart Mill admits a permanent possibility of sensation behind the phenomena of the objective world ; but the thorough-

going Idealism of Berkeley does not. Indian thought is a much more profound Idealism than these; mind and matter are both objective to the Purusha; they are revealed by him, without whose illumination they are Asat, non-being, for Sadbhâva, manifestation of being, can never exist without the illumination of the Purusha. But to himself Purusha is always illuminated; consciousness is an ultimate factor of human experience and cannot be proved or need not be manifested by anything else. Descartes argued, "I think, therefore I am;" Hindu Philosophers argue, "I am, therefore I am."

2. *The Âtmâ is of the nature of consciousness and is immutable.*

The part of Man that we have called consciousness is variously named Purusha, **Âtmâ**, Bhoktâ, etc, and its characteristics variously described. Thus the Purusha of the Sâṅkhya School is pure consciousness, devoid of any quality. The **Âtmâ** of the Vaiṣeshikas is characterised by desire, effort and so on. But in all Schools the essential nature of the **Âtmâ** is Svayam-prakâṣatva, the power of illuminating or manifesting the mental and bodily functions which, but for the Âtmâ, would go on unconscious and unknown. Itself is immutable, a steady light that knows not change. The immutability and hence the immortality of this

immaterial part of man is involved in its very conception. Âtmâ is vibhu, not limited by space; matter is aṇu, atomic. It is, in the words of Plotinus, "All in all and all in every part." Hence the Âtmâ is neither divisible nor indivisible, neither a compound nor an atom, not susceptible of diminution nor of excess. It is futile to attempt to conceive the origination or destruction of consciousness, for consciousness is involved in that very conception. Creation and destruction are understandable if conceived as the beginning or the ending of one of a series of forms in which any noumenon manifests itself in relation to an observer; consciousness being from its very nature immutable can hence neither begin nor end. "The Âtmâ is Jña, eternal consciousness, because it is increate. Eternal consciousness is the nature of the Âṭmâ, just as heat and light are of fire."* (*Ṣaṅkara Bhâshya* on *Ved. Sût. II. iii. 18.*) Moreover, Âtmâ is by definition the opposite of Anâtmâ, matter. The essential nature of matter is its mutability, its capability to evolve into a procession of phenomenal forms; whereas Âtmâ is unchanging. Therefore the beginning or the ending of consciousness is excluded from the very definition of Âtmâ. He may shift his place of illumination from body to body; or rather, a series of bodies may be periodically brought near him and shine by his reflected light, but he is nitya, eternal. Some Bauddha

schools alone, of Indian systems, reject the notion of the continuity of the life of the man's Âtmâ, but Buddhism and Jainism are excluded from this brief survey of Indian thought, only the so-called orthodox schools being included, those that at least nominally admit the prâmâṇya, authority, of the Veda and do not openly denounce it as the followers of the Buddha and the Jina do.

(3) Mind, though an inner organ is material and is other than the Âtmâ.

The mind of man is an organ made of subtle matter and is not immaterial or spiritual but prâkrita, made of matter. Sensation, perception, volition, etc., are in western philosophy called subjective states and treated as non-material. Hindu philosophy analyses them into two factors, viz: (1) a mental process internal but *not* subjective, and (2) consciousness accompanying the process and reflected from the Âtmâ. The first is material and the second immaterial. Mental processes are variously classified in the various schools, the Sâṅkhya attributing to the mind all psychic life, and the Vaiṣeshika regarding it merely as the organ of attention, but all schools are agreed in regarding mind as matter. This apparent paradox of schools of philosophy, essentially idealistic, but holding to the view called materialism in the west, namely the view that mind is matter, has proved a stumbling-block to every western scholar. In western philosophy, the

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clear-cut concept 'consciousness' as we have formulated it above has not been attained ; nor are definite marks attached to the concept 'matter.' Descartes made extension the only characteristic of matter. This "confusion of matter with space", as Clark-Maxwell called it, even Spinoza, the expounder of Descartes, rebelled against. In ordinary thought the so-called properties of matter are made to hang loosely from that concept, and the phrase 'states of consciousness' is held to imply elementary facts incapable of further analysis. When consciousness is eliminated from the facts of psychic life and when it is realized that mental functions are by themselves, jaḍa, unconscious, it ought not to be difficult to understand what the Hindu philosopher means when he says that antaḥkaraṇa is a form of matter. Antaḥkaraṇa literally means, the inner organ as opposed to the outer organs of sensation and action. The jña, the spirit, uses it as an organ, and therfore it must be other than he, 'since there is a knower and an organ of knowledge." (*Nyâya Sûtra III. I. 17.*) This mind is objective to the spirit. He sees it quite as much outside him as he sees his body and the world outside him, whereas the knower cannot place himself outside like a perceived object. Objectivity to the conscious Purusha is the chief mark of matter ; matter and mind possess this characteristic. Another idea involved in the concept 'matter' is its mutability,

its ever-present flux, its capability of evolving in a series of ever-changing phenomena. Antaḥ-karaṇa evolves in ever-changing phenomenal forms (called chittavritti by the Yoga school) like the waves and ripples and eddies on the surface of a lake, unlike the steady light of the Purusha which waxes not nor wanes.

These phenomenal manifestations of matter in a never ending kaleidoscopic flux of forms are subject to time and space; and mental events are both temporal and spatial. They succeed one another in time and are restricted in space to the brain which subserves them. Purusha is neither big nor small; he has no before and after. These spatio-temporal relations of the manifestations of mind are subject to the law of causation. They are prakriti-vikriti, related as cause and effect. But consciousness is a steady light and where there is no change, there can be nothing subject to the relation of cause and effect. Hence if, as modern Psychology admits, mental states are governed by the law of causation, mind is matter, not spirit.

Atomicity—indivisibility and invisibility— is a mark of certain forms of matter according to the Vaiṣeshika philosophers and mind is aṇu, atomic. Âtmâ is vibhu, pervasive, everywhere and nowhere. Consciousness cannot be conceived as being restricted to any part of the body through which it manifests itself; but the mental processes

of cognition, desire, etc., are certainly not "all in all and all in every part," but clearly localized.

Traiguṇya—being possessed of the three Guṇas or fundamental properties, resistance, motion and equilibrium—is the chief characteristic of matter according to the Sâṅkhyas. Whatever resists force, can be moved by it and reaches equilibrium under the action of many forces—that is matter according to this school. Antaḥkaraṇa displays all these characteristics, inertia, excitability and finally equilibrium. But consciousness by itself is not amenable to the influence of external objects. It cannot be quenched ; nor can it be increased by their influence. Hence it is a category quite distinct from mind.

It is difficult to realize mind to be matter, because of the fact that it derives a pseudo-subjectivity on account of its being an inner organ. When our muscles act, our consciousness accompanies the action ; but we can in thought separate the consciousness from the muscular action and realize the latter as a phenomenon of matter that is the non-ego, and all the more easily because in the case of other human beings than ourselves we observe these muscular actions without observing the consciousness that accompanies them. But mental action each man can study only in the operations of his own mind, and as these are accompanied by the light of his own consciousness, the separation of

these two and the appreciation of the difference of the nature of consciousness and of mental action becomes a matter of difficulty.

Plato and Aristotle use such phrases as the "seeing of sight", "the perceiving of perception," the "thinking of thought" to indicate consciousness apart from mental functioning. *Kena Upanishat* uses strikingly similar phrases "what speech does not enlighten, but what enlightens speech," "what one does not think with the mind, but by whom they say the mind is thought", "what one sees not by the eye, but by whom seeing is seen", "what one does not hear by the ear, but by whom hearing is heard," "what none breathes with breath, but by whom breath is breathed, this is Brahma, not what people here worship." (I. *4-8*.) Plotinus, among ancient philosophers first clearly formulated this distinction. "Intelligence is one thing and the apprehension of intelligence is another. And we always perceive intellectually, but we do not always apprehend that we do so." (*Enn. IV. 3. 30*, Trans. Taylor.) This is the first clear indication in European philosophy of the existence of unconscious mental action, and of the idea that our so-called inner life is a complex of two different factors—consciousness and unconscious mental modifications. The idea that consciousness is not a necessary concomitant of mental operations was first clearly enunciated

in modern European philosophy by Leibniz. "As a matter of fact our soul has the power of representing to itself any form of nature whenever the occasion comes for thinking about it, and I think that this activity of our soul is, so far as it expresses some nature, form or essence, properly the idea of the thing. This is in us and is always in us, *whether we are thinking of it or no.*" (*Metaphysics*, Tr. by Montgomery, *P.64.*) "Perception should be carefully distinguished from apperception or consciousness. In this matter the Cartesians have fallen into a serious error, in that they treat as non-existent those perceptions of which we are not conscious." (*Ib : p. 253.*) Sir William Hamilton brought into prominence the conception of unconscious mental modifications. Dr. Schofield, in the opening chapter of his *Unconscious Therapeutics*, attributes the phenomena of hysteria to the power of unconscious mind, and justly complains that the powers of unconscious mind have been unduly neglected by investigators. But it has not struck western thinkers that mind is in itself always unconscions as muscle is always unconscious. Ribot, in *The Diseases of Personality*, uses the fact that the life of the mind is sometimes unconscious, to prove that consciousness is "a simple phenomenon, superadded to the activity of the brain, as an event having its own conditions of existence appearing and disappearing according

to circumstances." (*Ib : p. 4.*) Binet says, consciousness is "capable of disappearing without the corresponding nerve process being altered. Two similar images succeed each other in the mind. It matters little whether we did or did not notice the resemblance, for being similar, they will put a common cell element in vibration. This identity of seat will be sufficient to produce all the results which are produced by a resemblance which is recognised and judged by a conscious comparison." (*Psychology of Reasoning p. 126.*) "The formation of general ideas must take place without the intervention of the cell, in the same manner as suggestion by similarity and for the same reasons, by the sole virtue of the images raised; or in more accurate terms by the effect of the identity of the seat of the particular impression. Images have the property of organizing themselves into general images as they have the property of suggesting similar images." (*Ib: p. 27.*) This is true so far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. *All* psychic life is in itself unconscious, except in so far as the light of consciousness illuminates it and manifests it to the knower. Consciousness is unique; it exists for itself and of itself. Psychic life runs its own course, following its own laws, which are the same as the general laws of matter; this course is not affected by the light of Purusha that is sometimes shed on it thus bringing it with-

in his field of vision. Psychic and physio logical conditions are invariably bound together, both being material functions; consciousness is not a phenomenon or epi-phenomenon of material processes as it exists in its own right, neither beginning nor ending, never increasing, never diminishing. Not so the complex fact, which we have called personal consciousness, made up of the reflection of pure consciousness and of mental functions. All mental functions are in themselves unconscious; when the Purusha turns to them he illuminates them and makes them manifest; otherwise they would remain as unmanifest as the physical world would be in the absence of sentient beings. Mind is a material fact just as a muscle is a material fact. The action of the mind or the muscle may be or may not be accompanied by consciousness. In investigating the action of the mind or the muscle, consciousness has to be eliminated as an alien factor, and mind should be realized to be always unconscious in its own own nature, as muscle is. Western philosophy not thus distinguishing the nature of consciousness to be characteristically different from that of mind has raised an insoluble problem—"what is the relation of conscious mind and unconscious matter? Is it one of interaction, or of parallelism?" Either hypothesis is unthinkable. It is neither possible nor philosophically helpful to imagine that consciousness and modifications

of matter, categories so characteristically apart from each other, can interact or run parallel to each other. Immutability and mutability cannot meet. Mind is matter and mental processes are material modifications. Consciousness may illuminate them, manifest them, or know them, but except this there can be no other relations between them and consciousness. Whether the mind be taken as identical with the nervous system, as western materialists do, or it be constituted of subtle matter as eastern philosophers hold, it is absolutely different from the Purusha that illuminates it; though he may out of ignorance identify himself with it, he is not really identical with it. The disciplines prescribed by the founders of the Darşanas are but means of training a man to realize the nature of the Âtmâ to be different from that of mind. The bondage from which all the Darṣanas except the Pûrva Mîmâṃsa propose to relieve the Âtmâ is that due to adhyâsa, false identification of himself with mind, the consequent pain due to ignorance, and moksha is the actual realization of the difference of these two. Till this difference between the Âtmâ and mind is grasped it is impossible to understand the philosophy of the East.

4 *Psychic Life obeys fixed laws and hence all mental events are determinable.*

As the antaḥkaraṇa is a material organ, its modifications must take place under fixed laws.

All matter obeys the law of causation. Hence every mental event is the resultant of previous events, so that if the causes were known, the effects could be calculated and predicted exactly as in any other sphere of matter. As all schools of Hindu philosophy thus regard mind as a form of matter, the problem of the freedom of the will was never raised in India. The 'will' is a metaphysical entity, that is one of which we cannot form a picture, which, in European philosophy, is supposed to be a factor of the mind and to introduce into phenomena, mental or bodily, a new force which can upset all known causes of those phenomena. Hindu philosophy analyses mental events into cognitions, desires and actions interconnected by causal relations, but does not postulate a will among them. The threefold life of the mind goes on under the triple law of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, but neither the mind itself nor anything extraneous to it can constrain the mind. There is no other *vera causa* of its movements than Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, which are but the conditions of its modifications. Hence the so-called freedom of the will is a myth. That cannot be called free which obeys fixed laws and the course of whose modifications can be calculated beforehand. The mind is no more free than the apple which falls when it is released from the tree which gave it birth. Hence all Indian philosophy is deterministic. It regards

all mental action as reflex; a current of energy (called Prâṇa, the analogue of nervous energy in subtle matter) from without, entering the mind and returning as an action. In the mind, deliberation may intervene between the in-going and out-going currents. During the deliberation, motives floating in the mind or buried deep within it may rise and influence the direction of the return current, but all is calculable, all is determinable. No mental function is "free" in the sense that the well known laws of matter are transcended by them.

The mind is not free, but the Âtmâ may attain freedom from his bondage to mind. Consciousness is involved in most mental and bodily processes. We are generally conscious of our thoughts and motions. In the case of some of them, we can deliberately withdraw our consciousness from them. We can turn our consciousness away from a passing thought or a casual bodily activity; but an intricate train of thought or a complicated co-ordination of muscular contractions perforce drags the consciousness into it. This compulsory involution of the consciousness in mental or bodily life is bondage; the ability to withdraw the consciousness from mental or bodily events, however exciting, or again, the ability to stick to a thought which is being hustled out of the field of consciousness by other thoughts is the freedom which man is to gradually acquire by self-training. Thus

freedom is the goal of human evolution; but this is not freedom of the will, but the liberation of consciousness from being compulsorily mixed up with bodily and mental events. The Mukta, he who has reached perfection, is said to be "free." It is not freedom of the will that he develops, but the freedom from the compulsory interlocking of his conscious self with his mind and his body. He may turn away from matter and thus escape its tyranny, but if he uses a mind, he can do so only by recognizing its laws and by utilizing them by judicious obedience to them just as man uses the forces of the physical world by understanding them and obeying them. In this sense, the greatest God, nay Işvara Himself, is said to be not above the Law of Karma.

The two profoundest thinkers of modern Europe Spinoza and Leibniz had no illusions on the question of free will. "In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause and so on to infinity". (Spinoza, *Ethics*, *18*, *48*, Transl: Elwes.) "All our thoughts and perceptions are but the consequence, contingent it is true, of our precedent thoughts and perceptions, in such a way that were I able to consider directly all that happens or appears to me at the present time, I should be able to see all that will

happen to me or that will ever appear to me". (Leibniz, *Metaphysics*, Transl: Montgomery. *p. 25.*)

The theory of free-will has been re-started in recent western Philosophy by the argument that it is a datum of consciousness. In the interest of this theory Munsterberg has propounded an illogical antithesis between "truth of life" (Free Will) and truth of science (Determinism). The function of Science is to group the facts of life under ideal schemes, and hence there cannot be any antithesis between the two. The new Oxford School of Hmanism, led by Dr F. C. S. Schiller, holds the view that determinism is a postulate, a methodological assumption in the sphere of science, the truth of which is strictly relative to its explanatory function. Similarly freedom is a postulate in the moral sphere with as good a right to exist if it can be used with like profit. But common sense rebels against the adoption of two opposing postulates to explain the same phenomena. The real cause of the difficulty is this:—determinism is a fact of the mental world and freedom, possible or actual, belongs to the sphere of Âtmâ. Western philosophy treats the mind enlightened by the consciousness of the Âtmâ as one single category, whereas a so-called state of consciousness, *i. e.* a psychical event, is a complex of two factors—one unique, at present in bondage but with the possibility of acquiring freedom, and the other, working

under fixed laws. With regard to this mixed category, called personal consciousness, disputes have raged. Some looking at one side of the question have maintained it is free and others have protested against the idea. Hindu philosophy escaped being caught in the vortex of this dispute, because it started with a clear analysis of a psychic state into its constituent elements (1) consciousness and (2) a flux of psychic phenomena and saw, from its inception that freedom as a datum of consciousness, and determinism of the psychic series as a scientific conception are not incompatible, because thy refer to different categories. In popular religious thought, the question is still further confused by the importation into it of alien problems. The problem of evil supposed to be introduced into the world by a personal devil and the idea of the moral responsibility of man for the proper use of powers he was supposed to be gifted with by a personal God have confounded the real philosophical question at issue. The irrepressible anthropomorphism which ruled early human cultures and inspired the ideals of so many world-scriptures erected God into an autocratic Ruler who gave life and human faculties to man and ordered him to use them according to certain ordinances on pain of punishment for violation. But science has abolished this God made in man's image and this divine law

which was but a glorified copy of human laws.

Others maintain that effort depends on free will. Effort is roughly proportional to stimulus, and belongs as much to matter, as force does; for what depends on stimulus from without cannot in any sense be spiritual or free.

A few again fight shy of a frank acceptance of determinism from a fear that it will render impossible man's guiding his self-improvement. This fear is groundless. The supersession of the capricious Gods of nature of the early days by the recognition of natural law in the material Universe has in no wise tended to strangle human efforts to utilize nature for human purposes. So, too, will the recognition of natural law in the mental and moral world not prevent human efforts in mental growth; but on the contrary, it would make self-training intelligent and effective and prove it necessary. Ignorance of the laws of the mental world and a blind faith in its being outside the law of causation can never help effort. On the contrary a knowledge of the conditions of mental life, of what is possible and what is impossible in mental training, and of the means whereby we might co-operate with nature in the evolution of our minds is the best possible help to individual effort for self-improvement.

5 *The five sense-organs and the five action-organs are, like the mind, made of subtle matter.*

5. Subject to the mind are the five Jñânendryas (organs of knowledge) and the five Karmendryas (organs of action). These also are made of subtle matter. The nervous system is the physiological counterpart of these eleven subtle organs, one "internal" and ten "external." They are all made of Sûkshma bhûta, the five kinds of subtle elementary matter to be discussed later on. The organs of knowledge are those of audition, touch, vision, taste and smell. The organs of action are those of speaking, handling, walking, excretion and procreation. These ten organs are conceived as being primarily modifications of invisible subtle matter, which evolve into those of the visible physical body. Their ten functions are controled by ten different subtle lines of force and they are subordinate elements of psychical life, while the functions of the mind are its principal elements. Like the mental functions they enter the field of consciousness only when the light of Âtmâ falls upon them. At first sight it looks like a violation of the law of Parsimony that the senses are conceived as existing both in the physical and super-physical matter. But if it is true, as all Hindu Yogis assert, that the sense functions are exercised by a man separated from the physical body during life or after death, the subtle organs ought to exist separate from the gross ones. The division of muscular functions (Karmendriyas) into five class-

es is against the modern physiological idea that motor impulses of all kinds are one and the same; but so long as physiology has not yet been able to make up its mind as to what a nervous impulse is, it cannot object to the Hindu idea of there being five different kinds of motor impulses in the subtle body.

(6) *The Eleven organs inhere in a Liṅga-deha which is relatively permanent.*

The mind of man and the other ten organs inhere in a body of subtle matter called Liṅgadeha (characteristic body) also called ayonija (nonuterine body) and * subdivided variously into several subtle bodies by the different schools. It is the companion of the Âtmâ during his long wanderings (Saṃsâra) in a kalpa (world period). It is bhûtâşraya, composed of elementary subtle substances. It is also Karmâşraya, the store-house of saṃskâras, potential deposits of man's thoughts, desires and actions. It is the vechicle of his prâṇas, nervous energies of various kinds. The union of Purusha with the Liṅgadeha, during the long period

* Diffierent Schools mention different subtle bodies, intermediate between the permanent lingadeha and the perishable sthûladeha *i.e.* chhâyâ. Yâtanâdeha, etc, perishable bodies that the man is provided with during his post-mortem peregrinations ; but here we are concerned only with the general principles underlying all Hindu Schools and not the special teachings of any particular School.

of his manifested life (K a l p a) is for the purpose of enabling him to experience pleasure and pain (b h o g a) and finally reach a p a v a r g a (emancipation). Pleasure and pain are not primary attributes of physical or psychic life. The action of the outside world on man through the sense organs produces a reaction in the shape of a motor impulse. This motor impulse is a flow of p r â ṇ a towards muscles. This flow if uninterrupted is called pleasure and if interrupted is called pain. Both in normal and morbid conditions pleasure and pain are frequently confounded and people find pleasure in pain and v i c e v e r s a ; thus proving that the flow or interruption of p r â ṇ a is the primary fact and pleasure and pain but an interpretation thereof. This is all in harmony with the Hindu ideas ; but this flow or interruption of energy takes place in the L i ṅ g a d e h a, whose special function is B h o k t ṛ i t v a, capability of subserving sensibility.

The Neo-platonists believed in the existence of a L i ṅ g a d e h a. Plotinus speaks of "a separable portion of the soul," a "common, dual, or composite nature which is the subject in perception," and which is an intermediary between soul and body. (Whittaker's *Neo-platonists*, *pp.* 46-49.) This doctrine dropped out of European philosophy in the darkness of the middle ages. On account of the severance of the Greek philosophic tradition during this period

of the obscuration of European intellectual life it is impossible to find out what the ancients really meant by the terms psyche and mens, nor can we trace the exact correspondence between Greek and Hindu philosophy; only it is certain that the modern English translations of Greek terms are as inadequate as those of Saṃskṛit terms and there was more unity of thought between the ancient Greek and the ancient Indian than the English translations of Greek and Saṃskṛit works indicate.

7. *The Liṅgadeha is periodically connected with a body of flesh.*

This is the Sthûla-deha, the "gross body" by means of which man acts on nature outside him. The addition of this Sthûladeha completes the man. The personal consciousness as already pointed out is the result of the conjunction of the Saṃvit of Purusha, the Bhoktṛitva (sensibility) of the Liṅgadeha and the Kartṛitva (capacity for action) of the body of flesh and blood. While in this body the world offers man pleasures to be enjoyed and pains to be avoided. These call forth his activities in manipulating nature. When he acts on the world he gets a knowledge of the world as object and of himself as actor. The resulting pleasure and pain intensify this knowledge of self as apart from the not-self. Desires and experience of pleasure and pain interact on each other, and he thus establishes relations between himself and other

men. He therefore periodically returns to incarnation for the fruition of his hankerings and the satisfaction of the bonds established between himself and others. When R â g a d v e s h a m (desire and aversion) is transcended, compulsory incarnations cease.

Super-human beings also who normally have but subtle bodies sometimes take birth in human bodies. This is called A v a t â r a, a crossing over of the boundaries that usually separate the currents of human and super-human lives. This may be a voluntary or a compulsory incarnation. Kṛishṇa in the *Bhagavat Gîta* IV. 6-8 says, "Though I am not a being subject to birth and death and the Lord of born beings, I by my wonder-working power enter into p r a k ṛ i t i that is mine and am born in a body. Whenever there is a decay of right action and increase of lawlessness, then I make for myself a body, O Bhârata; for the protection of the well-doers and destruction of ill-doers and the establishment of laws I come to birth age after age." The *Purâṇas* abound in tales of superphysical beings being made to take physical births as a punishment, but an incarnation voluntary or involuntary is a limitation to the being that undergoes it, for while in a physical body, the laws of physical matter cannot be transcended even by the highest. But the body also affords the superphysical being opportunities to hold intercourse

with human beings and affect their destinies in a much surer fashion than otherwise, as is indicated in the Ṣlokas quoted above. If superphysical beings should from their own spheres act directly on the brains of man, it would be at the cost of upsetting the nervous, and hence the mental and moral, equilibrium of the man acted on. Inspired prophets have always been abnormal men in whom pathological conditions have been prominent and to them perfect sanity as we understand it has been impossible because their evolution has been so different from ours. For even an Îṣvara is not omnipotent in the sense that laws of being (material or immaterial) can be suspended by him. The only way He can directly affect human beings is by birth among them as a man. As Antaryâmî (inner controller) he turns the wheel of life; he is onlooker, approver, supporter, enjoyer, greatest sovereign and highest self in the body (*Bhag*: *Gîtâ* XIII. 22), but laws of nature (Prakṛiti) are immutable and she is the root of all mutations and qualities (*Ib*: 13-19).

Avatâra is popularly understood as a "descent" of Îṣvara into mundane regions. This is absurd. Îṣvara is everywhere and hence a "descent" would be to Him an impossible feat. Hindu writers take care to explain that what actually takes place in Avatâras is but the manifestation, generally temporary, of a ray of Him, through the body of an

advanced human being, more than He is manifested in the heart of the ordinary man. Even Kṛishṇa said to be a "full" Avatâra became an ordinary man sometime before his death.

8 *Matter is mutable, but increate and obeys fixed Laws.*

Matter like the Âtmâ is increate and indestructible. Creation ex nihilo and dissolution again into nothingness have been notions always obnoxious to Hindu thinkers. The Saṃskṛit root Sṛij means to pour out, emit, beget and Sṛishṭî means emission or emanation. In the Vedas the self-existent is always spoken of as emitting or emanating matter as well as living beings by means of tapas, meditation. Leibniz among European philosophers agrees with the Hindus in regarding creation "as a kind of emanation just as we produce our thoughts" (*Metaphysics*, tr. Montgomery p. 23). The chief characteristic of matter is that it is dṛîṣya, perceptible, that which becomes an object to the knower. It is jaḍa *i. e.*, its existence could be manifested only by the spirit that is the seer; it is not svayam-prakâṣa, *i e.* it cannot of itself manifest its being. It is prakṛiti-vikṛiti, mutable. It transforms itself into a series of phenomena during a cycle of manifestation (kalpa), each phenomenon being a modification of a previous something and itself soon modified into something else. This susceptibility to

change of name and form, nâmarûpa, as well as its objectivity are the primary characteristics of matter. Matter is also atomic, Bhinnâ, whereas the Âtmâ, cannot be broken up into minute parts. It has three primary characteristics or Guṇas which are the fundamental laws of its being—Tamas, Rajas, and Sattva. In the physical world, Tamas is the property of inertia and sums up the facts that particles of matter or material objects tend to retain their states of motion or rest and offer resistance to any force acting on them. It is the fundamental Law of all beings and is the primary definition of objective existence. Rajas indicates the second property of matter, by which we conceive of it as "not only that which offers resistence to change of motion, but also that which causes change of motion in other portions as of matter: it is not only the object on which force spends itself, it is the seat of this force." (Merz, *Hist. Eur. Thought.* i. 336.) Rajas, therefore, is the Law of Force, embodying the Second fundamental property of matter as it shows itself to our senses. Sattva is the Law of equilibrium by which atoms and molecules, paramâṇus and dvayaṇukas, when they are parts of objects act and react on each other so as to reach equilibrium and to hold together and remain as objects. These three properties of matter, or guṇas as the Hindus call them, follow from the fact

of the existence of material objects. If they have to exist at all they must have those g u ṇ a s, hence they constitute the materiality of matter. They constitute, as it were, three cases of the so-called Law of self-preservation. If we try to imagine a physical world without one of these three g u ṇ as of inertia, force and equilibrium we shall find that our world will dissolve into thin air before our mental vision. Hence they are g u ṇ a s more properly than Laws. This explanation of the action of the three g u ṇ a s in the physical world makes them exactly the same as Newton's famous three Laws of motion. It is being gradually recognised that Newton's Laws are not so much Laws of motion as factors that make up the concept 'matter'. The first and third Laws can scarcely be called Laws of motion. The second is as much a Law of motion as of matter. They are more properly the fundamental properties, g u ṇ a s, of matter, that which differentiates matter from what is not matter. They define matter and indicate the conditions of its manifestation. Matter manifests itself while in motion; that is why they are also called Laws of motion. In the earlier days, motion was regarded sometimes as an e n s r a t i o n i s, sometimes as a thing in itself, because the Cartesian conception of material substance as consisting merely in extension was prevalent. But we can see "that matter without motion is as inconceivable as matter without extension, so that

Descartes' assumption that matter was there first as an inert lump and motion was put into it afterwards is illlegetimate and irrational" (Pollock, *Spinoza his Life and Philosophy*, p. 115).

These three Guṇas condition mental modifications also. Mental events are of three levels, according as cognitions, desires and actions predominate in them. In the lowest level, Tamas, Rajas and Sattva appear automatic action, excited action, and deliberative action. In the level of desire, the three manifest themselves as all-compelling desire, the struggle of motives and Vairâgya, or regulated desire. In the level of cognition, the three Guṇas operate as ignorance, clouded intellect and perfect knowledge. The general tone of the mind, under the influence of these guṇas, is indifference, pain and pleasure. Thus the mind is as traiguṇya, conditioned by the three guṇas, as the body.

Thus we see that the conception of the three Guṇas is the widest and most helpful generalization that has been reached by philosophy. It embraces within its wide sweep all states of perceptible objects and all states of mind that we know of, everything that is mutable, everything that is objective to the Purusha, and binds them in one general concept, Guṇas differentiated into the three conditions of the manifestation of the objective Cosmos. The inertia of physical objects, the

automatism of the mind, its subjection to desire, the failure of its powers of apprehension and insensibility to pleasure and pain are all comprehended under the one word, Tamas. Tamas is literally, 'being choked', hence darkness, and sums up in one word these characteristics and forms one of the conditions of the manifestation of matter. Rajas similarly sums up motion under the constraint of force, excitement, struggle of desires, wrong apprehension and pain. Rajas, literally, the cloudy coloured illumination of the intermediate sphere between the dark earth and the bright heaven, aptly denominates this condition. The common factor of equilibrium, balance, self-control, right apprehension and pleasure is conceived as Sattva, real being.

These three guṇas are not qualities of any substance, but the laws of matter, the modes in which matter can manifest itself. Karl Pearson defines scientific method to consist in "the careful and often laborious classification of facts, in the comparison of their relationships and sequences, and finally in the discovery, by the aid of the disciplined imagination, of a brief statement, or formula, which in a few words resumes a wide range of facts." Such a formula is a scientific law. In this sense, the Guṇas are the fundamental laws of matter. The word, law, associated as it is with the idea of a Law-giver is a rather unsatisfactory word un-

less we, as Lotze says, "give up the customary view according to which the Laws of reality are regarded as a self-subsistent power controlling the real and actual. They are nothing more than general forms of thought in which, a spirit contemplating the course of the world and comparing its different movements might sum up the whole system of it in one brief expression. What is thus briefly expressed is the thing realized by and through the own nature of things themselves, which are what they are and act as they act of themselves, so making it possible for us to comprehend their behaviour as a case of this or that law. Everything which we regard as a law or ordering of the world is just the world's own nature, and it is only our incorrect, though hardly avoidable way of looking at things which represents it as a rule separable therefrom and having already an authority from some other source to which this nature must submit" (*Philosophy of Religion* p. 76). In other words, the activity of matter found the laws and not the laws the activity. The three laws, or Guṇas, condition the manifestation of matter everywhere. What is not matter—Purusha, consciousness—can alone never be affected by the Guṇas, which do not belong to the sphere of the immutable Âtmâ.

That matter is also subject to Space and Time and causality follows from its being atom-

ic in constitution and Traiguṇya in nature. But though the evolution of matter is subject to time, matter itself is indestructible. The individual Purusha may turn from it and ignore it but it ceases not to exist. And when The Lord of the Universe withdraws His energies from it its evolution is but interrupted, for during Pralaya, matter continues to exist as Asat, Avyakta, unmanifested "as the shoot within the seed" (*Ṣaṇkara*).

(9) *The world-history is made up of alternating periods of activity and rest.*

Matter is in a constant state of flux. The largest periodical flux is that of pralaya and kalpa. Pralaya is the period when matter is avyakta, undifferentiated. It cannot then be cognized. The Guṇas are in a state of quiescence. Purushas are then also avyakta, unmanifest. Kalpa is the period of the manifestation of a world, or a system of worlds. Western scholars are of opinion that the doctrine of periodical manifestations and obscurations of the universe did not exist in the earliest period of the *Veda* notwithstanding the assertion of *Rigveda*, V. 190-3, that "Brahmâ created as before." But western scholars are apt to forget that the three *Vedas* are, after all, compilations for purposes of Yajña (sacrifice), and were never intended to be religious treatises; for the matter of that, even the *Upanishads* are

but manuals of U p â s a n a (meditation) and religious doctrines can, if they appear at all in them, do so only by way of allusion. Hence the paucity or even the absence of references to any doctrine in these books cannot by itself be treated as evidence to prove that the doctrine had not been worked out by the ancient thinkers. It was just because the whole of the *Veda*—the former and the latter parts, the portion of ceremonial work and that of meditation, was merely a manual of ritualism that m î m â-ṃ s a s were required to elucidate the theory and practice of the rituals. Therefore there is nothing to disprove the traditional view accepted in India that the doctrine of periodical dissolution and creation belongs to the earliest ages of Indian thought.

Nor is the doctrine so difficult or complicated as to pre-suppose a long previous course of philosophical development. Man naturally works from his own constitution to that of the cosmos. In the earliest savage times he attributed his own thoughts and sentiments to rocks and trees and animals around him. So to-day he extends the conceptions of force and of energy which he is conscious of in his own body to the objects about him and thence seeks to explain the cosmos. Just so, in olden times he extended the daily alternations of activity and sleep of his own body, j â g r a t a and s u s h u p t i to the universe and formulated the ideas of B r a h m â 's activity (K a l p a) and sleep

(pralaya). There is nothing specially modern in this conception that should compel the historian of Hindu thought to assign to it a later age.

Here it must be noted that the word Nitya, usually translated eternal, means not an illimitable future, as is understood in the West. Eternity is but time with its boundaries thrown to a great distance, just as infinite space, is but limited space, but with its bounds thrown far apart. Both phrases are freely used and few realize they are but words without any definite meaning behind them. On the contrary, Hindu philosophy invariably understands by Nitya, up to the end of this kalpa; a şloka of the *Matsya Purâṇa*, says "By immortality (amṛitatva) is meant (life) until the destruction of all beings (i-e. until Pralaya sets in). Immunity from reincarnation is life as long as the three lokas last." Indeed it is meaningless to extend Time, as we know it, into the state, called Pralaya. Time is related to the change of states of a perceiving mind and hence cannot exist, when the minds themselves are no more. The Hindu philosophy divides Kâla (Time) into two classes, Khaṇḍa, and Akhaṇḍa, discrete and continuous. The former alone, is time as we know it. The latter, duration, independent of change of states of mind, we can scarcely understand, since it transcends human experience. *Mait. Up.* vi. 15. says:—"There are two forms of Brahma, Kâla and

A k â l a, Time and No-Time. That which is before the Sun is Akâla, devoid of parts; and that which is subsequent to the Sun is Time, with parts." It is in this sense of A k h a ṇ ḍ a, that kâla is hymned as the source and ruler of all things in *Atharva Veda* xix. 53, 54. and that Kṛishṇa speaking as the Î ṣ v a r a, says in the *Bhag. Gîta* xi. 32, "Time am I, the destroyer of the worlds."

(*10.*) *The subtle elements that make up all objects are five corresponding to the five senses.*

The subtle elements, sûkshma bhûta, are conceived as elementary sensations. Thus smell, taste, light, touch and sound exist in a rudimentary, ethereal form outside man and also in his sensorium. They are called in many schools, t a n m â t r a, lit., that alone, the pure root of sensation. Corresponding to the five senses, there are five t a n m â - tras which by their combinations produce the s t h û l a b h û t a, the objects of the world.

Western Science explains "the ultimate element of material constitution to be an electric charge or nucleus of permanent æthereal strain". "Each sub-atom with its permanent electric charge must be surrounded by a field of permanent or intrinsic æthereal strain, which implies elastic quality in the æthereal instead of complete fluidity; the portion must therefore be in whole or in part a nucleus of intrinsic strain in the æther, a place at which the continuity of the medium has been

broken and cemented together again (to use a crude but effective image) without accurately fitting the parts, so that there is a residual strain all round the place" (Larmor, *Æther and Matter*, *pp*. 26. 27).

Thus have Western Scientists, with extraordinary experimental and mathematical skill, framed a picture of **Â**kâṣa, Æther, modified to serve as the basis of light vibrations. Clerk Maxwell proved light and electricity to be identical, and hence the Æthereal strain charged with electricity is explained as the particular structure that helps us to imagine what corresponds to R û p a t a n - m â t r a or rudimentary light. But no Western Scientist has as yet started the question of what are smell, taste and touch. Are they also strains in the Æther and if they are, what kinds of strains? Most Hindu schools say that they also are modifications of **Â**kâṣa, t a n m â t r a s, roots of sensation, the Vaiṣeshikas only regarding them, as well as light, to be qualities and not modification, of atoms. Thus four different kinds of strains in Æther would be required to explain the roots of these four sensations. Then there is sound, which Hindu Philosophy conceives as a quality or modification of the unstrained, unmodified, non-atomic Âkâṣa. Modern Science explains sound to be vibrations of air. The Hindu idea is that behind the air vibrations there is a modification of Âkâṣa, not

of the kind that constitutes an atom, and this is the basis of sound. There is nothing inherently improbable in this idea that the five sensations are five different modifications of Æther. Outside the human body they exist in a T â m a s a or resisting form and constitute the elements of the Universe. Inside the sense-organs the same Æthereal modifications exist in their S â t v i k a, equilibrated form and hence the man perceives them as sensations. Western Science pictures the external causes of the various sensations as modes of vibration. This has led to the insoluble problem, how can a vibration outside the body become a sensation after it impinges on a nerve. To conceive of light or sound as vibrations as the physicist does, helps him to investigate their properties, but from thence to assert that the vibration is a fact, a noumenon, a reality independent of our thought, and that the sensation is a phenomenal representation of this fact by consciousness to itself is absolutely unphilosophical. For vibration is but a concept of the mind manufactured from experience of the motion of our bodies and itself but a phenomenal representation. It is equally unphilosophical to talk of consciousness responding to vibrations in the forms of sensations. This is (in the words of the *Yoga Sûtras*) a v i k a l p a, a form of words without any fact corresponding to them (I. 9.) The only idea we can attach to conscious-

ness is, as Hindu Philosophy points out, that of enlightener, what manifests or illumines that whose existence would otherwise be unmanifest. To speak of consciousness as responding to vibration is to attribute activity to that which cannot be conceived as acting. It is not an active agent, a manipulator of vibration into a sensation, a déus ex machina that mysteriously changes a vibration, a harmonious displacement of molecules of matter into a taste, a smell, etc. Such an explanation is metaphysics in the worst sense of the word —the use of language to conceal ignorance and not to clarify thought. Consciousness can enlighten, render conscious, make the man know what would otherwise be unconscious sensation, unknown to him, but it is impossible to imagine how it can respond to, *i. e.*, change itself, in the form of a sensation, when a vibration falls on it. The physical explanation of sensation that "sound light, heat, electricity and even the nervous influx" is due to "vibratory movements, varying only by their direction and their periods" is, as Binet lucidly points out, "but an artifice, a symbol or a process convenient for classification in order to combine the very different qualities of things in one unifying synthesis—a process having the same theoretical value as a memoria technica, which, by substituting letters for figures, helps us to retain the latter in our minds. This does not

mean that figures are, in fact, letters, but it is a convenient substitution which has a practical advantage" (*The Mind and the Brain*, p. 33). Motion is not less of a phenomenon, more of a reality than the five sensations, but is more easily capable of measurement. Otherwise the physicist can conceivably explain all sensations and motions, *i. e.* all phenomena in terms of form, or, as the Hindu mystic does, in terms of sound. From a philosophical standpoint it is a mere accident that our visual and muscular sensations seem to have acquired such a supreme importance that we invent theories explaining other sensations by imaginary visual and muscular events. But it is as valid to explain a sound as a vibration, as to explain a motion as a sound. "To measure the length of a body instead of applying to it a yard wand, one might listen to its sound ; for the pitch of the sound given by two cords allows us to deduce their difference of length, and even the absolute length of each," (*Ib.* p. 4.) Thus all scientific theories may be reconstructed in terms of auditory events, and sound held to be the parent of all material form; and we may understand why the Hindu calls sound (nâda), the first manifestation of the unmanifested. Hence the idea that vibration is an ultimate fact and sensations are its phenomenal forms, though it underlies all modern European thought, is philosophically absurd.

Moreover to say that a vibration affects consciousness is to attribute mutability to that which is immutable. The Hindu explanation is at least intelligible. Sensation is the same outside the body as it is inside the body. But inside the body it is illuminated by the conscious subject, who is then said to "know", and till it is known it is what we may call "unconscious sensation." Sensation exists outside the body as sensation and the five sensations by their combination constitute the objects of the world. It is in this sense that they are the five elements of the world. Hence also is the world perceptible by a mind. Thus sound inside the auditorium or in the universe, is but a special modification of Â k â ş a. The perceiving organ of audition and the perceived object, sound, are of the same nature, both being Â k â ṣ a or Ṣ a b d a t a n m â t r a, pure sensation of sound ; only Â k â ş a outside the body is not pure, unmixed, like the one in the organ of hearing, but compounded with air, etc., and hence the Ṣ a b d a (the essence of sound) in the external Â k a ş a before it can reach the hearer must first be manifested as n â d a or d h v a n i, or vibrations of air. As a commentator on Jaimini's *Mimâṃsa Sûtras*, I. 13, says, "the still atmosphere which interferes with the perception of sound, is removed by the conjunctions and disjunctions of air (undulations, v î c h î - t a r a ṅ g a) issuing from the speaker's

mouth and thus sound becomes perceptible." Similarly in the case of the other senses cognition is rendered possible by the fact that the same substance exists inside the sense-organ as in the outside world. These are the five elements, so much misunderstood and hence ridiculed. This Hindu view of the existence of five t a n m â t r a s or five elements or five modifications of Æther to account for the five sensations and five s e n s i b i l i a is not as all opposed to reason or to modern ways of thought.

11. All energy in the Universe is personal, i. e. bound up with consciousness, though of varying degrees of intensity.

Besides consciousness and unconscious matter, the great generalization made from the phenomena of the universe is Energy. Energy is the link between these two. The only manifestation of energy of which we have first hand knowledge is the energy we expend in re-acting on the objects around us by changing their position or conditions. Hence when we observe bodies altering shape or position, we infer that some energy has been acting on them. That the manifestation of energy in the world other than by animals is not accompanied by any degree of consciousness is what is called the mechanical view of the world, and this view dominates modern thought. The opposite view, that all manifestation of energy in the universe

proceeds from conscious beings, visible or invisible, is the animistic theory of the cosmos, the adhidaivata explanation of it accepted by all Indian schools of philosophy. Of these theories the adhidaivata theory is certainly the more plausible, for the conscious exertion of energy by us is a concrete reality of our lives, whereas the idea of energy unaccompanied by consciousness is only an abstraction from our experience. The mechanical theory, like Euclid's theory of space, has been a concept of much assistance in understanding the cosmos, but neither theory is a percept of the world of experience. The extraordinary growth of modern science inspired by the mechanical explanation of the universe has made people forget that it is an abstraction and not a reality of conscious experience.

Of this trio, Consciousness, Energy and Matter, one view isolates Consciousness as Real Being and regards Matter and Energy as being prakṛiti or object. This is the view of the *Bhagavadgitâ*, vii. 4—6:–"My atomic Prakṛiti eightfold, is Earth, Water, Fire, Âkâṣa, Manas, Buddhi and Ahaṃkâra. This is the lower; learn now, O mighty armed, my Prakṛiti, higher than this, that which becomes living (Jîva) and by which the Universe is upheld. Know that these two are the wombs of all beings." Another view isolates Prakṛiti, and regards consciousness and Ṣakti,

or Energy, often personified as Ambikâ, the world-mother, as the chief factor of the cosmos. As the opening stanza of *Ânandalahari* says "Ṣiva can create only when united with Ṣakti." This is the Ṣâkta view that has affected later Hindu thought so much. The view that modern science has evolved, which makes Nature, that is, Matter moved by Energy, the reality behind the Universe to the entire exclusion or neglect of Consciousness is nowhere represented in Hindu thought; for all Hindu Philosophy is animistic. Even the Sankhya, Yoga, Purvamîmâṃsa and Vaiṣeshika Sûtras, which ignore a Supreme Real Being—Parabrahma or even a moral Governor of the Universe, accept this scheme of the Adhidaivata hierarchies, troops of gods (devas and asuras) that inhere in nature and cause its operations. These gods are, some of them at least, not spiritually or morally higher than man; for man is the microcosm in whom all the elements of the cosmos exist. Himself is the Purusha; his mind, sense organs and action organs represent the various devas, and his bodies represent the subtle and the differentiated elements. Hence the Universe is represented in him in miniature. But the gods, though the field of their operations is much larger, are parts of the macrocosm. They have each one element to deal with and one kind of organ to control it by; nor are many of them capable of the high moral and

intellectual advancement that man can attain to. The animistic theory prevails in crude forms among the savage races of the world. Hence the West regards it as a theory fit only for savages, but the true philosopher does not estimate the value of philosophical theories from feelings of racial superiority. The modern impatience with animism is but a phase of the materialism that has obsessed the Western mind; and surely an idealistic savage may have better intuitions than one who is the flower of modern civilisation but blighted by the canker of materialism. The prejudice against animism is, like the prejudice against determinism, due to a feeling that the conduct of conscious beings must be capricious irreducible to fixed laws.

But conduct of man or of nature, depending as it does on mind and body, takes place always according to fixed laws. The informing consciousness that accompanies it either in the human body or in Nature has no power to make it fitful or unamenable to the eternal Laws of matter. Hence the unerring mechanism of Nature's operations is quite compatible with its being enlightened by the conciousness of the gods.

The name animism is an unfortunate one suggesting as it does, totemism and similar associations. But the theory that personality of various kinds or degrees underlies all operations of Nature

is not at all crude. Many of the greatest thinkers of the world have accepted and expounded it, some admitting one Personal God, and others assuming many personal beings, calling them Gods, Angels, Powers, D e v a s, A s u r a s, etc. Materialism alone opposes it.

Leibniz, who shared with Newton the honour of presiding at the birth of modern scientific thought, perceived the danger of that thought lapsing into a forgetfulness of the intelligence behind nature and vigorously protested against it. In section 19 of his *Metaphysics* he acknowledges the validity of the mechanical explanation of nature so far as it goes, but adds that to neglect totally the intelligence behind nature would be " as if, in order to account for the capture of an important place by a prince, the historian should say it was caused by the particles of powder in the cannon having been touched by a spark of fire expanded with a rapidity capable of pushing a hard, solid body against the walls of the place, while the little particles, which compose the brass of the cannon, were so well interlaced that they did not separate under this impact,—as if he should account for it in this way instead of making us see how the foresight of the conqueror brought him to choose the time and proper means, and how his ability surmounted all obstacles " (*Ib.* p. 35). Leibniz uses this argument to establish the intelligence of the one God behind nature, but it does

not affect the argument if to that one supreme intelligence be added many subordinate intelligences. Animism, then, is not so terribly primitive a conception as it is said to be.

12. This energy is P r â ṇ a, which is intermediate between spirit and matter.

Western science conceives all forms of energy as motion, molar or molecular. We must remember that this picture of energy of all forms as motion is not a reality independent of our mind. It is a concept formed by us to help our halting thought to deal with the various physical phenomena which we desire to bind into one notion, and is not necessarily true outside the world of ideas. Hindu philosophy regards P r â ṇ a and not motion as the fundamental energy of the cosmos. P r â ṇ a is conceived as a power coming from or started by the P u r u s h a and acting on matter. This conception of P r â ṇ a as power charged with consciousness which manifests itself as energy when it acts on matter and thus becomes visible outside the P u r u s h a is a necessary corollary of the A d h i d a i v a t a explanation of the world.

The S â ṅ k h y a cannot admit that P r â ṇ a can start from the P u r u s h a. The utmost that this school and the allied school of Y o g a would allow is that P r â ṇ a starts into activity in matter when there is a union of P u r u s h a and P r a k ṛ i t i.

If nature-powers (D e v a s) exist behind

nature all her energy must ultimately be immaterial in origin. The energy exerted by an animal or a man is primarily nervous energy. All the energy of animals is nervous energy till it leaves the muscles and acts on outside objects. This nervous energy is called Prâṇa. Western Science has for a hundred years unsuccessfully tried to explain nervous energy as a form of mechanical motion; Eastern Philosophy reverses the process and derives mechanical motion from Prâṇa, or energy accompanied by consciousness.

Prâṇa, corresponds to the Psychikon pneuma, animal spirits, of Greek philosophy, a category which is intermediate between spirit and matter, and brings them into relation with each other. Matter is ever changing, always in a state of flux. Purusha is immutable. He reflected, "What is it by whose departure I shall depart (from the body), by establishing whom (in it) I shall remain established (in it)? He emitted Prâṇa" (*Pras. Up. VI. 3-4*) as his empirical representative. Matter is atomic and unconscious; Prâṇa is continuous, that is, not discrete, and charged, as it were, with the consciousness of the Purusha. Purusha being above space, cannot himself move or be the direct cause of motion in matter. Prâṇa is spoken of as Vâyu or air, for air is the best symbol of an immaterial something which is the cause of motion, but is not at the same time pure

spirit. The energy of the Universe is but the Prâṇa of cosmic beings. Prâṇa is Ṣakti regarded as a material fact and not as conscious somebody. Being an intermediate category between Âtmâ and matter it partakes of the nature of both. It is capable of more or less, like matter, and is at the same time accompanied by consciousness. It connects as a bridge Âtmâ and matter whose characteristics are so opposed to each other that to speak of their union or their interaction will be as absurd as to say that linear magnitude is mixed with whiteness. Students of European philosophy are familiar with the difficulties of the connection of body and mind. This intermediate category solves all such difficulties.

This doctrine of Universal Prâṇa is developed in the Upanishad and Âgama literature and not fully worked out in the other Darşanas. It is not incompatible with their special points of view, but is not discussed by them because the Darşanas concern themselves with the discipline that they advocate, and do not refer to theories not immediately connected with the special mental training they prescribe.

13. The Law of causation — Karma — is supreme in the physical and mental worlds.

The Law of Karma is the supreme law under which the manifested Universe works. The binding nature of the relation of cause and effect

is part of the conception of the Prakṛiti. Both the physical and mental worlds being evolved from matter come under this Law. All beings that possess bodies, even if it be the highest being incarnated cannot be independent of this Law. The free spirit that has reached the self-realization, is alone above it, for spirit being immutable is "free". The fundamental idea of the Law of Karma is this. Every mental or physical process, every thought, desire, or force exerted on bodies is followed by a consequence which when not immediately visible, is called Apûrva, Adrishṭa, whose nearest English equivalent is "potential energy," which manifests itself when suitable conditions arise.

"The experiences of the seen (physical world) and the unseen (subtle worlds) have their resting place in Karma and their root in Kleşa (the afflictions of ignorance, egoism, etc.); as long as the root exists it fructifies as birth (in human or non-human bodies), life (therein), and experiences (pleasurable or painful). They lead to joy or grief according as they originate in good or evil" (*Yoga Sût.* ii. 12-14). Every experience is a Saṃskâra, a modification of the subtle body, which has a tendency to reproduce itself; and every man is "bound" by the Saṃskâras. They form the atmosphere which must influence the course of his thoughts, desires, and deeds in the present. It is not

every one of the S a ṃ s k â r a s that can operate every minute of his life. For potential energy can become kinetic only when the proper conditions present themselves. That portion of a man's past that is operative in influencing a man's mind and the course of his experiences during an incarnation is called p r â r a b d h a (lit : begun to act). Those that yet lie deep within the inner recesses of his l i ṅ g a d e h a and have not yet begun to manifest themselves during an incarnation are called s a ṃ c h i t a (accumulated), while every present act, every present thought, every present desire becomes stored in his subtle body as a g â m i (augmentative), which goes to enrich his atmopshere of Karma and will react on him in the future.

The present course of a man's life, the circumstances in which he finds himself, the pleasures and pains that will reach him, the thoughts and desires that will rise in his mind and the actions that he will be constrained to do, all depend upon p r â r a b d h a. The Law of Karma* reigns supreme in the mental and physical worlds.

Hence all schools of Hindu philosophy are rigid-

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* An oft quoted ṣloka shows the use of Karma as one of the names of the universal cause against which use some scholars have protested. "He, whom Ṣ a i v a s worship as Ṣ i v a, V e d â n t î s as B r a h m a, Buddhists as B u d d h a, the N a i y â i k a s skilled in proof, as the Creator, those that delight in the J a i n a scriptures as A r h a n, the M i m â ṃ s a k a s as Karma, may he, H a r i, the Lord of the three worlds, give us the fruits of our desires.

ly deterministic. Man is not free but bound by his past conduct, is absolutely determined by the desires that operate on the mind and the prârabdha determines what desires should rise under any given combination of circumstances. Desires, actions, even the mind, being all material processes, the supreme Law of matter—the Law of causation—inviolably constrains man. Even the mukta, the liberated man must experience his prârabdha Karma.

(*14*) *Saṃsara, the course of Karma, is anâdi, had no beginning.*

Karma, the sum total of causes, that remains potential during a period of pralaya and manifests at the beginning of a world-period (Kalpa) is described as Anâdi, beginningless. Anâdi is defined in the Hindu books to be "like a flowing stream whose origin beyond the circle of vision is unknown." In tracing events to their causes we can push back our inquiries up to the point when the present world manifestation began. Beyond that point, it will neither be possible nor profitable to trace the current of causes. It is unphilosophical to assume that these currents must have started at some past point of time, for there are no grounds for such assumption. We know that matter is in constant flux under the Law of causation; but cannot think that there was a period when there was no such flux. If it

did not exist at some past point of time it could not at all have been originated. Hence the course of Karma is A n â d i, has always existed.

So too, M û l a p r a k ṛ i t i, causal matter, whether it be the non-existent Nescience of the A d v a i t a, or the germ of objectivity of the other schools. The individual spirits (j î v â t m â) too are A n â d i, for if they did not exist at any time no cause could have arisen to bring them into being. The B r â h m a ṇ a s and the U p a n i s h a d s very frequently speak of a beginning—A g r a. This A g r a always means, before the present Kalpa—world-period—and no more. A n â d i does not mean eternal. Hindu books speak of two kinds of beginninglessness, (1) A j a n y a t v a r û p a a n â d i t v a, beginninglessness of the kind of never having been born. This belongs only to Absolute Being. (2) P r a v â h a a n â d i t v a, the beginninglessness of a flood, above explained. All Hindu speculations about N i t y a t v a, enternity, ought to be understood only in the second sense; thus the N i t y a m u k t a s, eternally free beings, of the R â m â n u j î y a s are those who were 'free' at the beginning of this K a l p a and the N i t y a n â r a k i k a s the eternally damned, of the M â d h v a s are those who will remain "bound" at the end of this K a l p a.

(*15*) *Moksha is the goal of human life and results from the training of the mind and hence reaching Moksha is a mental event.*

All human beings are baddha, bound, by the course of karma, the causes they have set going, also by the laws of the matter that constitutes their minds and bodies. The object of philosophy is to teach them to escape this bondage and to lead a life uninterrupted by compulsory incarnations. When this is transcended, man is mukta, emancipated. So long as the conscious spirit does not realise its nature and identifies itself with its body or its mind, it is not free. So long as the man's life is but the life of the material body and the material mind, which act according to fixed laws, all life is bondage.

What, then, is moksha, the state of freedom to attain which is the true goal of human life? The constant unbroken recognition of the difference between the nature of spirit and of matter, the knowledge that the operations of mind are foreign to, outside of, the real man, the consequent freedom of the spirit from involution into psychic life, and the perfection to which man may bring his mind by knowing the laws of its working. In the physical universe the modern scientific man conquers nature by obeying and utilizing its laws; the same the mukta does in the psychical world. The training for moksha therefore is a process of knowledge, a process of "discrimination of Purusha from Prakṛiti Âtmâ from Anâtmâ." As the Saṃskṛit aphorism has it, "Jñânâdevatu kaivalyam," liberation is

through knowledge alone. One necessary concomitant of the realization of man's true nature as a spiritual being is "deathlessness." For when he knows himself to be not his body but the immutable Â t m â, "the Lord of death runs away" from him, for the Lord of death has control over bodies alone and not over the eternal Â t m â. Another concomitant of the discrimination of man's real being from the unreal phenomenal forms of matter is the cessation of pain (d u ḥ k h a, k l e ṣ a, t â p a.) Pleasure and pain and are but interpretations by B u d d h i of incidents of the flow of P r â ṇ a in the subtle bodies. Hence when the spirit, after his long weary pilgrimage, knows himself to be other than the subtle body or the mind, he feels pleasure and pain to be outside him. Life is no more a ceaseless storm of desires tossing the helpless mind about; the long pilgrimage of man is over; no more under the sway of something external to him, but self-ruled, self-determined, he reaches supreme peace.

This discussion of the common points of all the Hindu D a r ṣ a n a s, however brief, shows that they are practically agreed in regard to all vital questions regarding the constitution of man, the constitution of the cosmos, and the lines of the past and the future evolution of humanity. It is impossible to point out such a surprising unanimity among the sects of any other religion, or the schools

of philosophy of any other nation in the world. Hence it is that neither the extraordinary complexity of the subdivisions of sects that so distract the inquirer, nor the great changes of ritual and external manifestations of religion that the Hindu D h a r m a has undergone during the many thousands of years it has swayed the lives of the Indian peoples, nor again the impacts of the diverse foreign cults that have at various times assailed it, have at all impaired its vitality, but have only helped to show that it rests on the bed rock of truth, and will continue to prevail in the distant future when many modern philosophies will have been forgotten.

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CHAPTER II.

METAPHYSICS.

EVER Since man began to think about the relations between himself and the world about him and to distinguish the hosts of passing phenomenal forms from the possible permanent nonmenon of which these forms may be temporary modifications, he has followed two different and opposed tendencies of thought, which may be called individualistic and monistic.

The first tendency is inspired by the ineffaceable sense of continuous personal existence which men feel and which refuses to be abolished under any circumstances. The other is the equally potent intuition which men have of the unity of all things, of the oneness of the life that pulsates in all beings. Hence philosophy has grown in two directions—two opposing theories have been advocated by thinkers—one in which the individual man is declared a real permanent factor of the cosmos, the other in which the manifold world is conceived as aspects of one Reality—whether that reality be a conscious Brahma, or unintelligent Nature. These latter theories are rightly called monistic; but the

name dualism usually applied to the former is scarcely accurate, for they recognise, not two, but at least as many real Beings as there are human individuals, besides the real substances behind nature. Hence the name individualistic or pluralistic seems to be a more correct designation of these theories.

Kṛishṇa, in the *Bhagavad Gîta*, ii. 3, divides men into two classes—Sâṅkhyas and Yogîs, those fit for J ñ â n a yoga and those fit for K a r m a yoga.* To the former, meditation on the Self appeals; the latter prefer a life of action, one of loving service of the Lord of the Universe, or of some monistic abstraction, like the humanity of the Positivists. This difference between these two classes of men seems to be due to the preponderance of the representative or the affective elements of psychic life, of 'intellect' or of 'will' as Schopenhauer calls them. "If the normal man is made up of two-thirds will and one-third intellect, the man of genius consists of two-thirds intellect and one third 'will' (Schop. "*On the Primacy of the Will.* Quot. by Ribot. *Psych. of Emot.*, page, 390). The names Sâṅkhyas and Yogîs given above to these two classes of men have nothing to do with the

* The words Sâṅkhya yoga and Karma yoga as used by Kṛishṇa are generally misunderstood. The former not only means intellectual discipline, but also includes the Yoga of Patañjali: whereas the latter includes what are understood as the religion of humanity and as theism in Europe.

Schools of Philosophy, so called, but only imply that the former are inclined to the discipline of Contemplation and the latter to that of Effort; abstract thought attracts the former, concrete images the latter. In India, as in other countries, both kinds of philosophical theories have been expounded and vigorously upheld by their followers; those called Vaişeshika, Nyâya, Sâṅkhya and Yoga are individualistic: whereas those schools of thought which are derived from the *Upanishads* and *Âgamas* are directly or indirectly monistic. In this and the succeeding chapters the different metaphysical, cosmological and psychological theories of these schools as propounded in their earliest available expositions will be discussed. In later Indian philosophy, the doctrines of the sharply distinguished lines of thought of the six Darşanas have been mixed up. Hence, the original Sûtras or Kârikas will be quoted as far as possible, and the commentaries will be, as a rule, avoided, for they were made by later thinkers who mixed up the ideas of the different schools, partly because in their days, the Vedânta came to be regarded as the final truth, and partly because the absence of a historical spirit made it impossible for them to expound accurately the ideas of schools which were widely divergent from their point of view.

Metaphysics attempts to answer the question :—

what is the ultimate reality behind the changing phenomena of the Cosmos? Phenomenon means showing, n â m a r û p a, name and form, and pre-supposes a noumenon, or "thing as such," which shows itself as phenomena. How many noumena are necessary to explain the Cosmos, and what is the essential nature of each noumenon are the fundamental problems of metaphysics; and these have been solved variously in India as in the West.

The Vedânta* believes the ultimate independent Reality to be One—P a r a m-B r a h m a. The Sâṅkhya and the Yoga schools posit two noumena, P u r u s h a and P r a k ṛ i t i, to produce the Cosmos. The schools of the Vaishṇavas and the Ṣaivas postulate the t a t t v a t r a y a–three ultimate realities, the Lord, the individual and the unconscious (matter). The Ṣâktas also admit three, which they conceive as the absolute consciousness, the active consciousness and matter. The Nyâya and Vaiṣeshika schools predicate no less than nine ultimate d r a v y a s (substances) which unite to produce the manifested worlds. We shall briefly discuss the metaphyical theories of each of these schools.

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* It is unfortunate that the woıd Vedânta means different things to different Indians. In this book it is invariably used to mean the doctrines of the *Upanishads*, the *Bhagavad Gîtâ* and the *Sûtras* irrespective of the sectarian differences found in the Bhâshyas.

Section I. *Vedânta.*

The *Vedânta* teaches that there is but one Reality behind the world of matter and of individual beings and that is Param Brahma. The earliest attempt to describe the Supreme Being, the one Reality that underlies what we call spirit and what we call matter is the well-known *Nâsadîya Sûkta, Rig-Veda X. 129.* "Then Asat (proto-matter) did not exist. Sat (manifested being) did not exist. There was no air nor sky above. What enveloped (all)? Where, in whose protection? Was it water, the profound darkness? Death was not, nor immortality. There was no differentiation of night or day. That one breathed without breath, self-supported. There was nothing different from or above it. In the beginning darkness existed, enveloped by darkness. Undifferentiated was all this. That one which lay void wrapped in Nothingness was developed by the power of meditation." This is a description of the one Reality during the period of world-repose—Pralaya. Now follows a description of the same during the world-activity, Kalpa. "I will propound to you the Jñeyam (that which is to be known) knowing which one tastes deathlessness, the Supreme Brahma. It is called not Sat and not Asat. It has hands and feet in every direction, eyes, heads, and mouths on all sides, ears everywhere. It stands enveloping all things in the world. Devoid of all organs, it

shines with the functions of all organs. It is unattached, yet the supporter of all. Without G u ṇ a s, yet enjoyer of G u ṇ a s. It is without and within all beings. It is movable and withal immovable. It is unknowable on account of its subtleness. It is far and near. Indivisible, yet dwelling amidst beings as if divided. It is to be known as the supporter of all beings, their devourer and generator. It is the Light of Lights, is said to be beyond Darkness. This j ñ e y a m is consciousness seated in the hearts of all, and is to be reached by consciousness" (*Bhag. Gîtâ*, xiii. 12—17). "Root above, branch below, Aṣvattha they call it, indestructible, whose leaves are hymns; who knows it is the knower of V e d a. Downwards and upwards spread forth its branches, nurtured by the G u ṇ a s, the sense-objects its twigs. Downward its roots stretch, the bonds of action in the world of men. Its form is not here beheld, nor its end, nor the beginning, nor its foundation. This Aṣvattha of well grown roots with the strong weapon of dis-passion having cut down, then the path has to be trodden, which having reached, no one returns. I follow indeed that primal P u r u s h a whence has streamed forth the ancient energy" (*Ib.XV.* 1-4).

He is not A s a t (the root of matter) for "There is no other seer than He, there is no other hearer than He, there is no other perceiver than He, there is no other knower than He. In that A k s h a r a

(imperishable), then, O Gârgî, the A k â ş a is woven, like warp and woof" (*Brih. Up. II.* viii.-11). He is not S a t (manifested being), for "That, verily, O Gârgî, the Brâhmaṇas call A k s h a r a, not gross, not minute, not short, not long, not red, not fluid, without shadow, not dark, without air, without A k â ş a, not attached, without taste, or smell, without ears or eyes, without speech, without m a n a s, without seed, without P r â ṇ a, without mouth, without measure, having no inside or outside, it does not consume any thing, nothing does consume it," (*Ib. III. viii. 8.*) He is above the three limitations of space, time and causality (D e s a k â l a n i m i t t a). "This Brahma has no earlier or later, no inside or outside" (*Ib. II. v. 19*). "Beyond good, beyond evil, beyond what is made, beyond what is not made, beyond what has been, beyond what shall be" (*Kaṭh. Up.* ii-*14*). This Supreme Being is creator in the sense that he emitted matter and then entered it as its soul. "He wished, may I be many, may I propagate. He meditated. After he meditated, he emitted all this, whatever there is. Having emitted it, He entered it. Having entered it he became S a t (Being) and T y a t (? Non-Being), defined and undefined, supported and unsupported, consciousness and unconsciousness, reality and unreality. The Reality became all this whatsoever. That is Truth, they say" (*Tait. Up. II. 6*).

P a r a m B r a h m a, the one Reality is thus the

one behind unconscious matter, the one behind all p u r u s h a s (conscious beings). He is the immutable Being underlying the various manifestations of conscious lives due to the union of innumerable p u r u s h a s with forms of matter. Unlike them, he is the Enjoyer without means of enjoyment, the Seer without an organ of vision, the Actor without organs of action. He is the source of the Energy that plays in the Universe. He is the matter of which the worlds are made, as well as the maker of these worlds. He is the Inspirer of all actions of all beings and yet the Dispenser of the fruits of those actions.

The V e d â n t a Sû t r a s of Bâdarâyaṇa were intended as a *Mîmâṃsa*, an exegesis, embodying the principles of interpretation to be applied to the *Upanishads.* These latter being manuals of meditation, Bâdarâyaṇa proposes to teach by his S û t r a s how the various symbols and words used by the Ṛishis have to be interpreted, and how meditation is to be practised. The V e d â n t a S û t r a s do not primarily constitute a manual of philosophy so much as a manual of exegesis. Incidentally, Bâdarâyaṇa attacks the other disciplines prevalent in his days, like the *Sâṅkhya*, the *Vaiṣeshika*, the *Bauddha*, the *Bhâgavata*, the *Pâşupata*, etc. and proves their philosophical implications to be opposed to the revealed Ṣ r u t i and to reason. In philosophical ussicn which is so common in India, solitary sen-

tences of the *Upanishads* or the Sûtras of the *Uttara Mîmâṃsa* embodying philosophical doctrines are frequently quoted ; hence people imagine that these are philosophical works. It is time that they are recognised not to be such, but that the former are manuals of Upâsana, heterogeneous collections of various methods of meditation, advocated and practised in ancient India, and of utterances embodying mystic experiences while in an exegesis or state of ecstasy, and the latter, but a manual of the same. Nor are the Sûtras complete in the sense that they contain unmistakeably Bâdarayâṇa's ideas. For the word Sûtra means a thread. The Sûtras are series of single words, or phrases, or sentences, on which were hung the explanations and lectures of the Ṛishis to their disciples and were a sort of *memoria technica* intended to remind the disciples of the teachings of the Master. In many aphorisms, neither the subject treated of, nor what is predicated, is at all referred to ; e. g. " From connection " (*Ved. Sut. I. iv. 15*) ; " On account of the connected meaning of the sentences " (*Ib. I. iv. 19*). In course of time the lectures were lost, the 'threads', alone remained, without the pearls, lending themselves to the ingenuity of the commentators to hang whatever they liked on the Sûtras; this and the wonderful dialectic skill of the Âchâryas have in the case of the Vedânta Sûtras made it all but impossible for an unsecta-

n investigator to find out exactly the opinions of Bâdarâyaṇa on many points.

Yet there is no ambiguity about the fundamental position of the Vedânta Sûtras. "Then therefore the enquiry into Brahma. From which the origin, etc. of this (Cosmos). From being the source of the Scripture. That, again, from its close connection. From seeing (*i. e.* consciousness) being attributed to the cause of the world, unconscious matter is not (the cause; for it is) unscriptural" (*Ved. Sût.* I. i. 1. 5). The reality behind the Cosmos is thus a conscious Being. The Sûtras then explain that this Being is referred to in the *Upanishads* for purposes of Upâsana (meditation) by various personal names—Ânandamaya, the Blissful person (*Ib.* I. i. 12-19), Hiraṇmaya Purusha, Golden person (in the Sun), Akshipurusha, person within the eye (*Ib.* i. i. 20), Manomaya, he who consists of mind (*Ib.* I. ii. 1-8), etc.; this Being is also referred to in the *Upanishads* by names of material substances—Akâṣa (*Ib.* I. i. 22), Prâṇa (*Ib.* I. i.-23), Jyotis, light (*Ib.* I. i. 24-27), etc.

This Brahma is the operative (Nimitta) cause of the world. "He is declared as described to be the cause with regard to Akâṣa, etc.' (*Ib.* I. iv. 14). Because the world is called (His work)" (*Ib.* I. iv. 16). He is also the material

cause of the world. "The material cause also. on account of its not being in conflict with the pro-missory statements and the illustrative instances" (*Ib.* I. iv. 23). But he is formless. "He is without form verily, that being the most important. (He is) as consisting of Light (which manifests forms), (this discription) being not devoid (of meaning)" (*Ib.* III. ii. 14-15). "For this very reason (are used) comparisons such as (images) of the sun, etc." (*Ib.* III. ii. 18). "He is a v y a k t a, undifferentiat-ed, so (the scripture) says. But (He is apprehen-ded) by propitiation, according to p r a t y a k s h a and a n u m â n a" (*Ib.* III. ii. 23).

He is the Supreme, though he is described in the *Vedas* by means of phrases indicative of limitations of place, as a bank (s e t u), a boundary etc. "On account of the designation of bank, measure, connection, and separation, (in the Ṣ r u t i), one might think there is some thing higher than He; but (it is not so, for He is only called a s e t u) on account of some resemblance (between a bank and Him). (Such phrases only) subserve the purposes of the mind; as when we speak of his four feet. (The statements of connection and difference) are due to difference of place, as in the case of light, etc. (being spoken of as shining in particular places, though all pervasive) and on account of the possibility (of only this sort of connection between Him and other existences).

Thus from a denial of everything else (He alone is the) Highest. His omnipresence (is proved) from declarations of (His) extent" (*Ib.* III. ii. 30-36). He is also the moral governor of the world, the distributor of the rewards of actions. "From Him, the fruit; for (that alone) is possible. And because that is declared by Scripture" (*Ib.* III. ii. 37-38).

Thus there is no ambiguity about the main Vedânta position. The noumenon of the world is one. In Pralaya that one can neither be regarded as conscious Being as we know it (Sat) nor as the unconscious (Asat). He is above Sat and above Asat. These two are aspects of Him, but yet are apprehended apart form Him. He is the one source of life, the one goal of aspiration to be reached by conciousness (Jñânagamya).

Plotinus, in the third century A. D., learnt these Vedânta teachings, and taught them in Rome in words that recall the phraseology of the *Upanishads* and the *Bhagavad Gîta*. "In order to perceive the one it is necessary to receive from intellect a declaration of what intellect is able to accomplish. Intellect, however, is able to see either things prior to itself, or things pertaining to itself, or things affected by itself. And the things indeed contained in itself are pure; but those prior to itself are still purer and more simple; or rather this must be asserted of that which is prior to it. Hence, that which is prior to it, is

not intellect, but something more excellent. For intellect is a *certain* one among the number of beings, but that is not a *certain* one, but prior to everything. Nor it is being (S a t); for being has, as it were, the form of *the one.* But That is formless and is not even without intelligible form. For the nature of *the one* being generative of all things, is not any one of them. Neither, therefore, is it a certain thing, nor a quality, nor a quantity, nor intellect, nor soul, nor that which is moved, nor again that which stands still, nor is it in place nor in time; but is by itself uniform, or rather without form, being prior to all form, to motion and permanency.....When we say that the one is the cause of all things, we do not predicate anything as an accident to it, but rather as something which happens to us, because we possess something from it, the one in the meantime subsisting in itself" (Enn. III. ix. Tranl. Taylor). Spinoza, among modern European philosophers approaches nearest to the V e d â n t a metaphysical position. "God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists. Whatsoever is, is God; and without God nothing can be, or be conceived. God is the in-dwelling and not the transient cause of all things. God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence. Intellect, in function finite, or in-

function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else." (*Ethics*, I. Props. 11,15,18,25,30.) "Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking being. Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing" (*Ib.* II. Props. 1,9). Pollock thus translates Spinoza's metaphysical position in language suited to modern habits of thought. "We know the world under the attributes or aspects of extension and thought (A s a t and S a t), and in each kind the sum of reality appears to be inexhaustible. Our world consists of modes of extension associated with modes of thought ... But we have no right to assume that this is the only world; for this would be to set bounds to infinite being" (*Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy*, p. 167).

It is curious that one of the half-a-dozen sentences (l o g i a) which modern research has traced to Jesus, but which is not found in the Gospels, is pure Vedânta. Such Vedânta l o g i a were carefully eliminated from the Christian Gospels, possibly during the time when the early church parted company with myticism in the 3rd and 4th centuries of the Christian era, and Christianity entered a phase of materialism from which it has not yet emerged.

The *Vedânta Sûtras* also discuss the relation between the individual souls and Supreme

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Brahma as well as the relation between Him and matter. But the different Âchâryas have made these Sûtras yield different meanings absolutely opposed to each other. Thus, III. ii. 11, literally translated would run, "Not on account of place, though of the Supreme, two-fold characteristics; everywhere, verily" Ṣaṅkara reads this as "Not on account of (difference of) place also can twofold characteristics belong to the Supreme; for everywhere (Scripture teaches Brahma to be without difference)."

Râmânuja makes this out as, "Not on account of place even is there any imperfection in the Supreme; for everywhere (He is described) as having two-fold characteristics." According to Madhva, it is, "Even from difference of place, no essential difference between the manifestations of the Lord should be supposed; for (Ṣruti declares of Him the identical character) everywhere." Again, III. ii. 17 runs thus:—"It is seen (in Ṣruti); and also is remembered (in Smṛiti)." Ṣaṅkara comments on this:—"That Brahma is without difference is proved by passages from the Ṣruti. The same teaching is conveyed by Smṛiti." Râmânuja comments on the Sûtra as follows:—"Hosts of *Vedânta* passages (prove) His being devoid of faults and being the treasure-house of auspicious qualities; so, too, the Smṛitis". Madhva makes out this sûtra to mean that Ṣruti shows that perfect bliss

is the form of the Lord and Ṣmṛiti shows that the Lord's form consists of intelligence. Again that famous sentence of the *Upanishads*, "Ṭat Satyam Sa Âtmâ Ṭattvamasi," has been the battle-ground of the Âchâryas. Ṣaṅkara in comments on it says, "In the sentence 'Tattvamasi' (That thou art) it is taught that 'thou' refers to Sat, real Being......By 'Ṭattvamasi' (he) directly teaches the identity of the Self and Saṭ, Pure Being" (*Com. on Chh. Up.* vi. 16.) Râmânuja explains it as follows:—"The word 'that' refers to Him who is the cause of the world, a mine of hosts of all auspicious qualities, without imperfections, without change, and 'thou' refers to the same Brahma specialised in the mode of a Jîva who is his own body, by his forms of the inner controller of Jîvas." (*Vedârthasaṃgraha*, p. 35.)

Madhva remarks on this passage, "the statement of non-difference (between the individual soul and Brahma) is due to his essential nature being knowledge, bliss, etc.; which are qualities of Brahma (also)" (*Bhâshya on Ved. Sût.*, II. ii. 29).

In one of his *Prakaraṇas*, called *Vishṇu Tattva Nirṇaya,* section *Navakṛitobhyâsa,* Madhva cuts the Gordian knot by proposing to read "Sa Âtmâ, Atattvamasi," "He is the Âtmâ, Thou are not that." This is the *reductis ad absurdum* of the favourite Hindu method of

deriving new ideas from old texts.

The Ṛishis of the *Upaniskads* spoke as Upâsakas. Sentences like "tattvamasi" were intended to give pointed expression to experiences reached during the practice of Vidyâs, methods of meditation, which abound in the *Upanishads*. They are psychological facts, at least to the one engaged in the mystic contemplation; facts to be verified by following the methods of meditation prescribed, and not to be treated, as the Âchâryas, and more especially their later expounders have done, as texts to be wrenched out of their context and made the foundation of a philosophical structure built with a heavy load of argumentation. The Ṛishis spoke of Brahma from the intuitions reached during the rare moments of ecstatic communion with Him, arrived at after steady attempts at keeping down all mental activity and reaching a plane above the storms of human passions. By the more or less contradictory statements of the Real being scattered in the *Vedas*, and especially in the final sections of the *Vedas* called the *Upanishads*, the human mind tries to represent to itself what must ever be realized by transcending the mind; mind being but an organ made of matter, human language, which is the expression of the human mind, can contain only expressions descriptive of objective material categories. To attempt to describe in

such language what is not mind, and further what is not conscious being as men know it, must necessarily lead to the use of contradictory ideas and phrases. The Ṛishis, who spoke from intuition, did not realise the difficulties that cold logic could raise against the contradictory statements that alone are possible when we attempt to describe the indescribable, to limit in forms of speech what is unlimited, to imprison in symbols of the mind (pratîka, that which is formed by out-going activity of the mind) what for ever soars in an atmosphere which the mind cannot reach. The Âchâryas of a later age were anxious above all to construct a self-consistent theory. Logical consistency can apply only to the systems built by the mind. An extension of the laws of mind to the region of the Absolute, which is above mind as It is above all regions of relativity, must lead to profitless logic-chopping, as it has done in the sectarian squabbles of the minor subdivisions of the Vedânta.

The principal commentators of the *Vedânta Sûtras* among those that have founded sects, namely Ṣaṅkara, Râmânuja and Madhva, have imposed on them three widely different, but self-consistent philosophical and disciplinary systems called Advaita, Viṣishṭâdvaita and Dvaita. Their followers have accentuated the differences among these three, and minimised their

points of agreement, and thus carried on the sectarian movement till the modern Vedantic sects are hopelessly divided. Later, but original, commentators have formed other theories out of the same Sûtras. We shall briefly indicate the main line of divergence of these three original sects of the Vedânta.

Ṣaṅkara starts from the position of one who attempts to realize the nature of the Âtmâ, the Self manifested in the heart of the individual, of one "who apprehends in the moment of the rise of knowledge (*i. e.* in the moment of realization of the Supreme) his Self and no second" (*Dakshiṇâmûrti Stotrai*). When the consciousness is released from the bounding adjuncts of matter and mind, there is no more duality, no more relativity, all is One and that One is the Self. In such a state of exaltation the world appears unmanifested, "like the shoot within the seed." Hence Ṣaṅkara allows only phenomenal existence to the individual Self, Jivâtmâ (the self living in the world) and to matter. The following quotations from his Bhâshya on the *Brahma Sutras* indicate his view on these questions.

"We meet with two forms of Brahma (described in the Ṣruti, one) conditioned by the different kinds of name and form, and (the other) the opposite of this, devoid of all conditions whatsoever. Thus

where there is duality (or relativity) then one sees the other. When all becomes his Self, whom does he see and by what (organ)?" (*Br. Up.* IV. x. 15). "When he sees naught else, that is the high (state); when he sees something else, hears something else, perceives something, that is the low (state). That which is the high, that is the immortal (state); that which is the low, that is the mortal (state)" (*Chh. Up.* VII. xxiv. 1). "The wise one, who, having perceived all forms and made all names, sits calling (them by their names)" (*Tait. Ar.* III. xii. 7). "Without parts, without actions, peaceful, without faults, taintless, the supreme setu (bank) of immortality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel" (*Svet. Up.* VI. 19). "Not so, Not so" (*Brih. Up.* II. iii. 6). "Not great, not small" (*Ib.* III-viii. 8). "One place is defective, the other perfect". These texts and a thousand others point out the double form of Brahma, according as it is the object of Vidyâ or Avidyâ, knowledge or Nescience" (*Ved. Sut.* I. i. 11). "(It is argued that) He who maintains the nature of Brahma to be immutable (Kûṭasthabrahmâtmavâdî) contradicts the tenet of Îşvara being the cause (of the world); because the absolute unity (of Brahma) precludes the relation of the Ruler and the ruled. (To this we reply), No, for omniscience (and other qualities) of Îşvara depend on the evolution of the germs of name and form, which are of the nature of Nescience.........Forming (as it were)

the very soul of the omniscient Îşvara, are name and form, produced by nescience, incapable of being described as Its nature or as the nature of any other than That, which constiute the germs of the phenomenal universe. This is the wonder-working power (Mâyâşakti) of the omniscient Îşvara, Prakriti, as we learn from Şruti and Smriti. The omniscient Îşvara is other than those two (name and form)......Thus Îşvara is dependent upon the conditions of name and form, produced by nescience, just as space is dependent upon the conditioning objects, jars, pots, etc. (before it becomes differentiated as the space inside a jar, the space inside a pot, etc.). From the standpoint of the phenomenal universe he is the Sovereign of those who are called Jîvas, (individual souls), Vijñânâtmâs (lit. knowing selves, those capable of perception and knowledge), who are his very self, but who depend on (bodies that are) the aggregates of organs of action, produced by name and form, based on nescience, resembling in this the space in a jar; hence Îşvara's Lordship, omniscience, and omnipotence depend on the limitation of condition of the nature of nescience. From the standpoint of the noumenon the activities (involved) in being the Ruler, the ruled, the omniscient, etc., cannot subsist in the Self, cleared of all limiting adjuncts by right knowledge (Vidyâ)." (*Com. on Ved. Sut.* II. i. 14). "In the supreme Brahma,

there is no duality ; this concept excludes no second being, real or unreal. The concept Îşvara necessitates the concept of a causal 'fore-state'(prâgavasthâ) of the world, dependent on the Îşvara, but without which Îşvara cannot become a creator. This causal state of the world is called Avidyâ, nescience, for it is destroyed by Vidyâ, knowledge of the Âtmâ which secures for the Mukta, the released, once for all, the realization of the absolute unity of all life. It is also called Avyakta, unmanifested, for before creation it cannot be perceived; sometimes it is spoken of as Mâyâ, illusion" (*Bhâshya on Ved. Sût.* I. iv. 3). The theory that Prakriti is Mâyâ, unreal, the non-existent simulating reality, was started by Şankara and done to death by his later followers. He himself is guarded in his statements, as might be noticed in the above quotations, and seems to insist more on Avidyâ (ignorance) being the cause of the imaginary duality where there is but unity; but later Advaitîs have, with the fatal, but dangerous, facility with which phrases devoid of content are handled by metaphysicians, created Mâyâ into a non-entity that masquerades as an entity, and read this doctrine into the *Upanishads*. All other schools of Hindu thought that have any touch with Vedânta—Vaishṇava, Şâkta and Mâheşvara Schools have always protested against the notion of the world being an

unreal non-entity, as it is based on the real Brahma. Among European scholars, Colebrooke first noticed that Mâyâ was always used in the early (and genuine) *Upanishads* and *BhagavadGîtâ* for the wonder-working power of the Lord, and the use of Mâyâ for non-entity or for Prakṛiti was invented by the Advaita School. It is curious that Gough and, in our day, Deussen, should have so far allowed their critical faculty to be obscured by their familiarity with the Advaita Vedânta as to attempt to read the modern Mâyâ doctrine into the ancient *Upanishads.* To these scholars as to most Indian Advaitîs, the word Vedânta means advaita; the Ṣâṅkara teaching and that, too, in its later developments, identical with that, of the *Upanishads.* They forget that Ṣaṅkara, though a great philosopher, claims to be but a Bhâshyakâra, a commentator, and that he did not even profess, as Râmânuja professes, to expound the Sûtras in accordance with tradition. If Ṣaṅkara quotes any previous commentator it is but to criticize him; he boldly starts a new line of thought following the logical necessities of his stand point and brushes aside any textual difficulties that might obstruct him. All system-builders that base their philosophical system on ancient inspired texts have to twist them to suit their purposes; but Ṣaṅkara does this more self-reliantly than the other Âchâryas who support

their interpretations by quotations from other books of doubtful authority. Ṣaṅkara relies chiefly on argument for this purpose.

The Advaita was first propounded by Gauḍapâda, a generation before Ṣaṅkara, in his Kârikâs on the *Mâṇḍûkya Upanishad*. It is noteworthy that Gauḍapâda and his disciple's disciple, as Ṣaṅkara is said to be, were both of them Ṣâktas, and base the whole Advaita doctrine on the fundamental fact of their realization of the unity of all life in the ecstacy of contemplation. It is to them a fact of experience, a "datum of consciousness" reached after undergoing a special discipline. Ṣaṅkara defines those whose "vision is superior" as those who are able to realize that the Âtmâ alone exists (*Com. on Mâṇḍûkya Kârikâ*, iii. 16). He again speaks of the "Advaitadrishṭi (vision of oneness) of us, the disillusioned" (*Ib.* iii. 18). Whereas all their critics later than Râmânuja, and, what is more curious, all their followers and exponents, too, treat it, not as a question of fact, but as a question of argument, not as a question of discipline, but of exegesis. This has led to the fearful degeneration of Advaita in India, where we find people who talk monism all day long, but lead the most selfish life imaginable.

Râmânuja controverts the fundamental metaphysical positions of the Advaita. (1) He

does not allow that a non-differentiated substance could be established by any one's consciousness, because consciousness always implies difference. (2) He holds that the Ṣ r u t i does not also teach a Brahma free from all difference (n i r v i ṣ e s h a Brahma). To accentuate his opposition to this theory he delights in piling adjective on adjective describing the divine attributes. "The one cause of the evolution, maintenance, dissolution and release from S a ṃ s â r a of the universe of sentient and non-sentient objects, of a nature different from all things other than Himself, on account of being hostile to all evil, and being one with infinite auspiciousness, of hosts of lovely qualities, boundless and unsurpassable, Universal Â t m â, Supreme Brahma, Supreme Light, Supreme Essence, Supreme Â t m â, known in all Vedânta by various words like S a t, etc. the Lord, N a r â-y a n a, Exellent P u r u s h a" (Râmânuja's *Vedartha Saṃgraha,* p. 11.) (3). He also holds that the theory of a beginningless M â y â (Nescience) cannot be proved by the accepted methods of proof. (4). Nor can such Nescience act on supreme reality so as to become the cause of creation, etc. For he argues that a perfect Being cannot become a prey to ignorance ; hence, according to him, creation and relativity are due not to M â y â, but to the Love of the Supreme Deity for man and other individual souls. He allows the validity of the

realization of Unity (Advaitânubhava) of Gauḍapâda and Ṣaṅkara, but explains that this ecstatic consciousness of unity is not the consciousness of the Supreme Brahma, but that of the Self as apart from the limitations of matter (Prakriti Vîyuktâtmâdarşana). A higher experience than this is the intuition of Param Brahma by constant loving meditation on his divine attributes (bhakti, upâsana).

He regards metaphysical questions from this standpoint and hence he teaches that Brahma is Savişesha, characterized by attributes. He is the Self of both the individual souls (chit) and matter (achit] and yet different from them. His views of the relation of the Supreme to individual Âtmâ and matter can be gathered from the following:—"It is proved from the *Antaryami Brahmana* (*Brih. Up.* III. viii. 3-23), etc., that Chit and Achit (conscious and unconscious beings) in their gross effected state (during a Kalpa) and in their subtle causal state (during Pralaya) form the body of Param Brahma, and Param Brahma is their Soul.........From words like Ârambhaṇa, etc. *(Chhand. Up. VI.* i. 4. etc.), it is known that the world is not other than the Supreme cause, the Param Brahma. Now this is the truth—it is Brahma that is denoted at all times by all words because of His having for his body Chit and Achit.

Sometimes (during p r a l a y a) notwithstanding His possession (of these) as His own body the body of C h i t and A c h i t attains a Subtle State, in which it is incapable of being designated apart from Him. This is Brahma in the causal condition (K â r a ṇ â v a s ṭ h â). At other times (during K a l p a) the body of C h i t and A c h i t attains a gross state in which it is capable of being treated as something apart from him. This is the effected condition (K â r y â v a s ṭ h â) (*Sri Bhâshya* on *Ved. Sût. II.* i. 15).

Thus according to Râmânuja, the Reality is one, the Supreme Brahma and C h i t, the conscious individual souls, and A c h i ṭ, the unconscious forms of matter, are his bodies, A v y a k t a, indistinguishable from Him during P r a l a y a, but during K a l p a in a period of manifestation; not only V y a k t a, distinguishable from Him, but related to Him in the Ṣ ê s h i ş e s h a b h â v a, the relation of the Disposer and the disposable.

The V i ş i s h ţ a d v a i t a has undergone a degeneration quite as bad as that noticed in the case of the A d v a i t a. Râmânuja preached an Îsvara of unimaginably excellent qualities, the goal of loving thoughts uninterupted like a stream of oil, of whom all humanity and all nature was the body. His followers to-day have become an exclusive sect, marked off from the rest of the Hindus by glaring white and red marks cover-

ing their person and substituting an elaborate mummery for the simple life of loving meditation on the perfections of Îşvara and service of men that the founder preached. It is also curious that Râmânuja speaks more often of Işvara, though he maintains Nârâyaṇa to be the chief form of Işvara; but his followers call themselves Vaishṇavas, the devotees of Vishṇu, one of the Hindu Trinity. Râmânuja, while controverting the psychological possibility of cognizing a Nirvişesha Brahma, an absolute Being devoid of attributes, fully recognised the validity of the Advaita experience of the unity of Âtmâ as one of the goals of humanity, as legitimate as a means of immortality as the Bhakti he advocated. (*Vide*, *Bhag. Gîtâ*, *Râmânuja Bhashya* on viii. 20.) So, too, Yâmuna, his predecessor and the early Âgamas. Similarly Ṣaṅkara, while specially advocating jñâna yoga in all his writings, admits that Krishṇa taught the easier Karma Yoga to his friend Arjuna in preference to the *more difficult* path of contemplation. (Vide *Bhag. Gîṭâ*, *Ṣaṅkara Bhâshya* on xii. 13). But the disciples of these teachers have developed an intolerance which the founders of the Advaita and the Vişishṭâdvaita did not feel, and always tried to be-little each other's system and to abuse each other.

Before going into Madhva's views on these

questions, it must be pointed out that Ṣaṅkara's and Râmânuja's interpretations of the *Vedânta Sûtras* agree in most points, except when in sundry places their special doctrines come into conflict. Madhva's interpretations differ widely from these. Thus according to the former two, *Ved. Sut.* II. 42-45 deal with the Bhâgavata doctrine, but according to Madhva they deal with the Ṣakta doctrine. By comparing Ṣaṅkara's and Râmânuja's Bhâshyas, Sûtra by Sûtra, a comparative study of their common points and divergences can be made. But Madhva's Bhâshya strikes such original lines, that therein is visible most plainly how the traditional interpretations of the Sûtras having become lost, the Bhâshyakaras, commentators, were untramelled and could make out whatever they wanted form the Sûtras.

Madhva's views can be gathered from his Bhâshya on *Ved. Sûtras*, II. iii. 28, 29." The Jîva, individual soul, is certainly separate (from the Lord), for *Kauṣika Ṣruti* argues, 'The supreme is different from the multitudes of individual Souls. The Supreme is inconceivable. He is full, the group of individual souls is not full. He is eternally free, from Him release from bondage (is to be obtained). Hence he is to be sought: Since the essential nature (of the individual soul) is knowledge and bliss (which are also)

the qualities of B r a h m a, the individual soul is spoken of as not different from Him. Brahma is spoken of as the Â t m â of all (the universe) in the text. All this is indeed Brahma' (*Chh.* III. 14. 1) because all qualities belong to him". Under *Ved. Sût.* II. iii. 7, he quotes the following from *Brihat-Saṃhitâ* :—"The One, Supreme P u r u s h a, Indivisible is called Vishṇu. P r a k ṛ i t i, P u r u s h a, Time, these three are divided (*i. e.* limited) ....That Supreme, Hari, is immutable. Being undivided, He is of Supreme bliss, eternal, of eternal attributes; what is divided is of little power". The following quotation from Chapter V of *Sarvadarṣana Saṅgraha* show how very vigorously the M â d h v a s, protest against the A d v a i t a doctrine which they consider an insult to the most High :—"As stated in the *Tatvaviveka,* T a t t v a (ultimate substance) is acknowledged to be two fold, independent and dependent; The Independent is Vishṇu, the Lord exempt from imperfections and of endless excellence. From inference, too, difference (between the Supreme and the individual) is ascertained. The Supreme Lord is different from J î v a, as (the former) is the object of his service. He who is to be served by another is different from him, as a king from his attendant.........On account of their thirst to be one with the Supreme Lord (they make) a statement that the excellent attributes of

Vishṇu are like mirage aud this resembles the cutting of the tongue in the desire to gain a fine plantain; since it will result in their entering Andhaṃtamas (Hell of utter darkness) on account of their offending Vishṇu.........The grand revelation, 'A difference between Jîva and Îşvara, and a difference between matter and Îşvara,a difference of Jîvas each from others, a difference between matter and jîva and a difference of material beings each from others, this is the fivefold difference in the universe.' This is real and beginningless; if it had a beginning it would have an end; but it has no end; nor is it illusorily imagined, for if it were imagined merely, it would cease; but it never ceases.........As the *Mahopanishad* says, 'Like a bird and the string (tied to it), like the juices of different trees, like the rivers and the seas, like fresh water and salt water, like the robber and the robbed, like man and the objects (that he sees), so are the Jîva and the Îşvara different, eternally differentiated from each other'".

Starting from these three different standpoints numerous theories, all calling themselves Vedânta have been evolved by later expounders. Each system attempts to be a self-consistent whole, displaying the keenest logical and exegetical skill. The *Bhâshyas* and *Vrittis* on the *Vedânta Sûtras* so far discovered amount to over 30 and

the commentaries on them run into hundreds each giving a slight twist to the original doctrines. It would not be possible to summarize the teachings of these schools; nor would it be of much interest as the points of difference that endow each school with individuality are so minute and so much apart from modern interests. These three have been noticed partly because they are so popular in modern India and partly because they seem to have been originally conceived as compromises between the Vedânta and other metaphysical theories. The Advaita is a compromise between the Vedânta and Sâṅkhya. It accepts the specific Sâṅkhya ideas of the immutability of spirit and of action and experience belonging only to matter, but adds that neither the Purushas nor Prakṛiti are really existent but are imagined to exist on account of nescience. Buddhism and Jainism also influenced the evolution of the Advaita philosophy though Saṅkara like every other Âchârya, did not always clearly and correctly understand their position as is evidenced by his criticisms of them. The Dvaita is a compromise between Nyâya and Vedânta. It accepts the specific Nyâya teaching of the absolute differences among Îṣvara, Jîvas and matter and grafts them on Vedânta as far as possible. The Viṣishtâdvaita attempts to find a meeting point for

the monism of Vedânta, the evolution and individualism of the Sâṅkhya and the theism and realism of Nyâya.

We can not in this book pursue the later developments of Vedânta in this country. They form a vast mass of profitless literature in which the old philosophical schools have been jumbled up in inextricable confusion. In them argument takes the place of psychological experience, bigotry takes the place of meditation, and abuse of other sects takes the place of inspiration. Among them they have raised the innumerable sects that divide modern India and deprive philosophy of its power of consoling man in his troubles and elavating him to a place of peace.

Section II. A. *Saṅkhya.*

The Sâṅkhya analyses the universe into two independent and sharply contrasted factors— Purusha and Prakṛiti, spirit and matter, subject and object. Purusha is not the Ego, for Egoity is a function of matter and the ordinary human consciousness involved in the notion of 'I' is but the reflection of the Seer on the instrument of cognition. The pure consciousness of the Purusha is reached only when the man has attained Kaivalya, aloneness, absolute separation from Prakṛiti and is devoid of the distinction of I and not-I. This Purusha is not the noumenon underlying all the purushas of the universe, for each purusha, whether he be in the body of a Deva or of a man, is independent of and different from other purushas of the Universe. His attributes are the reverse (viparîta) of those of Prakṛiti; he is immutable, not affected by the Guṇas, the conscious Seer of objective, phenomenal forms, separate from other purushas, the enjoyer (bhoktâ) of pleasure and pain (*Sâṅ. Kâr.* xi). He is neither prakṛiti nor vikṛiti, neither the antecedent nor the consequent state of a changing object (*Ib.* iii). The existence of the knower is established by the following proofs. (1) The objects of the universe apparently exist not for

their own but for another's use. (2) The existence of matter with three g u ṇ a s pre-supposes the existence of p u r u s h a without g u ṇ a s. (3) Man has the power to control his body. (4) Man has the power of 'enjoyment'. (5) Man is impelled to seek k a i v a l y a—the state when he is the pure seer, separated from contact with objects (*Ib.* xvii). Hence the p u r u s h a is the solitary, inactive witness of the operations of Nature, bystander, spectator, passive (*Ib.* xix). Being immutable he does not change into phenomenal forms like p r a k ṛ i t i, but by his union with forms of insentient matter, b u d d h i, etc., they assume the appearance of sentiency and the inactive p u r u s h a appears active though it is the g u ṇ a s that are the source of all activity (*Ib.* xx). These p u r u s h a s are many in number, because birth, death and the organs (b u d d h i, etc.) are severally allotted to individuals, their activities are simultaneous, and the three g u ṇ a s are differently distributed in different men (*Ib.* xviii). As the Sâṅkhya teaches the existence of many p u r u s h a s, each living eternally separate from the rest, it may best be described as a school of individualism.

P r a k ṛ i t i, the other constituent of the universe is of two forms, one causal, and homogeneous the other, effected and discrete (v y a k t a.) The latter (v y a k t a), is an effect (h e t u m a t), inconstant, unpervading, *i. e.* bounded, mutable, multitudinous,

phenomenal, mergent (in its noumenon), divisible and dependent. The former is the reverse (*Ib.* x). Pradhâna, or Mûlaprakṛiti as the noumenon of material forms is called, is that from which the organs of knowledge and action and the objects thereof are evolved. It is not a modification of anything antecedent (vikṛiti); hence it is a noumenon (*Ib.* iii). It can not be apprehended by the organs of knowledge on account of its subtility and has to be inferred from its effects buddhi, etc., some of which are similar to it, others dissimilar (*Ib.* viii). It differs from its phenomenal manifestations (vyakta) in having no antecedent, being indestructible, pervasive, inactive, unique, unsupported, indissoluble, indivisible, uncontrollable (*Ib.* x). It is curious that mûlaprakṛiti, the root of matter is, in the Saṅkhya school given all the negative attributes that the Vedânta attributes to Param Brahma. It is also noteworthy that similar negative attributes are attributed to ether by modern science. Agnes Clerke, in her *Modern Cosmogonics* describes ether in words strikingly similar to the Sâṅkhya description of Mûlaprakṛiti allowing for the difference of standpoint between the metaphysical and the scientific. "To the very brink of that mysterious ocean, the science of the 20th century has brought us; and it is with a thrill of wondering awe that we stand at its verge and survey its illimitable

expanse. The glory of the heavens is transitory, but the impalpable, invisible ether inconceivably remains. Such as it is to-day, it already was when the Fiat Lux was spoken; its beginning must have been coeval with that of time. Nothing or everything according to the manner it is accounted of, it is evasive of common notice, while obtrusive to delicate scrutiny. Its negative qualities are numerous and baffling. It has no effect in impeding motion; it does not perceptibly arrest, absorb, or scatter light; it pervades, yet has (apparently) no share in the displacements of gross matter. Looking, however, below the surface of things we find this semi-fabulous quintessence to be unobtrusively doing all the world's work. It embodies the energies of motion; is, perhaps, in a very real sense, the true primum mobile; the potencies of matter are rooted in it; the substance of matter is latent in it; universal intercourse is maintained by means of the ether; cosmic influences can be exerted only through its aid; unfelt, it is the source of solidity; unseen, it is the vehicle of light; itself non-phenomenal, it is the indispensable originator of phenomena. A contradiction in terms, it points the perennial moral that what eludes the senses is likely to be more permanently and intensely actual than what strikes them."

Besides these negative attributes Pradhâna

or M û l a p r a k ṛ i t i has some positive attributes which are common to it and the phenomenal forms evolved from it. It is affected by the three G u ṇ a s, it is unconscious, objective, common to all P u r u s h a s, insensible to pleasure and pain and immutable (*Ib.* xi). The existence of this P r a d h â n a, (lit., chief principle) or M û l a p r a k ṛ i t i (or root of matter), this noumenon behind phenomenal material objects, is proved by the following considerations; (1) these objects being discrete, can only be conceived as being carved out of an indiscrete something; (2) certain common properties are found in all objects thus indicating a common substratum; (3) objects remain discrete only so long as the energy of their cause acts in them; (4) an effect is different from its cause; (5) the whole universe of multitudinous forms is one object (*Ib.* xv). This noumenon of matter operates by means of the three G u ṇ a s. The three G u ṇ a s are not three qualities of some substance other than themselves; but they "are substances, yet called G u ṇ a s, qualities, as they are the accessories of the P u r u s h a" (Bhâskararâya. *Com. Lal. Sahas.* 604).

They are three strands into which primal matter differentiates itself when its homogeneity is first disturbed. Their manifestations as the so-called Laws of motion in the physical world, as mental characteristics in the world of mind and as feeling-

tones in the moral sphere have been described in Chap I. They are "things (d r a v ý â ṇ i) and not specific qualities." "In speaking of qualities, however, the term G u ṇ a is not to be regarded as an insubstantial accidental attribute, but as a substance discernible by soul through the medium of the faculties." (Wilson's *Com. on Sañ. Kâr.* xii). The origin of the theory of the three G u ṇ a s is shrouded in obscurity. It appears all on a sudden in the Sâṅkhya philosophy. The only references to it previous to the age of Sâṅkhya philosophy is found in *Atharva Samhitâ. X. viii. 43.* "The knowers of Brahma know that spirit (Y a k s h a) which resides in the lotus with nine gates, invested with the three G u ṇ a s." This verse is repeated in *Ath. Sam*, X. ii. 32, but the latter half is changed into "in the sheath (K o s a) made of gold, of three spokes, of three supports". The V e d i c age divided regions into three, P r i t h v î, A n t a r i k s h a, and D y u, the earth, the intermediate sphere and the sky. Possibly this triplet was developed into the triplet of G u ṇ a s. This idea is rendered probable by the fact that R â j a s, the second of the G u ṇ a s is also the name of the middle region, A n t a r i k s h a. In P ṛ i t h v î, the earth, there is a preponderance of T a m a s, in A n t a r i k s h a, the middle region there is a preponderance of R a j a s and in the D y u, the sky, there is a preponderance of S a t t v a. In later times a fourth region and a fourth G u ṇ a

was worked out and described in the *Âgamas* and the *Purâṇas.* This region was beyond the sky; in this region the three G u ṇ a s are absent; instead of them, there is Ṣ u d d h a s a t t v a, illumination accompanied by knowledge, whereas the lower three regions are characterized by M i ṣ r a-s a t t v a—a mixture of the three G u ṇ a s in different proportions. T a m a s literally means the condition of being choked or exhausted, hence darkness. R a j a s is colour, the coloured radiance of the cloudy regions, obscuration, S a t t v a is illumination, brightness. These are the three fundamental blue, red and white threads out of which the universe is woven.

These two categories of the Sâṅkhya, P u r u s h a and P r a k ṛ i t i are thus absolutely opposed to each other. There is nothing common between the two. Each P u r u s h a is independent of the rest. There can be no common substratum underlying all P u r u s h a s, for the P u r u s h a is the pure immutable consciousness and not a phenomenon. He can understand his nature as P u r u s h a only by an intellectual analysis of man's life and putting away all that is contributed to it by matter and thus realizing his K a i v a l y a, aloneness. The Sâṅkhya reached this conclusion because it began by rejecting the ritual of the *Vedas.* "The revealed mode [of salvation] is impure, because it requires animal sacrifices, while

its rewards also are susceptible of diminution and excess." (*Ib.* ii). The Sâṅkhya proves its conclusions by the intellectual analysis of human experience and not like the *Vedânta* by exegesis. In this path each man can start only with his own experience; and starting therefrom, he denudes it of all that is not himself. He strips from his experience sensation, perception, egotism, and volition, all that matter has contributed, and finally knows himself to be the pure J ñ a, knower, when there is an end to ignorance and pain. Hence when he is M u k t a he remains a separate entity, in other words he reaches K a i v a l y a, aloneness.

The history of the rise of the Sâṅkhya school of thought is wrapped in impenetrable obscurity. Most scholars now admit that it was developed before the age of Buddha. The *Kapila Sûtras* as we have them, has been proved to be a work composed not earlier than the XIV century, A. D., though it probably contains words and phrases belonging to a very much earlier *Kapila Sûtras*, now lost. The *Tattva Samâsa Sûtras* which Max Müller regarded as an ancient work strikes us as being a rather late index of some pre-existing S û t r a work. Îşvara Kŗishņa's *Sâṅkhya Kârikâ* composed probably in the age immediately preceding the beginning of the Christian Era, is the earliest exposition of the Sâṅkhya that we have. Kârikâ, means the versified

form of a pre-existing S û t r a. Pañchaşikha, an early Sâṅkhya teacher is quoted by Vyâsa in his commentaries on *Yoga Sûtras* II. 13. He is also quoted in the *Sâṅkhyasâra* * by Bhâva Ganeşa Dîkshit, a disciple of Vijñana Bhikshu. All this early Sâṅkhya literature is now lost; but yet there is no room for doubting that the system was worked out in the form it now exists in the age that preceded the birth of Gautama Buddha and Mahâvîra. This system, so ancient in birth and so modern in spirit, must have taken some centuries to be developed. Philosophical systems do not start straight from the head of a thinker, as the finished Minerva from the head of Jupiter. The Sâṅkhya, as we know it, is a final product with no mark of the hesitancy which characterizes an evolving system. It holds definite views on many questions, the nature of S a m s â r a and of K a r m a, the functions of the three G u ṇ a s, the nature of the P u r u s h a, the materiality of A n t a ḥ k a r a ṇ a, and the unreality of bondage, most of which were scarcely known to the thinkers of the early *Upanishads.* The Sâṅkhya is a finished metaphysics and a finished psychology. How many centuries intervened between the fluid state of thought we meet with in the later V e d i c age and the co-ordination and crystalline polish of the Sâṅkhya,

* A Ms. work loaned to me by Mr. Govinda Dâs of Benares.

what has become of the intervening literature which alone can show how the one evolved out of the other, who can say? Between the schoolmen with their doctrine of "occult qualities" and "sympathetic virtues" and the modern pellucid scientific conceptions of energy, etc., so many centuries of quick-moving thought have elapsed. Whether ancient thought moved as quick, what helped on the ancient Sâṅkhya movement to gain independence of the trammels of revealed scriptures and boldly take its stand on reason, is a problem which at present defies solution. Of one thing we may be sure. The Sâṅkhya could not have been evolved by one man, of however commanding genius, as Prof. Garbe thinks (vide Introduction to his translation of Aniruddha's *Commentary*).

Another equally curious fact is the fate of the Sâṅkhya system after its promulgation. The *Vedânta Sûtras* make a definite attempt to oppose it (*Sût.* II. i. 1-2 and II. ii. 1-10). The Buddhists controverted some of its teachings. The Vaiṣeshikas from the beginning opposed its fundamental principle of Satkâyavâda, the axiom that effects pre-exist in a potential form in their causes. But very soon and especially outside these schools, the Sâṃkhya came to be regarded as a revelation and absorbed bodily and welded firmly into later Indian thought.

The *Âgamas*, on which has been based the Hindu religion of the past two thousand years took in the Sâṅkhya wholly. The Âchâryas except that they oppose one Sâṅkhya tenet—that a Supreme conscious being is not the cause of the world—treat the rest of the Sâṅkhya teaching as revealed truth and base their exposition of the Vedânta on the Sâṅkhya. This has cut short the further evolution of the system and it remains exactly where it was two thousand five hundred years ago. Whether a future Indian Renaissance, inspired by the science of the West will take up the work thus interrupted is a problem whose answer is concealed in the womb of the future.

B. *Yoga.*

The metaphysics of the Yoga school is practically the same as that of the Sâṅkhya. Purusha and Prakṛiti are called by the more expresive names of Drashṭa and Dṛiṣya, the Seer and the Seen. Sight (Dṛiṣi) is the word used in this school to express the function of conciousness, as other schools prefer light (Prakâṣa) or Jnâna (knowing). The Seer sees the operations of the 'inner organ', which in this school is called Chitta, not to be confounded with the Chitta of the later Advaita schools whose function is merely memory. All mental activity, the

unceasing succession of 'states of conciousness' (as they are called is Western philosophy) is termed Chittavṛitti in the *Yoga Sûtras* and the Purusha sees these 'states of conciousness'; hence he is the Seer. Yoga is the inhibition of the ceaseless flow of Chittavṛitti and while it ceases flowing, the Seer abides in his true nature (Svarûpa) of pure conciousness (*Yoga Sûtras* I. 2-3). "Drisya (The Seen) has the three qualities (Ṣîla, Guṇa) of illumination, activity and rest and is the noumenon of objects and organs (and exists) for the enjoyment and emancipation (of the Seer)". (*Ib.*II. 18). Prakâṣa, Kriya, Sthiti of the *Sûtra* just quoted, stand for Sattva, Rajas and Tamas.

The noumenon of the Drişya is called Alinga (lit., the indistinguishable), Avyakta, as it is called in other Schools. It is the Pradhâna of the Sâṅkhyas. "The Drashṭâ, mere vision, (conciousness), though pure (*i. e.*, devoid of any mutation), immediately perceives images of objects. common to others besides him (who has reached Kaivalya.) The conjunction (of the Seer and the Seen) is the cause that they attain the nature of the possessor and the possessed." (*Ib* II. 20-23.) On account of this conjunction the Seer evolves into the possessor and the Seen is then apprehended as possessed. But when ignorance is removed, the real inmmutability of the Seer is grasped. Thus we see that, except for a complete change of

technical terms, the metaphysical theories of the Yoga are absolutely identical with those of the Sâṅkhya. The *Yoga Sûtra* designates itself Sâṅkhya Pravachana, exposition of Sâṅkhya. The *Sarvadarşana Saṅgraha* sums up the Yoga arguments regarding the immutabity of the Seer in these words:—"Chitişakti (lit. the power of 'knowing', conciousness) is devoid of mutation because it always 'knows' (the mental modifications). If this Purusha were mutable, he could not always know mental modifications, as the mutable is inconstant (in its action). As the Purusha who is of the nature of consciousness remains always the Superintendent, his essentially pure nature is always maintained. Whenever it (his nature) is (apparently) affected (lit. clouded) by (the shadow of) any object whatsoever (that is perceived by him), it is the Drişya, the object that always receives his light and is illuminated by it. Hence the Purusha is (really) unaffected (during a perception) and it follows he is always knowing and is always above the suspicion of mutability. The Chitta it is that is (really) affected by objects and then that object is perceived. When it is not affected (by an object), it is not perceived. Objects resemble magnets and the Chitta resembles iron and is susceptible of mutation because it is the seat of attraction and repulsion (by objects) which causes

their being known or unknown. Now (it may be objected that) as the Chitta and Indriyas (sense organs) which are of the nature of egoism are all-pervasive and hence always connected with all objects, therefore must be produced knowledge of all things always and everywhere. (It is replied that) though all-pervasive, when the Chitta is modified in any one body and by certain objects in contact with that body, in that body alone is knowledge (of those objects) produced; not in other bodies. As this limitation is absolute, it is held that objects are like magnets and affect the Chitta which resembles iron by their coming into contact with it through the channels of the sense-organs. Hence modifications belong to the Chitta and not the Âtmâ" (*Ib.* chap. xv).

Drişya (matter) evolves as Bhûta, objects, and Indriya, organs, by which the Drashṭâ comes in contract with objects. Objects and organs are Dharmî, the seat of Dharma or qualities. Chitta, the inner organ, being a mode of Drişya, matter, cannot illuminate or manifest itself but must be lighted by Purusha. "The whole universe is but the Chitta tinged by the Seen (on the one hand) and the Seer (on the other) (*Yog. Sût.* iv. 22). The Seer illuminates it and the Seen colours it a mixture of white, red and blue, the three colours representing the three Guṇas. As Vyâsa in his comment on this Sûtra says,

"It is but Chitta that, tinged by the Seer and the Seen, manifests as non-ego and ego becomes conscious and unconscious, though material, appears immaterial, and is called the totality of objects."

Among the innumerable Purushas that are in this world there is one called Îşvara. The mention of Îşvara in the *Yoga Sûtras* has made many people decribe the Yoga as a School of theism; but this is extremely inaccurate; for the Îṣvara mentioned in the Yoga is in no sense God. He is neither the ruler of Nature nor the moral governor of the Universe. Out of the multitude of Purushas in the Universe, he is a special Purusha who was never touched by Kleşa, the defects of ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and clinging to life, and by the mental deposits left by Karma and their fruition (*Ib.* i. 14). In Him is fully developed the seed of Omniscience which every Purusha has. He is the ancient teacher whose life is unbroken by Time as ours is (*Ib.* i-25-26). The Îşvara of Yoga Darşana, therefore, is neither the reality behind Nature, nor any Universal Being in which human selves find their unity. Except omniscience and mastery over time, He has no other divine attribute, His only function being that of an ancient teacher. Hence Yoga is in its tenets as atheistic as Sâṅkhya. Yoga is called in India Seşvara Sâṅkhya, the Sâṅkhya which acknowledges the existence of

an Îṣvara; but when this phrase is translated 'theistic Sâṅkhyas, as is frequently done by English Scholars, it becomes absurd. For the Îṣvara here referred to is not the Lord of the world, but the Lord only of his devotee, and He is his Lord only in the sense that he figures Him in his heart as the mystic syllable 'Om' and this makes it easy for him to reach his own inner consciousness. Though the Îṣvara of Yoga is an inactive Purusha, it accepts, like the Sâṅkhya, the adhidaivata, animistic, explanation of the life of nature. But this doctrine of the adhidaivata cannot make any philosophy 'theistic' in any sense of the word. On account of the great spread of Vedânta in modern India, later writers like Madhusûdhana have regarded Sâṅkhya and Yoga as stages leading to Vedânta. German mysticism also, whether it appears as the realistic monism of Haeckel, who sees in matter the one noumenon of the universe, or the more popular Pantheism of many modern philosophers, discounting as it does the abiding value of the individual, arrogates to itself the title of final truth and calls all individualistic or dualistic theories empirical. This is absurd. Both monism and dualism are equally valid explanations of the cosmos. It is a question of individual temperament which explanation appeals to one. The human mind which forms general concepts to explain the cosmos to its

own satisfaction is swayed by the temperaments. The man of the rich, emotional cast of mind whose mainspring is his love to the Lord of the universe, whose greatest pleasure is service of the Lord of his heart follows the path that leads to monism; for to him everything is his Lord, all beings, conscious or unconcious, but the Lord's body, and he thus reaches the concept of the one noumenon. If he shuts himself out of touch with the spiritual side of the universe and thus cannot reach the conception of Îşvara, he invents the idea of nature or clothes with flesh the abstract idea of humanity and erects them as the objective of his emotional outflow. On the other hand, the man of the stern intellectual cast of mind prefers the path of meditation, trains himself in Viveka, distinction of Self and Not-self and reaches the dualistic interpretation of the cosmos. He may, like the Advaitî try to explain away the Not-self as really illusory and only empirically true and thus reconcile his theory with monism, but he is a dualist all the same, for his path is one of discrimination. Nor must we forget that after all both theories are but concepts of the mind, and not experiences of the spirit. Before the spirit can realise itself or the devotee can realise his Lord, Manas has to be transcended and the stage of theorizing has to be passed; and when there is realization, concept-making is neither necessary nor possible.

Section III. *Âgama.*

The early Vedic religion was a cult of magic, a system of propitiation or constraint of Nature-powers (D e v a s) by means of sacrifices (Y a j ñ a s), offerings of animal fat (g h î, v a p â, etc.) and fermented liquor (S o m a), poured into fire regarded as the mouth of the Gods, and accompanied with the chanting of m a n t r a s. Some of these m a n t r a s were incantations of praise, and others combinations of sound having no meaning, being sometimes inarticulate cries ("like the bellowing of a bull, etc."). They were believed to please or constrain the D e v a s and thus to secure the fulfilment of the sacrificer's desires, whether these were the acquisition of material objects in this life or the enjoyment of pleasures in post-mortem states (S v a r g a). In the alignment of the Y a j ñ a Ṣ â l â, the sacrificial hall, were embodied the early notions of the structure of the Macrocosm, for even in the earliest days the idea of the world being a macrocosm and the individual man being a microcosm, a minified copy of the cosmos, was worked out. The well-known P u r u s h a S û k t a which though later than the earliest hymns is certainly much anterior to the age of the *Upanishads*, proves this. "The moon sprang from (the Cosmic P u r u s h a's) manas ; from (his) eyes the sun was born ; from (his) month I n d r a and A g n i, from (his) p r â ṇ a, v â y u was born. From (his) navel was the middle region (a n t a r i k s h a)

from (his) head was the sky; from (his) feet the earth, the quarters from (his) ears." (*R. V.* X. 90. 13, 14). This subject is referred to in numerous passages of the Vedas (*Vide Ṣat. Brâh.* X. iii. 3. 8., XIV. 2. 13. *R.V.* X. 16. 3. etc.). Since all the gods were represented in the human body, methods of getting into communion with them other than by means of sacrifices were invented. These attempts were, in the first instance, but the conversion of the bahiryâga, outer sacrifice, into antaryâga, inner sacrifice, bâhyapûja (exterior worship) into mânasapûja (mental worship). The intermediate stage between bahiryâga and antaryâga is represented by the following quotation from *Ṣatapatha Brâhmaṇa* XI. ii. 6. 13. "One should say 'this is the Deva yâjî' and 'this is the Âtma yâjî. He is the Âtmayâjî (lit: self-sacrificer) who knows, 'by this rite this member of my body is rectified,' 'by this rite this member of my body is restored'...He is the devayâjî (god-sacrificer) who thinks 'I worship the gods with this, I offer (it) to the gods; ... (The latter) does not conquer so great a world as the other." Gradually the form of sacrifice was kept up but transferred to the region of the mind. An early example of this is quoted from *Tait. Âraṇ.* III. i., where is described the chidyâga by means of which Prajâpati created the world. "Thought (was) the sacrificial ladle (sruk); chitta (mind),—the ghi; voice

(vâk), the altar (vedi); purpose, the grass on the altar; desire, the fire; knowledge, the (second) fire; the Lord of voice, the hotâ (priest); manas, the Upavaktâ (assistant priest); prâṇa, the offering; equanimity, the adhvaryu." From these were developed the genuine vidyâs, methods of meditation, which are collected in the various *Upanishads*,* each of which contains the vidyâs traditionally taught in the Vedic School to which it belongs.

Meanwhile other influences worked on the Hindu mind and carried religious thought in other directions. The multifarious gods of the Vedas were grouped under three classes, thus laying the foundation of the later doctrine of the Trimûrti. The irrepressible instinct for unifying the multiform cosmic phenomena under one grand concept also worked from very early times and thus was evolved the idea of Brahma, the indefinable reality behind the Devas, the power that resides in the Mantras and hence can be utilized by the Mantravit, the knower of the Mantras, the Brâhmaṇa, for the purpose of constraining the Devas, the same power that in the Macrocosm drives the Universe. "Through fear of Him the wind blows, through fear the sun

* Upanishad means literally 'sitting near by.' As the sitting posture (Âsana) is absolutely necessary for the practice of most vidyâs (*Ved. Sut.* IV. i. 7-10), the word Upanishad came to mean a vidya or a collection of vidyâs,

goes; through fear of Him, Agni and Indra (do their work), and Death runs, the fifth." (*Tait. Up. II.* v. 3.) This same Brahma is the power within the innermost Self of the man. "Who dwells in the Earth, is other than the earth, whom the earth knows not, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth from within, he is thy Âtmâ, the inner ruler, the immortal." (*Br. Up.* III. vii. 3.) "Who dwells in the (individual) Self, is other than the Self, whom the Self knows not, whose body the Self is, who rules the Self from within, he is thy Âtmâ, the inner ruler, the immortal." (*Ib.* III. vii. 22.) This identification of Brahma with the Âtmâ, of the God of the Universe with the God within the man, led to the development of the Supreme Science, the Parâvidyâ, which is the specific Vedânta discipline and attempts to soar to the greatest heights of meditation man is capable of.

But it is very few that can seek the Supreme in the silent recesses of the heart. In most men 'the senses run out, not towards the Self'; and they seek Brahma in the Cosmos without, in the world of object and not the subject. When the Paramâtmâ is thus thought of as the object He appears as the power of Nature, for That can never become the object, but is "the consciousness, to be reached by consciousness (in-turned), seated in the hearts of all." (*Bhag. Gîtâ* xiii. 17). Search for

Him outside as Indra did. "He ran to That. That vanished from his view. He beheld in that very space, a woman, very brilliant, Umâ of golden hue." (*Kena Up.* iii. 11, 12.) She is the Supreme power "by which this Universe is upheld," symbolized by Gâyatrî in *Chh. Up.* iii. 12 and *Brih. Up.* v. 14. This concept of Ṣakti, the Power of Nature, was developed from the much earlier one of Aditi, defined in the Nirukta as Adînâ devamâtâ, the mighty mother of the Gods. Even in the earliest hymns of the *Ṛig Veda* she is an embodiment of Power and the supporter of the Universe. She is described as "the luminous Aditi, the Supporter of the Earth, living in Heaven" (*R. V. I.* 136. 3). Not only is she the mother of the Gods, but she is "the great mother of the devotees (Suvratânâm), the mistress of the rites, the strong in might, the ever-young, the widely-extended, the protecting, the skilful in guiding" (*Vâj. Sam.* 21. 5). When the power behind Nature and that of Mantras was erected into one objective entity—the world-mother, she absorbed all the functions of the ancient Aditi. Gradually this idea, that Brahma if sought as an object, and not the subject of introspective vision is Ṣakti, that the objective form of the One without form is Cosmic Power, grew and appealed to the religious imagination. Ṣakti, Cosmic Power, became the recipient of worship,

both outer and inner; both Pratîka Upâsanâ, worship of symbols in temples and at home, and Mânasapûja of Ambâ, the world-mother spread in the country* and largely supplanted Vedic Yajñas. This gave birth to the literature of the Âgamas (literally, revelations), also called Tantras (lit. skilful acts).

At the same time the ancient movement, already referred to, of reducing the many Gods to three classes, each class under the headship of one chief God developed in different lines. The *Nirukta* of Yâska, and the *Brihaddevata* were the earliest attempts at what we may call the higher criticism of the *Vedas*, while portions of the *Brâhmaṇas* represent the lower criticism. The critical movement of the *Nirukta* was snuffed out by a later ebullition of the mythœpic instinct, which seems so congenial to the Indian mind. The *Nirukta* taught, "There are three Gods, according to the expounders of the *Veda*, Agni whose place is the Earth, Vâyu or Indra, whose place is the middle region, and Sûrya, whose place is the sky." In the *Kenopanishad* Agni, Vâyu and Indra are spoken of as the chief Gods. This must have been the general belief in the age when the hymns of the *Rigveda* were compiled into a Saṃhita (collection), for we find that the

* The horrible images and bloody rituals of the Nature-goddesses of the Dravidians were also adopted in this worship.

first hymns of each M a ṇ ḍ a l a of the *Rigveda* (except the ninth, devoted to S o m a) are those in praise of Agnî, the next generally of Vâyu and the last of Indra. In the *Taittirîya Upanishad,* Surya takes the place of Indra, but Indra (or Ṣakra) continued to be a chief God during the age of Buddhism. Indeed he was worshipped in temples in Southern India and Jâva, in the early years of the Christian era, when Buddhism was the state religion, as we find from Tamil Epics of eighteen hundred years ago. But long before this another T r i m û r t i had been worked out; Brahmâ, Vishṇu and Ṣiva who were minor dieties in the Vedic age, Brahmâ being called Brahmaṇaspati or Brihaspati, and Ṣiva being called Rudra, supplanted the earlier Trinity. Ṣiva absorbed the functions of Agni besides those of some popular Dravidian phallic deity and Vishṇu those of Indra and Sûrya.* Later on, Ṣiva with some and Vishṇu with others became the chief person of the Trimûrti, on whom the heart might lean and round whose feet the emotions of the devotee might twine themselves.

Brahmâ, though one of the Trimûrti, the Indian Trinity of the age that succeeded the final

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* Innumerable Vedic passages prove that Agni coalesced with Ṣiva and Indra and Surya with Upendra, Vishṇu. Krishna's defeat of Indra might refer to this latter incident. Brahmâ corresponds to Vâyu as he is cosmic P r â n a He is identified with the atmosphere...the region of Vâyu in *Atharva Sam.* X. ii. 25.

compilation of the *Mahâbhârata* never became a supreme God like Vishṇu or Ṣiva. This has puzzled European Scholars who cannot understand why the creator, the first and greatest person of the Trinity in their religion, should be considered a secondary person in the Hindu Trinity. The Hindu framed the concept of the one noumenon of the universe not as a person, but as a substance behind Sat and Asat, personal consciousness and the unconscious (*R. V.* x. 129). Considered as an *object* of thought, the *same* was the active power behind the phenomenal universe, identical with the power of the mantras, the golden hued Brahmâ, Brahmaṇaspati, the Lord of Hymns (*R. V.* ii. 23, i. 40 etc.), later on conceived as a female deity, Ṣakti. Brahmâ (male) never became a supreme personal God, for the Jñâna Yogîs, men of the intellectual temperament naturally preferred the higher concept of Brahma (neuter), the Impersonal Reality behind the Cosmos to be reached by âvrittachakshuḥ, introspective meditation, as the eternal, immutable Subject, the âtmâ; and the Karmayogîs, men of the emotional temperament, when they did not worship Vishṇu, the active God of the developing universe (the Vedic Sûrya, the nourisher of all that is) or Ṣiva who manifests himselt when the individual turns his back on the world and becomes an ascetic (the vedic Agni who burns the universe), preferred

the concept Ṣakti, universal power as a wider generalization than Brahmâ (male), the same power exercising the one function of creation. Another reason why Brahmâ did not attain to the position of Vishṇu or Ṣiva is that, being the creator, he is no more an active deity and could scarcely reward or punish his devotees. It is the hope of reward and fear of punishment that is the basis of most of what passes for Bhakti (religious devotion) and Brahmâ could not satisfy these human emotions. In later times Brahmâ was degraded to the position of an Individual Soul (jîvâtmâ). Hence so few traces are found of any worship of Brahmâ in India. The cults of Vishṇu were called Bhâgavata or Pâñcharâtra and those of Ṣiva, Pâṣupata or Mâheṣvara. These cults were in existence before the Christian Era. The Bhâgavatas are alluded to in an inscription of the second century before Christ. The *Mahâbhârata*, which most critics now assign to the third century B. C., refers to the Pâṣupata and of the Pâncharâtra systems; and the part of the *Mahâbhârata* where they are referred to is certainly not a later interpolation, but is at least as ancient as the bulk of the poem.

These monotheistic movements, the Vaishṇava and Ṣaiva, inspired by the need of a single, supreme, personal God felt by those who could not rise to the high levels of meditation on the absolute spread to South India, where they received a great

accession of strength, especially when opposed to Buddhism, which they killed out after a severe struggle which lasted a few centuries. This great development of monotheism in southern India was perhaps influenced by the monotheism of the Semitic races with whom southern India had commercial intercourse from early times. The sterner and more repulsive features of Ṣiva as well as the extremely realistic phallic emblems which represent him remind us of the Jahve of the Hebrews, and the sexual aberrations associated with Vishṇu worship remind us of similar excesses in the valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris. The specific tenets of the Pâncharâtra and Ṣaiva schools were formulated in Northern India, for we find them referred to in the *Mahâbhârata* and their technical terms are all Samskrit; but the movements became all powerful in Southern India, from whence they spread back to Northern India and have taken a more prominent hold of the Hindu imagination than any other of the numerous schools of thought or worship developed in India. The final extinction of Buddhism and obscuration of Jainism in India was due to these two waves of Vishṇu-worship and Ṣiva-worship that spread North from the South about 5 centuries after Christ. By that time Buddhism and Jainism were themselves choked with Tantra practices, though without provision for devotion to

a personal God and therefore easily gave way to Tântrika religions which provided for this Bhakti, so necessary to the emotional man. These cults utilized the architectural developments of Buddhism and Jainism and hence arose the Temple architecture of southern India. This architecture was probably also influenced by the Egyptian temple architecture, for southern India had from early times a steady commercial intercourse with Egypt as with Babylonia. Temple ritual was elaborated on a grand scale. This ritual was primarily based on the ceremonies of fetish-worship of the Dravidian races, many of which are still observed in villages and under wayside-trees in all their primitive barbarism. Into the Temple-ritual was welded elements from the sacrificial ritual developed by the Aryan Ṛishis. Thus was evolved the gorgeous ritual of the Temples which more effectively killed out the Vedic Yajñas (sacrifices) than the gentle banter of the *Sâṅkhya* and the *Bhagavad-gîtâ* or the more passionate denunciations of the founders of the Jaina and the Bauddha cults. Similarly the old fire-worship of the home (Ekâgni grihya ceremonies) gave way to domestic idolatry, a minified copy of the temple worship. And the vidyâs of the *Upanishads* became supplanted by mental worship of the two gods and the one goddess that now supplanted the innumerable gods of the

vedic Pantheon and the countless local and tribal deities worshipped from pre-Aryan times.

The worship of Ṣakti, Ṣiva and Vishṇu by means of meditation, and of symbols and idols both in houses and temples gave birth to the three classes of Âgamas, called Ṣâkta, Ṣaiva and Pâñcharâtra. The Âgamas like the *Upanishads*, were the ultimate developments of the *Brâhmaṇas*, (though they contained other elements besides); hence the followers of the Âgama schools sought to prove their orthodoxy by interpreting the *Upanishads* in accordance with their own tenets. They even gave the name of Saṃhita to them, as also the name Smṛiti, thus indicating their claim to be, what they really were, based on and regularly evolved from tradition. This movement gave birth to most of the later *Upanishads*, which unlike the earlier ones do not denominate the Supreme Being Param Brahma, but are expressly Vaishṇava, Ṣaiva or Ṣâkta in their tone and are probably in many cases but Âgamas under the name of *Upanishads*. Many of the Âgamas themselves are called *Upanishads*, though not included in the recognized 108.

The *Bhagavadgîta* which is called an *Upanishad*, also the Smṛiti, *par excellence*, and the *Svetâṣvatara Upanishad* are works of Vedânta, but show clear traces of the influence of the

Âgamas. Garbe has pointed out the influence of the *Bhâgavata* (Vaishṇava) *Âgamas* on the former. The latter bears equally clear traces of the influence of the Ṣaiva cult. Both works seem to be due to an ancient synthesizing movement in which was attempted a higher standpoint than the monism of the *Upanishads*, the pluralism of the Sâṅkhya and the Vaiṣeshika and the three tattvas (triple reality) of the Âgama Schools, a standpoint from which all three can be reconciled and treated as different aspects of the higher point of view.

The influence of the Âgamas or Tantras, as they are more familiarly known, on Indian life has been profound. The living Hindu religion of to-day from Cape Comorin to the remotest corners of Tibet is essentially Tântric. Even the few genuine Vedic rites that are preseved and are supposed to be derived straight from the *Vedas e.g.* the Sandhyâ, have been modified by the addition of Tântric practices. Equally profound has been the influence of the Âgamas on the development of Vedânta philosophy. Ṣaṅkara was a professed Ṣâkta and his advaita exposition of the Vedânta, though overtly independent of the Ṣâkta Âgamas, is influenced by Tântric theories and his discipline by Tântric practices. Râmânuja who, according to Dr. Thibaut, expounds a less forced form of Vedânta and more near to the

ideas of Bâdarâyaṇa, the author of the *Vedânta Sûtras*, than Ṣaṅkara, was a Vaishṇava and regarded the Vaishṇava Âgamas as authoritative, though he too seldom quotes them to support his exposition. Madhva is so much under the Âgama influence that his *Bhâshya* is but a string of Âgama texts with a few words thrown in here and there to connect them.

The Âgamas have all been kept secret, very few having been printed or being easily available in Mss. The names of 108 Pâncharâtra Âgamas, 28 Ṣaiva Âgamas and 77 Ṣakta Âgamas are given as the authoritative books of these schools. Hundreds more are quoted in the commentaries of the few books that one can get at. The few Âgamas that are available now belong to different ages. The *Lakshmî Tantra*, for instance, among the Vaishṇava Âgmas which is predominantly Ṣâkta in tone, the *Pâdma Saṃhita*, which is nearer to advaita than the modern Vaishṇava relishes, being decidedly ancient, and the *Parâṣara Saṃhita* and the *Bhâradvâja Saṃhita* which are highly sectarian and support specific recent tenets being decidedly of a very late age. In the case of the Ṣaiva and Ṣâkta Schools, their common tenets are so many and specific differences so few that this test of age cannot be applied, but many of the existing Âgamas are

anterior to the age of Ṣaṅkara.

And we must also remember that, in the case of these writings, as in that of the *Râmâyaṇa*, the *Mahâbhârata*, the *Purâṇas* and the metrical *Smṛitis*, portions of the substance are very ancient, but the form has grown with time. The contents of the Âgamas are of unequal value. Here and there we meet with snatches of high philosophy, subtle psychological analysis of ecstatic mental states, and valuable descriptions of centres of prâṇa and lines of force in the subtle body, but the bulk of the Âgamas is but grovelling superstition, mostly of a revolting form, and endless details of dull ritual. Besides the Âgamas, this school has given birth to a whole series of philosophical works—of Sûtras, Kârikâs,* Bhâshyas, Vrittis and Vârttikas, besides independent works—an immense literature jealously guarded from the prying eyes of the modern inves-

* A Sûtra is ordinarily a series of extremely brief prose aphorisms, generally unintelligible without a Commentary. A Kârikâ gives the substance of a Sûtra in verse form and is also terse. A Bhâshya is the exposition of the supposed teachings of a Sûtra but really the teachings of the Bhâshyakâra supported by a great wealth of argument and quotation. A Vritti is a further exposition of the same. A Bhâshyakâra always strikes out an original line of thought and twists the Sûtra as he likes; but a Vrittikâra is supposed to follow the lines of a Bhâshya. A Vârttika is generally a Vritti in verse form. A Ṭippaṇi contains brief explanations on a Sûtra, on the lines of some Bhâshya.

tigator, but slowly sacrificed to the omnivorous poochies.

The Âgamas are generally divided into four parts (pâdas,) Jñana, Yoga, Kriyâ, and Charyâ. "Jñana is knowledge of the Lord; that knowledge is called release" (*Pâdma Saṃhita* I. ii. 6.) "Yoga is the restriction (bandha) of the unagitated chitta to one subject" (*Ib.* II. i. 3.) "Kriyâ (embraces all acts) from ploughing the ground (for laying the foundations of the temple) to establishing (the idol) (*Ib* III. i. 6). Charyâ is "the method of worship" (*Ib.* IV. i. 1). The Ṣaiva Âgamas regard that the last three parts together constitute Tapas to be learnt from a human teacher and that the first, i. e., Jñâna can be taught only by Ṣiva who comes as the Guru to the ripe disciple at the psychological moment and gives him an initiation (Dikshâ) into wisdom.

In the earlier Âgamas of all the three cults the Supreme Real Being of the Universe, corresponding to the Brahma Paramam of the *Upanishads* and called Nârâyaṇa in the Vaishṇava tantras and Maheṣvara or Ṣiva in the other two tantras retreats to the background and all cosmic functions are attributed to Ṣakti treated as his wife but the really the predominant factor.

But in the Vaishṇava and Ṣaiva schools

the male god soon acquired a prominent position and they also broke up into different sects. Yet these numerous schools have some common characteristics: They acknowledge three tattvas—ultimate realities, (1) A supreme Being with the male or female aspect predominant. (2) the class of individual souls (3) the objective Universe. These three Realities (t a t t v a s) are given different names in the different schools, but their attributes and mutual relations do not vary much, though the terminology varies from school to school. These schools are also all agreed in opposing the M â y â-v â d a, the doctrine of the unreality of the world, developed from the teachings of Gauḍapâda and Ṣaṅkara and reduced to absurdity by their modern followers. Says the *Paushkara Âgama.* "If, (as the Ṣâṅkaras say) the world is an illusive appearance of conscious being, the effected world will be a hollow unreality; how can the world which is established to be really existing by all methods of proofs be a false transmutation of consciousness" (*Ib.* ii. 5).

The Â g a m a s do not regard the world as a false show; as Bhâskararâya says in *Lalitâ Sahasranâma Bhâshya*, under the name *Mithyâjagad adhishṭhânâ* No. 735, "Really according to the belief of the T â n t r i k a s, who hold (the doctrine that) the world (is) a transmutation of Brahma, the Universe is real; because as there is absolutely no

difference between Brahma and the world just as (there is no difference) between a pot and the clay (of which it is made), the reality of the universe neccessarily follows from the reality of Brahma. As we accept that the difference (between Brahma and the Universe) is false, we accept all the texts declaring non-difference. From the unreality of difference (between Brahma and the Universe) it follows that the relation of supporter and supported is false. Hence the Vedânta theory of the illusoriness of the world cannot be accepted."

Intense Bhakti, personal Devotion, to the world-mother or to the world-father (whether called Mahâdeva (Şiva), or Nârâyaṇa, characterises these schools. The root of this attitude of Bhakti to a supreme Being can be traced to that spirit of the vedic Ṛishis, which made them praise as the Highest, whatever God, high or low, they happened to invoke at any time—the spirit which Max Muller has labelled Henotheism. The development of the Âgama schools gave a great impetus to Bhakti by concentrating the attention on one Deva and this resulted in an extreme development of Bhakti, a devotion that expressed itself in an absorbing love, a complete self-surrender, which the want of a sense of humour led to such ridiculous extremes that the devotee's life became one orgie of singing and dancing and worse.

Another common characteristic of these Âgama

Schools is their intimate association with abnormal manifestations of the sexual instinct. The emotional nature of man is the common root of devotion to a superhuman being as well as to human beings and the habit of self-abandonment to a divine being which grows with devotion easily degenerates into self-abandoment of different kinds. Hence there exists in India to-day debased forms of Ṣ a k t i-worship, Ṣ i v a-worship, and V i s h-ṇ u-worship much too revolting to be described.

This devotional movement has, as in another countries, given a great stimulus to Art; Temple architecture, especially in Southern India, and Lyric (devotional) Poetry, especially Sanskrit, Tamil and Hindî have reached a high order of perfection; only for want of cultivation of the powers of observation, this poetry is not noted for any wealth of poetic images, but is oppressed, as other departments of life in India are, by a load of soul-suffocating convention. Music, Dancing (N â ṭ y a) and gesticulation (a b h i n a y a) have also been evolved under the influence of religious devotion; but the last art has degenerated into gross sensuality as its modern expounders are the women euphemistically called 'slaves of the Gods (d e v a d â s î s) attached to the Southern Temples.

The following notes regarding the early references to Ṣiva and Vishṇu temples in inscriptions so far discovered and deciphered have been drawn up by my friend, Mr. T. A.

Gopinatha Row, of Srîrangam and are extremely useful.

References to Vishṇu-cult.

1. Udayagiri cave inscription of...........ḍhala, son of Vishṇudâsa, grandson of Chhagala and vassal of the Gupta King, Chandra Gupta II, dated the Gupta era 82(401-2 A. D.) Sanskrit dedication of a rock-cut shrine to Vishṇu.

2. Bhitarî stone pillar inscription of Skandagupta, undated, recording the intallation of the image of the God Ṣârṅgî and the allotment of a village to it.

3. Junâgaḍh inscription of Skandagupta, dated G. E. 138 (457-8 A. D.) Repairs to the lake Sudarṣana by the governor Parṇadatta's agent, Chakrapâlita. Chakrapâlita caused to be built a temple to Charabhrit.

4. Gangdhâr inscription of Viṣvakarmâ. dated 423-4 A. D. The inscription belongs partly to the Vaishṇava and partly to the Ṣâkta (?) form of religion. It records that a person built a temple for Vishṇu, the Sapta Mât-ṛikas and a well of drinking water.

5. Êraṇ stone pillar inscription of Budhagupta, G. E. 165(484-5 A. D.) Erection of a dhvajastambha to Janârdhana by a Mahârâjâ Matṛivishṇu and his younger brother Dhanyavishṇu.

6. Khôh copper plates of Mahârâjâ Samkshobha. G. E. 209(528-9 A. D. [begins with the famous "twelve-lettered mantra" (Om namobhagavate Vâsudevâya), of the Bhâgavatas].

7. Khôh copper plate of Mahârâjâ Jaganâtha G. E.

177 (496-7 A. D.) Grant of the village of Dhavashaṇḍika to a number of Brâhmaṇas for the purpose of a temple of Bhagavân.

8. Khôh copperplates of Mahârâjâ Ṣarvanâtha G. E. 192 (512-3 A. D.)

9. Gaḍhwa stone inscription of G. E. 148 (467-8). found in the Daṣâvatâra temple.

References to Siva-cult.

1. Udayagiri cave inscription of Chandragupta II. undated. Records the excavation of a shrine of Ṣambhu.

2. Bilsaḍ stone inscription of Kumâragupta of G. E. 96 (415-6 A. D) Records the building of a number of minor buildings in the temple of Swâmî Mahâsena.

3. Bihâr pillar of Skandagupta.

4. Mandasôr pillar of Yaṣôdharma.

5. Kôsam (Kauṣâmbi) inscription on the stone image. of the time of Bhîmavarma G. E. 139 (458-9 A. D.)

These facts show how much these two cults were advanced in the Fifth century A. D. and that they must have had behind them many centuries of development.

We shall now discuss the fundamental tenets of the Â g a m a schools.

i. The Ṣ â k t a or D e v î Â g a m a

[The 77 Âgamas of this School are subdivided into three, (1) 5 Ṣ u b h â g a m a s, also called S a m a y a, which teach practices leading to knowledge and liberation (2) 64 K a u l â-

gamas, which teach disgustingly dirty practices supposed to develop magical powers (3) 8 Misrâgamas, aiming at both. The 64 Kaula Âgamas are said to deal with occult arts, causing illusions, killing people by means of magic, exorcising demons, alchemy and sundry dirty practices of worship. They are called Kaula, because they advocate the worship of Ṣakti residing in kula, the perineum. This is also called the left hand path. The eight Miṣra Âgamas deal with Ṣrîvidyâ also and are hence the mixed path. The names of these Âgamas are Chandrakalâ, Jyotisvatî, Kalânidhi, Kulârṇava, Kuleṣvarî, Bhuvanesvarî, Bârhaspatya, and Dûrvâsamata. The five Ṣubha âgamas describe the right hand path, also called also Samaya âchâra, the worship of Devî throughout the sushumnâ. They are the Saṃhitâs named Vasishṭha, Sanaka, Ṣuka, Sanandana, Sanatkumâra.* Philosophical ideas are referred to only incidentally in these Âgamas but are apparently regularly expounded in the Ṣakti Sûtras, a work which, it will be worth the while of Mss. hunters to bring to light. Nine Sûtras from this work are quoted by Bhâskararâya in different places of his Lalitâ

* For fuller details regarding these works, Vide Lakshmîdhara's comments on Saundaryalahari, Sl. 31.

Sahasranâma bhâshya. The opening Sûtra says, "Consciousness, which is independence is the cause of the production of the Universe." Another Sûtra says "when one does not realize this he gets confused by his own Ṣakti and enters Saṃsâra." The next Sûtra adds, "when he realizes it, and his mind is turned inwards and mounts up towards the knower, he reaches (pure) consciousness." The various stages leading to liberation are indicated in the following:—"When one attains the bliss of (pure) consciousness, (he reaches) Jîvanmukti, which is unshaken identity with chit (pure consciousness), though he retains the consciousness of body, prâṇa etc." "This attainment of the bliss of (pure) consciousness (Chidânanda) is due to Madhyavikâsa", *i. e.*, "by the destruction of doubt." "When he attains bala (power of will), he makes the universe his own." The last Sûtra describes the goal of life to be "the attainment of the Goddess of True Consciousness and the mastery over the Chakras (the centres of energy)." Judged from these quotations the Ṣakti Sûtras, if discovered, will prove a very valuable find. Many other works of this School are known only by name or by stray quotations by commentators].

The three tattvas (ultimates) of this school are (1) An impersonal, inactive Being called Prakâṣa

or Ṣ i v a (to be distinguished from the active Ṣ i v a of the Ṣ a i v â g a m a s), of the nature of pure consciousness like the P u r u s h a of the S â ṅ k h y a School, but differing therefrom in being omnipresent (a k h i l â n u g a t a). (2) an active, personal Being, called V i m â r ṣ a, Ṣ a k t i or Tripurâ of the nature of P û r ṇ â h a m b h â v a (full egoity), personal conciousness, who includes all individual souls; she is also called Ahaṃtâ, I-ness (3) The insentient universe of matter, also called Idaṃtâ, this-ness. Illumination, power and object thus form the triune manifested universe. In the Ṣ a i v a and V a i s h ṇ a v a â g a m a s, the first Being of this trinity is an active Being, and the Second, His Ṣ a k t i, occupies a subordinate position and in the latest developments of these schools almost disappears from view. The extreme Ṣ â k t a view is embodied in the opening ṣ l o k a of *Saundaryalahari.* "Ṣ i v a, when he is united with Ṣ a k t i, is able to create; otherwise, the God is unable even to move." Kshemarâja in his Ṣ i v a s û t r a V i m a r ṣ i n î*, quotes the following from the M r i t y u j i d b h a ṭ ṭ â r a k a. "That P a r â ṣ a k t i, my I c h c h h â, potent, born of Nature (S v a b h â v a j â) is to be known as heat in fire, as of the form of the

* A B h â s h y a by Kshemarâja, a writer of the 11th Century, A. D. on the Ṣ i v a S û t r a s, supposed to have been discovered or perhaps composed in the 10th Century by Vasugupta, the founder of the Î ṣ v a r a P r a t y a b h i j n â system of Cashmere. This work has been edited and translated by me and published by the Theosophical Publishing Co., Adyar, Madras.

rays in the sun, that Ṣakti is the cause of all the worlds." Another famous tantra says,

"Tripurâ is the Supreme Ṣakti, antecedent to jñânâ and other Ṣaktis, O dear one. She is differentiated as gross and suotle and becomes the mother of the origin of the Trilokî (triple experience of man). Her form is that wherein the totality of the (36) tattvas is dissolved. All evolution being hers, the Supreme is not required (to be active in the world process). The Supreme (Ṣiva) devoid of Ṣakti, is unable to do anything. He becomes omnipotent when he is united to Ṣakti. O, Supreme Lady, without Ṣakti, the subtle (unevolved, potential) Ṣiva has no name or support. Even though (he is) known, O Mahâdevî, there is no use (lit. no gain of name or virtue). When he is meditated on, (there results) no grace, no steadiness of mind. When she is in the supreme path, she is of subtle form and thence attains the states of the seed and the plant (the subtle and gross universes) which had been absorbed in her." (*Vâmakeṣvara Tantra* iv. 4-9).*

A Mss copy of this work, also called *Nityâshoḍaṣikârṇavam* (the Ocean of the 16 *Nitya* goddesses) and its commentary, by Bhâskararâya, called *Setubandham* (the building of the bridge) has been kindly placed at my disposal by Dr. O. Schrader of the Adyar Library. This work is divided into two parts called *Pûrvachatuṣṣatî* and *Uttarachatuṣṣatî*. Lakshmîdhara, a commentator on *Saundaryalahari* says that the Vamakeṣvara Tantra is a part of the *Âgama* called Bhairava yâmala. (Vide page 17. Mysore Edition of *Saundaryalahari*.)

Prakâṣa and Vimarṣa are explained by Bhâskararâya (the famous ṣâkta scholar of the 18th century, who was a paṇḍit of the Tanjore Court and who has been already referred to) in his *Bhâshya* on *Vimarṣarûpiṇî*, 548th name in *Lalitâsahasranâma*. "The spontaneous (svâbhâvika) vibration of Parabrahma, who is Prâkâṣa, is called Vimarṣa. It is said in the *Saubhagyasudhodaya*, 'His *Ṣakti* is spontaneous vibration, vimarṣa. It is she that creates the mobile and the immobile (creatures of) the universe, and also destroys this world." The third member of this trinity, matter, is defined and subdivided as in the *Sâṅkhya* School. In fact the *Âgama* schools have completely absorbed the *Sâṅkhya* philosophy so far as the analysis of the material universe is concerned. They have elaborated them in sundry directions and superadded other tattvas to those of the *Sâṅkhyas* and thus, to some extent, destroyed the clarity and philosophical purity of the *Sâṅkhya* concepts. Instead of the 25 tattvas of *Sâṅkhya* this school divides the universe into thirty-six tattvas (principles) which will be explained in the next chapter. These thirty-six tattvas are again classified as three tattvas (ultimates), called (1) Siva tattva, the supreme, (2) Vidyâ tattvas, the subtle manifestations of *Ṣakti* and (3) Âtmâ tattvas, the material universe starting from Mâyâ and ending

with the earth. These three ultimates are the same as Prakâşa, Vimarşa and Idamṃtâ. These three concepts are very clearly explained by Bhâskararâya in his *Bhâshyâ* on his own *Varivasyârahasya.*

"Brahma called Prakâṣa is the pure knowledge resulting from the consciousness implied in the first person in 'I desire', 'I know, etc. It is associated with Omniscience, Lordship, Omnipotence, Plenitude, Immanence, and other powers. The vibration of a ray of Prakâşa of the nature of bliss is called Parâhaṃtâ, the Supreme Egoism, Vimarṣa, the Supreme Lalitâ, Bhaṭṭâraka, Tripura-Sundarî [names of the world-mother]. It is said in the *Vişvaşarîra Skandha* of Virûpâksha Pañchâşika "Lordship is Omnipotence (Power of Action), Self-dependence and consciousness. These are said by Ṣambhu to be the names of Parâhaṃtâ. As objectivity (Idaṃtâ, literally, this-ness) is not manifested without the subject (Ahaṃtâ lit., I-ness) on account of the relativity of I and This (Self and not-self), the object, which is the content of the notion 'this', is caused by the power of Ahaṃtâ (the subject) or by Brahma who is other than it. That object is evolved from it." (*Varivasyâ-rahasya,* commentary on I. 3.)

Prakâşa is illumination; it is the purest distillate of experience or rather the attenuation of

experience to purest consciousness of Being, the barest consciousness without being stained by the least touch of relativity; the nearest approach to Pure Being, to the Absolute that human thought or human language can hope to reach.

A m b â (the world-mother) is the first appearance of a vibration in the absolute P r a k â ṣ a , the first assertion of relation, of V i m a r ṣ a, distinction, which gives birth to all this universe. She is the power (Ṣ a k t i) latent in P r a k â ṣ a beginning to manifest herself and give birth to Gods, men, and other beings. The motion that starts from A h a ṃ t â goes over to the other pole of I d a ṃ t â, (This-ness) objectivity, matter. These three ultimates of the T â n t r i k a s , Illumination, Power, and Object may be compared to Hegel's three doctrines of Logic—Being, Essence and Notion, and Idea. "Being is the notion implicit only ; its special forms have the predicate 'is' ... Pure being makes the beginning ; because it is on the one hand pure thought, and on the other immediacy itself, simple and indeterminate ; and the first beginning cannot be mediated by anything, or be further determined...Being-for-self, as reference to itself, is immediacy, and as reference of the negative to itself, is a self-subsistent, the One...The terms in essence are always mere pairs of correlatives, and not yet absolutely reflected in themselves: hence in essence the actual unity of the notion is not

realized, but only postulated by reflection. Essence, which is Being coming into mediation with itself through the negativity of itself is self-relatedness only in so far as it is in relation to an other—this other however coming into view at first not as some thing which *is*, but as postulated and hypothetised—Being has not vanished : but firstly, Essence, as simple self-relation, is Being, and secondly as regards its one sided characteristic of immediacy, Being is deposed to a mere negative, to a seeming or reflected light—Essence accordingly is Being thus reflecting light into itself......The Essence lights up in itself or is mere reflection : and therefore is only self-relation, not as immediate but as reflected. And that reflex relation is Self-Identity ...Essence is mere Identity and reflection in itself only as it is self-relating negativity, and in that way self-repulsion. It contains therefore essentially the characteristic of Difference. The Notion is the power of the substance self-realised. It is a systematic whole, in which each of its constituents functions, is the very total which the notion is......The onward motion of the notion is no longer either a transition into, or a reflection on something else, but development. The realisation of the notion,—a realisation in which the universal is this one totality withdrawn back into itself and which has given itself a character of 'immediate unity by merging the mediation: this realisation

of the notion is the Object." (*The Logic of Hegel*, 2nd Edition trans. by Wallace, Sect. 83, 84, 86, 96, 112, 115, 116, 160, 161, 193).

ii The Ṣaiva or Mâheṣvara Âgama

The Ṣaiva schools are so intimately allied to the Ṣâkta schools that the literature and doctrines of one are quoted as authoritative by the other. The chief characteristic of the Ṣaiva school is that Ṣiva is the predominant Being and, especially in the later developments of these schools, Ṣakti is almost a negligible factor of the cosmos. The characteristic Theism of the Âgama schools led to Ṣiva being regarded as the Final cause of the Universe. But the Ṣaiva system became divided into three different schools in regard to the question how far causal efficiency belongs to the will of Ṣiva and how far to the actions of beings.

These schools are called (1) the Lakulîṣa-Pâṣupata school of Guzerat, which prefers to call the Supreme Being Paṣupati (lit. the Lord of cattle); (2) the Ṣaiva Siddhânta of Southern India, intimately allied to the Ṣâkta; (3) the Pratyabhijñâ school of Kashmîr, so-called because the fundamental teaching of the sect is that pratyabhijñâ (recognition) of the Lord in the knower as well as in the known leads to liberation.

With regard to the question of the respective causal efficiency of Ṣiva and of Karma, the Pâşupata School maintains that Ṣiva is a cause independent of the actions (karma) of individuals but that "the efficiency of actions depends upon (an individual's) power of action (kriyâ-şakti) being unobstructed on account of conformity with the infinitely potent will of the Lord" (*Sarvadarṣana-saṃgraha chap.* vi). The Siddhânta school regards Ṣiva as the Universal agent, but not irrespective of individual Karma. "(The fruition of) the two (*i. e.* good and bad) actions reaches (individual) souls by the order of the Highest; His dependence on the karma of the individual does not detract from His independance, just as a king's depending on his guards to protect his city does not detract from the royal power; just as the holder of a magnet directs the motion of a needle, so the Lord directs the fruits of actions to the proper persons." (condensed from a lengthy discussion in Sivajñana bhâshyam, a Tamil commentary of the 18 centuary on Meykaṇda Deva's Tamil Sûtras called *Ṣivañanabodam*, earlier than the 13th century). The Pratyabhijñâ schools conceive Maheşvara to create the universe, "by mere force of desire", for he is of "unobstructed power, bliss and independence." This school, therefore, denies causal efficiency to all but the will of Maheşvara.

This difference of starting point has led to a wide divergence of views with regard to the nature and relations of the three metaphysical ultimates that compose the manifested universe.

(1) The Pâṣupata School.

The three ultimates are called by the followers of this school, the cause, the effect and the defect. The *Sarvadarṣanasaṃgraha* quoting from the commentary on the first sûtra of this sect, "Now then we shall expound the rules of Pâṣupatayoga of Paṣupati," says, "Paṣu means the effect, for it depends on something ulterior; Pati means the cause, (Kâraṇa) the Lord, for he is the cause of the world, the Ruler." "The cause is the author of creation, destruction and sustenance (of the world, the effect). On account of differences of quality and action he is subdivided into Pati, Sâdhya etc. His Lordship consists in infinite knowledge and power, eternal supremacy, being the First of beings, possession of power, not adventitious, etc." "The Effect (Kârya) is threefold, Vidyâ (sentiency), Kalâ (the insentient), Paṣu (the sentient). Sentiency (Vidyâ) is the characteristic of Paṣu. It is two fold, according as it is of the nature of Knowledge (bodha), and Ignorance (abodha). Knowledge is (again) two fold, according as its procedure is discriminative (viveka) or indiscriminative (aviveka). Discriminative

procedure which is based on evidence is called chitta. By means of chitta, all living beings cognize objects discriminate or indiscriminate when they are illuminated by the light of external objects.* Ignorance, again, is either characterized or not by the objects of the Paşu* The insentient (Kalâ), while depending upon the sentient, is unconscious. It is, also, two-fold, what is called the effect and what is called the cause. Therein, what is called the effect is ten-fold, the five tattvas, Prithvî (earth) etc., the five qualities, colour etc. What is called the cause is thirteen-fold, the five organs of Cognition, the five organs of action, the triple Antaḥkaraṇa, Buddhi, Ahaṃkâra and Manas having the functions of certitude, self-cognition and desire. Paṣu is what is under bondage. It is, also, two-fold, the displayed (Sañjana) and the undisplayed. Of these, the displayed are those that are associated with bodies and organs; the undisplayed are devoid of them." "Mala (defect) is an evil condition pertaining to the soul. It is of five kinds, false conception etc. It is said (by Haradatta) that 'false conception, deviation from duty, attachment, interestedness, and falling (from the path), these five are the root of bondage, to be specially shunned in this system.'" (*Ib.* Chap vi). Besides the *Paṣu-*

* The reading of these two sentences is corrupt and the translation is unsatisfactory.

pati Sûtras, Mâdhava quotes, as authorities of this system, Haradattâchârya, and Nakulîşa,* the author of *Pañchârthabhâshyadîpika* and *Âdarşa* about whom nothing is known.

(2) THE ŞAIVA SIDDHÂNTA SCHOOL.

The doctrines and religious practices of this school are propounded in 28 Şaiva Âgamas, a number of treatises on the Şaiva philosophy and a Bhâshya by Nîlakanṭha on the Vedânta Sûtras on Şaiva lines (usually called Şaiva Vişishṭâdvaita) besides a voluminous Tamil literature, produced during the last 1,500 years and perhaps more interesting as literature than as philosophy. The cult of Şiva is " the living system which exercises at the persent day......a marvellous power over the minds of the great majority of the Tamil people."† It is " the most elaborate, influential, and undoubtedly the most intrinsically valuable of all the religions of India."§

The nature and relations of the three ultimates according to this system, are well-explained in

* The proper form of this name is Lakulîşa, synonymous with Daṇḍâyudha, changed into Nakulîşa, in Eastern and Southern India.

† Pope's Tiru-vâşagam p. ix.

§ *Il*- p. lxxiv.

the M ṛ i g e n d r a Â g a m a,* which is the j ñ â n a p â d a (section dealing with knowledge) of the K â m i k a, the first of the Ṣ a i v a Â g a m a s. "S i v a is beginningless, free from defects (m a l a), the all-doer, the all knower, removes from the individual soul (here called, a ṇ u, atom, from its limitation), the web of bonds that obscure its nature. (*Mṛig. Âg.* ii. 1). The whole Ṣ a i v a position is thus "condensed in this one s û t r a†" (*Ib* ii-2) Creation, sustenance and destruction of the Universe, obscuration (T i r o d h â n a), and liberation (of the individual soul), (these five) actions,§ with their agency and fruit are to be known as His. The creator of the world must be self-existent, otherwise there would be a *regressus ad infinitum* and there will be no final cause of M o k s h a. The essence of consciousness is the act of seeing (c h a i t a n y a m d ṛ i k k r i y â r û p a m) and it exists in the Â t m â at all times and on all sides, for we hear that in the liberated, it is per-

* This and a few other Ṣ a i v a Â g a m a s, have been printed with Tamil commentaries in Madras. The Mṛigendra is being edited and transtated by Mr. M. Nârâyaṇaswâmi Iyer, Madras, who kindly furnished me with advance proofs of the first xi chapters.

† It is curious that Ṣ a i v a writers give the name S û t r a to Ṣ l o k a s. The *Iṣvara Pratyabhijñâ Sûtras* are a mixture of Ṣ l o k a s and S û t r a s as we ordinarily understand them.

§ The five functious are in the Ṣ a k t i S û t r a s, of course, attributed to Her and called Â b h â s a (illumination), R a k t i (coloration), V i m a r ṣ a n a (Examinatioo), B î j â v a s t h â n a (sowing the seed) and V i l â p a n a t a (lamentation.)

fect. Though it exists, it does not manifest itself as such (in the unliberated), hence it is inferred that it is obscured ; and it is subject to one whose powers are not obscured (P a t i, the Lord), till it reaches liberation. The web of bonds (p â ṣ a j â- l a m) is on the whole of four kinds, the enveloping, the will of the Lord, K a r m a, and the work of M â y â. (Their) names indicate their nature. "(*Mṛig. Âg.* ii. 3-7).

The Â g a m a discusses in chap iii. P a t i l a k- s h a ṇ a m, the characteristics of the Lord. " As the body and other things are proved to possess the characteristics of products, we must infer that there exists their Maker, different from them. He is ever-lasting because He is not limited by Time ; He is not confined to one locality, because He is all-pervading. He is possessed of powers of creating gradually and simultaneously, because creation is both gradual and simultaneous. He possesses an instrument (K a r a ṇ a), because no action is seen (accomplished) without instruments. This (instrument) must not be taken to be adventitious, because the work has been without a beginning. This instrument is no other than Ṣ a k t i. Ṣ a k t i is not unconcious but a concious Being. As objects are infinite. she, (though) one, appears likewise (infinite) both in cognition and in activity. Action (creation &c. does not result from) the seed of preservation, creation etc. (K a r m a), or from P r a k ṛ i t i or from the in-

dividual soul (a ṇ u); there only remains the theory that it is the work of the Great Lord, the Free. He is Ṣ i v a." (*Ib.* iii. 1-5). "Action always proceeds from an embodied actor; in the world we see actions only of persons with bodies. Hence He, too, is like us. (But) the Lord's body is, unlike ours, one of Ṣ a k t i; M a l a etc. cannot attach themselves to it; that body is composed of the five M a n t r a s and subserve His five actions * (*Ib.* iii. 8.)." "He is omnicient, because he is the Maker of all: for it is well-proved that one does a thing only when one knows the means, the consituent elements and the results. His knowledge is not veiled in anything, hence does not require any aid to manifest itself, It is without doubts and never at fault." (*Ib.* v. 12, 13). "Ṣ a ṇ k r a's knowledge is not based on perception, inference or authority. It shines pure, always, in all things," (*Ib.* v. 15.)

The second ultimate is the P a ṣ u, lit. cattle, hence what is owned by, subject to, the P a t i, the Lord. "The earth and the rest are effects; the Lord is the cause. They are no use to their Maker; nor to themselves because they are uncons-cious; nor are they purposeless, for that would be derogatory to their Maker. There only remains the

* The five mantras, *Tait. Aran.* x. 43. 47, called S a d y o j â t a, V â m a d e v a, A g h o r a, T a t p u r u s h a, and Î s â n a, respectively corresponding to the five functions of creation, preservation, destruction, obscuration and liberation, are the forehead, the mouth, the heart, the g u h y a and the feet of Ṣ i v a.

theory that they are for the use of a third, different from both, the Kshetrajña. The Paşu, for whose sake the earth and other things exist, is not the body, for the body is unconscious and hence it follows that itself must be for the use of another. (The body) cannot be a conscious being for it is an object of cognition (bhogya) and liable to changes of state. Such things as cloth etc, which are objects of cognition and liable to changes of state are insentient. If it is said that the body is conscious, because while in the body, there is consciousness of existence (Sadbhâva), (we reply that) as there is no consciousness in a corpse, the body is unconscious. If it is said that consciousness is one of a series of transformations (that the body is subject to) (we reply) that (if so), memory cannot be continuous. But (continuous) memory is well-known. Hence the one that remembers is other than the body. He is not confined (to space), not momentary, not one, not unconscious, no non-actor, possessor of differentiated consciousness, for it is said that, after the destruction of Pâṣa, he becomes Ṣiva " (*Mṛig. Âg.* vi. 1-7) The Paṣu, is, in his own nature, " the abode of eternal and omnipresent Chit-ṣakti" (*Ib.* vii. 5).

The third ultimate is Pâṣa, fetter, bond. It is threefold, (1) Avidyâ, ignorance (2) Karma (3) Mâyâ. Avidyâ is otherwise known as

Âṇavamala, the defect due to the âtmâ thinking that it is but Aṇu (atom), the taint of finiteness. The Âtmâ who is pure consciousness and Independence imagines himself to be finite, bounded by his body, of circumscribed knowledge and power. As Kshemarâja explains, in his commentary on Ṣiva Sûtras i. 2, "Being infinite consciousness, he thinks, 'I am finite'; being Independence, he thinks 'I am the body (Anâtmâ)". Thus the Âṇava malais of two kinds, (a) Ignorance of the fact that the Âtmâ is consciousness (b) mistaking the body for the Âtmâ, called respectively Akhyâti and Anayathâkhyâti, non-cognition and wrong cognition. This Pâṣa is described as a veil over the soul known by a variety of names, Paṣutva, bondage, Pâṣunihâra, mist round the paṣu, Mṛityu, death, Mûrchchhâ, swoon, Mala, defect, Añjana, pigment, Âvṛiti, envelope, Ruj, malady, Glâni, depression, Pâpa, evil, Mûla, root, Kshaya, decay, etc. It is one in all beings, beginningless, dense, great, possessed of numerous powers (Ṣaktis) residing in every soul and perishing when their time is over. (*Mṛig. Âg.* vii. 6-8). "The benign Mâheṣvarî-Ṣakti, benign, blessing all, is included in the Pâṣas, for they act in conformity with them". (*Ib.* 11), The five powers of the Lord are exercised only with reference to Paṣus and are hence transforma-

tions (pariṇâma) of Avidyâ.

For the purpose of bringing about the liberation of the individual soul, the Lord sets the malas evolving; so start the powers of creation, sustenance, destruction and obscuration of knowledge (tirodhâna or rodhâṣakti); then the Ṣakti evolves into Anugraha, the power of benediction, in that individual from whom the powers of mala have departed and he becomes liberated. The Lord supports the malas during the whole course of their transmutations for the ultimate good of the Paṣus dependent on His Grace. (*Ib.* vii. 11-22). The Second Pâṣa or mala, Karma, is described in chapter viii. It is the cause of the conjunction of the conscious soul with the unconscious body. It is local (*i. e*, not omnipresent), manifold, temporary, associated with individuals, and continuous throughout the births. It is an auxiliary of the first mala, Avidyâ. It is called karma, because it is produced by the activities of beings and adrishṭa (unseen), because it is subtle (between the ending of the action and the beginning of the phala, the reaction). It is the producer and sustainer of the body, the object of enjoyment. It is threefold (produced by the body, the speech and the mind). It is good and bad, dharma and adharma, according as it is based on truth or falsehood. It ripens during (cosmic) slumber, prevails during a Kalpa

and merges in mâyâ during pralaya, but is never destroyed without being experienced (viii 1-5).

The third among the malas is Mâyâ, also called Bheda, difference. This is the Yoni (*Ṣiva Sût.* i. 3), the womb of the world, the granthi-pâṣa (*Mṛig Âg.* ix. 1), the knot that imprisons the Âtmâ in ignorance. "It is single, the cause of misery, the seed of the universe, possessed of many powers and obstructs the individual till the power of its auxiliary (karma) should cease; it is omnipresent and imperishable. For the same reason a creator is inferred from the nature of the universe, it must follow that it has a material cause; for there is no cloth without thread. It is unconscious for its products are known to be so." (*Ib.* ix, 2-4).

The *Paushkara Âgama** describes the categories (padârtha) of the Ṣaiva School as follows:—"Pati, Kuṇḍalinî, Mâyâ, Paṣu, Pâsa, and the causes (kâraka), these are briefly the six categories, in the Ṣaivatantras. That category is called Pati whose triple function is destruction, enjoyment and authority, which is unchanging in its nature, and possessed of powers (Ṣaktis). Kuṇḍalinî (otherwise called, Ṣuddha Mâyâ, Pure Mâyâ) is that whence Pati

* The Jñânapâda of this work has been published in Madras with a Tamil commentary.

gets destruction and other functions, by which the Pure Path (Ṣuddhâdhvâ) is produced, and she is the form where Ṣambhu (Ṣiva) is ever established. Mâyâ (Aşuddha, impure) is that which produces bodies and organs for making possible, experience and objects; it is associated with men's karma. Paṣu is characterized by cognition-action (dṛikkriyâ) obstructed by limitation and is threefold, Sakala, Pralayâkala, and Vijñânakala.* The fifth category, Pâṣa, is said to be the totality of principles (tattvas) from kalâ to the Earth (kshiti). Excellent Ṛishis, the sixth category is, in the tantras, the supreme action called Initiation (Dîkshâ) whose fruit is experience, liberation and manifestation (of each individual as Ṣiva)." (*Ib.* i. 2-15).

Ṣuddha mâyâ, otherwise, bindu (dot), Kuṇḍalinî (the coiled), Ṣivaşakti, the Power of Ṣiva, is a category intermediate between Ṣiva that is Pure consciousness and Matter that is unconcious. She is "the Upâdhi, the cause of the differentiation of Ṣiva's function into destruction etc., described above (*Ib.* ii-1.) She is the cause of the bondage of all beings (aṇu) from Ananta (a person next to Ṣiva) downwards, and also of their release. But she is not the material cause of the world because she is chaitanya, conscious

* More commonly, Vijñânakevala, For a description of these three, *vide infra.*

being, like Ṣiva and without transmutation like matter. (*Ib.* ii.2-4). She is the eternal sound,* the subtle connecting link between words and concepts (*Ib.* ii. 17). This eternal sound is divided into four kinds, called Vaikharî, Madhyamâ, Paṣyantî, and Sûkshmâ. Vaikharî is what becomes in the throat the sound that is heard by the ear and takes the shapes of letters. Madhyamâ is the form of objects mentally apprehended before they are associated with sounds. Paṣyantî is undifferentiated like the yolk within the egg. Sûkshmâ† is the pure Jñâna Sakti. (*Ib.* ii 19-24). These are called four forms of Vâk (lit. Voice, sound), one objective, the others subjective, and all produce states of consciousness of the Paṣu. (*Ib.* ii. 25-26), The individual souls identify themselves with these forms of Vâk and thus result the three Malas (defects) which obscure cognition and action. (*Ib.* ii. 28-29). Kshemarâja defines the three bonds to be the three cognitions, like 'I am finite', 'I am thin or fat', 'I am the sacrificer etc', respectively illustrative of Âṇava, Mâyâ and Karma Malas.‡ These fundamental cognitions of limitation, of identity with the body, and of actorship exist in the mind either in the

* As oppsed to the rudiment of sound, Sabdatanmâtra which is a product. † More commonly called Parâ.

‡ Com. *Siv-Sut.* i-4.

form of words (Vaikharî), or of images (Madhyamâ), or of vague states of consciousness not yet differentiated into clear-cut images (Paşyantî) or, again, the mere possibility of such limited consciousness (Sûkushmâ). Vâk, Sound in its four forms thus marks all the stages of limitation of the individual soul. The names of the Şaktis (goddesses, energies of Şiva) that preside over these and the mantras indicating them are also combinations of Vâk. Hence Şuddhamâyâ, the mother of the universe is supreme Vâk, the eternal sound; this is the doctrine of Nâda, 'voice of the silence', which is the basis of the Şaiva and Şâkta disciplines.

Paşus (Individual souls) are "of three classes, (1) Sakala (2) Pralayâkala (3) Vijñânakala. Listen to their characteristics in order. Sakala is one whose powers of cognition and action are obstructed by (Âṇava) mala, are associated (by Mâyâmala) with Kala and other Tattvas* for the evolution (of limited, human powers) and bound up with Karma (mala) for experiencing (pleasure and pain). Pralayâkala is one who, like the preceding, has cognitive and active energies obstructed, but is released from contact with Kalâ etc. as his Karma has been

* The phrases 'kalâ etc', 'from kala to the earth (Kshiti)', mean 'throughout the manifested universe'.

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experienced (and done with), though it is possible for him to be again brought under its influence" (*Ib.* iv. 2-5). The Pralayâkala is one who is devoid of Karmamala and dissociated from Kalâ etc. during Pralaya. "He is called Vijñanakevala in the Tantra, whose cognition and action, being obstructed by (Âṇava) mala are almost non-existent." (*Ib.* iv. 5-6). Thus these three classes are respectively under the sway of one, two and three Malas. Their paths are called Ṣuddhâdhva, (pure path), Misrâdhva (mixed path) and Aṣuddhâdhva (impure path) "The Sûkshmâ Vâk pertains to the Ṣuddhâdhva, the grosser (Paşyantî and Madhyamâ) to the Mişrâdhva, and the grossest, (Vaikharî) to the Aşuddhâdhva." (*Ib.* ii. 30.) The doctrine of Vâk more properly belongs to the Ṣâkṭa school, but the Ṣaiva and Ṣâkṭa schools coalesce with each other in most points and, at times, it is almost impossible to differentiate one from another.

A later development of the Ṣaiva cult is that of the Liṅgâyatas or Jaṅgamas, founded by Basava, about the middle of the XII century in the reign of the Kalachûrya king, Bijjala. Its chief characteristic is a great revolt against the Brâhman supremacy and the abolition of caste. Curious enough Basava, himself, was a Brâhman. His successor, Chennabasava, was his nephew, son of

his virgin sister, Nâgalâmbikâ. Like all reformers from Buddha onwards, Basava preached in the vernacular. Ṣrîkara made the movement orthodox by writing a Bhâshya * of the Vedânta Sûtras in Sanskrit in the lines of this Liṅgâyata or Vîraṣaiva sect. His fundamental position is indicated in the following extract. "Brahma is never nirviṣesha (devoid of attributes). He is always bodied (mûrta) as well as unbodied...... He is said to be one (only) before creation. The old teachers of the Vedas, Reṇuka, Dâruka, Ṣaṅkhakarṇa, Gokarṇa, Revanâsiddha, Marulusiddha, etc. have taught that the advaita texts of Brahmâ (*i. e.* of the Vedas) refer to the stage before creation, as, then, the world manifested or unmanifested does not exist...The declaration that all knowledge (flows) from the knowledge of one, as in the illustration of earth (*Chh. Up.* vi. 1-4) is due to the identity of cause and effect. If Prakṛiti, the substratum of the world exist before creation, how then could there be oneness? To this, we reply, Prakṛiti, being but the Ṣakti of Îṣvara, is not different from him, like the attractive power of magnet, or the burning of fire. Hence those that desire moksha do not accept the theory of the falsity of the world." † A detailed

* I have been able to get a mss. of the first Adhyâya of this work in Ganjam Dt.

† *Ṣrîkara's Bhâshya* on *Ved. Sût.* I. i. i.

account of the opinions of this sect is scarcely necessary, as it was but a social reform movement with a veneer of philosophy put on later to gain an orthodox standing.

The Brâhmans have as usual sapped the vitality of this movement by reintroducing caste into the sect. Thus, though the Liṅgâyata reformation started like the Buddhist with a vigorous protest against the caste system, there are now Liṅgâyata Brâhmans, Liṅgâyata Ṣûdras, etc. The modern Liṅgâyata is marked by his fierce hatred of Vishṇu and his constantly wearing a liṅga encased in a silver box. *

The history of the fortunes of Ṣiva is more obscure than that of Vishṇu. The Ṛig-Veda

* Each sect relies upon an unconscionable misinterpretation of some vedic text or other for legitimizing some unvedic practice which has grown upon it. The Liṅgâyatas quote 'amṛitasya devadhârañobhûyâsam' [*Tait. Up.* I, 4-1] 'O God, may I possess wisdom' and interpret it to mean, 'may I wear the God'. The Ṣaivas besmear their body with burnt dung and support the practice by quoting, 'Bhûtyai na pramaditavyam' [*Ib.* I. ii. 1], 'Do not neglect greatness' and twisting its meaning into, 'Do not forget to besmear yourself with burnt dung'. The Vaishṇavas quote a phrase 'charaṇampavitram', meaning 'holy feet' and interpret it as referring to sacramental painting with clay and to branding. They have besides 'discovered' a whole Upanishad, *Gopîchandana Upanishad*, to uphold their elaborate painting of the body, similar to the *Bhasma Jâbâla Upanishad* 'found' by the Ṣaivas.

does not even mention him; but speaks of Rudra, sometimes as one God, at other times, as many, and of the Maruts as Rudra's sons. In the other Vedas Rudra gradually rose to first rank and in the age of the composition of the *Râmâyaṇa* and the *Mahâbhârata*, he became identified with Ṣiva or Mahâdeva and later on, became the last person of the Trimûrti. The phallic character of Ṣiva and his unlovely surroundings indicate the fact that he must have been the God of the aborigines amidst whom the invading Âryan settled and whose gods he had to adopt into his pantheon. The only possible reference to phallic worship in the Vedas is the scornful phrase Ṣiṣna-devas, *. applied to the enemies of the Aryans, either demons or dasyus. But these aboriginal races have had an ample revenge. Mahâṣepha, (a huge membrum virile) is the God of a large majority of modern Indians. It is worshipped in temples†, in wayside shrines and worn round the necks of the devotees of the 'Great God,' not merely for luck as in modern Italy!

* *R. V.* VII 21. 5., X. 99. 3. The word has been variously interpreted, but the most probable meaning is, 'those who have ṣiṣna for their God', or 'tailed demons'.

† The oldest Liṅgam so far known is one discovered by my friend, Mr. T. A. Gopinâtha Row in the North Arcot District. I am indebted to him for a description of this superlatively realistic idol which must be much older than he is willing to allow. He has also sent me a photograph of the

Liṅgam, which for obvious reasons cannot be published here.

"The temple of Paraṣurâmêṣvara in which the strangely realistic Phallus (Liṅgam) is set up, is situated in the village of Guḍimallam six miles north of Reniguṇṭa, a station on the Madras Railway line. One of the inscriptions belonging to the temple informs us that it was completely reconstructed in the 9th year of the reign of Vikrama Choladeva (1126 A. D.). The present structure is not after the common model of the period to which it belongs. Tho Vimâna [dome over the idol] has the so-called Gajapṛishṭhâkṛiti. A close study of the plan and sections whereof, hereunder given, would warrant the conclusion that the architect had distinctly in view the shape of the Liṅga- and hence the vimâna might be better styled the Liṅgâkṛiti-vimâna."

"Again the Liṅga of this temple is, as has been already stated, a most remarkable one in that it is an exact copy of the *phallus* and has the various portions shaped very accurately. It has been made out of a hard igneous rock of a dark brown colour, samples of which are found near the Tirumala hills. The Liṅga and the image of Ṣiva carved on its front side are very highly polished. Unlike the later representation, the image of Ṣiva has been made with only a pair of hands, the right carrying a ram by its hind legs and the left holding a water-vessel.. A battle-axe rests on his left shoulder (from which perhaps he derives his name of Paraṣurâmêṣvara) and there is the usual matted and twisted hair (Jaṭa) on his head. He is standing on the shoulders of a râkshasa, whom the sculptor has represented with a pair of animal ears. The Liṅga is the only one of its kind in Southern India and from its sculpture it might be set down to about the 2nd or 3rd century A. D. Compare this image with the picture of a yaksha given on page 36 of Grünwedel's "Buddhist Art in India" as translated by Gibbson and Burgess. The face, the ears and

ear-ornaments, the arms and the ornaments on them, the necklace, the arrangement of drapery, particularly the big folds that descend between the two legs—all these are identically similar in both the image of Ṣiva of Guḍimallam and the Yaksha of the book referred to above.

"The temple has several old inscriptions the earliest of which is dated the last quarter of the 8th century. All of these inscriptions call the place in which the temple is situated, Tiruvir-pPiramapêḍu,, and is said to be in the Ṣilai nâḍu belonging to the Tiruvêṅgaḍakkoṭṭam, a province of the Western Vaḍuga country ruled over by the Mahâbali-Bâṇarâyas, the powerful feudatories of the Pallavas of Kâñchi. Guḍimallam now belongs to the Kâlahasti Zamindari and is a petty village."

(3) The Pratyabhijnâ School

The Pratyabhijñâ School was founded in Kâshmîr in the eighth century A. D. by Vasugupta, who "discovered" the "*Ṣiva Sûtras*" and taught them to Kallaṭa. Besides the *Ṣiva Sûtras*, the chief works of this School are the *Spanda Kârika* composed by Vasugupta or Kallaṭa, *Ṣivadṛishṭi* by Somânandanâtha (900 A. D.), *Pratyabhijñâ Sûtra* by Utpala, son of Udayâkara, (930 A. D.), commentaries (Vimarṣinî) on the previous by Abhinava Gupta (993-1015 A. D.), and commentaries on the first work by Kshemarâja * (1030 A. D.). Bühler, who has fixed the dates † of these works in his "*Tour in search of Sanskrit Mss.*" wrongly divides the Kâshmîr Ṣaiva philosophical works into two schools, (1) *Spanda-Sâstra* of Vasugupta (2) *Pratyabhijñâ-Sâstra* of Somânandanâtha and Utpala, because the word spanda occurs frequently in the names of

* For fuller details of this work, see my introduction to my English translation of it.

† The following scheme of dates of the writers of the Kâshmîr school and Guruparamparâ, indicated by vertical lines, is mostly based on Bühler's investigation.

Vasugupta, discovered *Siva Sûtras*, 8th cent. A. D.

|

Kallaṭa, contemp. of Avantivarman, 854 A. D.

|

Ṣomânandanâtha, cir. 900 A. D.

|

1. Utpala, cir. 930 A. D.

the earlier works and pratyabhijñâ in those of the later. But there is not enough difference between the teachings of these two sets of works to justify their being regarded as belonging to two different schools. Spanda is the ultimate principle of the universe—that of the spontaneous *vibration* accompanied by consciousness which underlies all cosmic processes and pratyabhijñâ is the discipline prescribed by this school, which consists in the unbroken *recognition* of man's essential identity with Ṣiva and the falsity of every thing else. The earlier writers naturally treated the discipline as esoteric and the later ones, seeing that the tradition was getting lost, emphasized the pratyabhijñâ discipline and did not treat much of Spanda which the earlier ones had amply discussed.

This Kâshmîr school regards all the Ṣaiva âgamas and the numerous books based thereon as authoritative and similarly, the writers of the Ṣaiva Siddhânta school quote all the Kâsh-

2. Nârâyana, Trivikrama (?)
|
Lakshmaṇa Gupta, cir. 950 A. D.
|
Abhinava Gupta, 993-1015 A. D.
|
Kshemarâja 1030 A. D.

(Sometimes called Kshemendra, to be distinguished from his contemporary, Kshemendra Vyâsadâsa, author of works on Alaṅkara, some Tales and other works.)
|
Bhâskara, Râmakaṇṭha.

mîr writers as authoritative ; in fact, the analysis of the universe into the categories and tattvas of the previous section is accepted, *in toto*, by the Pratyabhîjñâdarṣana. The chief difference between the two so far as metaphysics is concerned, is (1) the greater insistence on the spanda (active) aspect of the âtmâ (2) the unreality of a substratum of the universe *apart from* Ṣiva.

Ṣiva, spanda, chaitanya, the one basis of the universe, is characterized by infinite consciousness which knows no limitations of Time and Space and by unrestricted independence (svachchhanda). "Complete independence in connection with conciousness is chaitanya. It exists only in the Lord Parmaṣiva" (Khemarâja's) *Sivasûtravimarṣinî*, i. 1.) "Though He possesses endless characteristics (Dharma), like Nityatva (eternality), Omnipresence, Formlessness, etc., yet nityatva etc., belong (also) to other beings (than He); hence Independence, which is not found in others, has to be described prominently (as His characteristic)" (*Ib.*) "From whence this objective universe and this group of organs (body), and manas, the internal organ, unconcious, yet simulating concious being, attain the functions of creation, maintenance and destruction, that tattva must be diligently examined, whose Independence is always unobstructed". (*Spanda Kârikâ*, 6-7) "As the Jîva (the experiencer, the individual) is the

self of all, the source of all (his) experiences, the object, attains identity with him by being experienced by him. Hence nothing other than Ṣiva exists, in the enquiry regarding word and object. The experiencer always and everywhere is seated as the experienced" (*Ib.* 28-29).

Cognition is a unique act, a fusion of subject and object. Of these two factors, the reality of the subject does not require proof; for in the words of Kshemarâja, "all proofs depend for their validity on self-luminous consciousness". The other factor—the object—attains the appearance of real existence only when cognized by the subject. "So long as these (Jîvas) do not cognize, how can there be the known, O dear one? The knower and the known are one Tattva." (*Ṣushmabhairava,* quoted by Kshemarâja). Hence the only reality of the Universe is Ṣiva. "As the consciousness on which all this effected world is established, whence it issues, is free in its nature, it cannot be restricted anywhere. As it moves in the differentiated states of Jâgrata etc., (waking, dreaming and sleeping), identifying itself with them, it never falls from its true nature of the Knower. The thoughts, 'I am glad,' 'I am sorry,' 'I am desirous,' manifest themsevles in a place different (from Spanda), wherein the states of pleasure etc., are strong. Where there is no pleasure, no pain, no known or knower, nor again unconsciousness,

that alone really exsists "(*Sp. Kâr* 2-5)."

From this point of view it follows that a second Reality, independent of Ṣ i v a, as the basis of the universe is unnecessary for explaining the cosmos. The cosmos is the projection outside of the experience of the inner organ, A n t a ḥ k a r a ṇ a.

"The illumination of objects as being present, really exists inside but is made to appear outside" (*Îṣvarapratyabhijñâ Sûtras,* V. i). "The Lord, of the form of C h i t, (individual), being under the influence of desire, causes the totality of objects to shine as if existing outside, (though) without a substratum, like a Y o g î." (*Ib.* V. 6). "The (part of the) cognition (A d h y a v a s â), 'this is a pot,' that transcends name and form, the Ṣ a k t i of P a r e ṣ a, is like the Â t m â and does not shine by objectivity (I d a ṃ t â),"* (*Ib.* V. 17). The theory of perception that underlies this the metaphysical position will be discussed in the Chapter on Psychology.

The active ṣ a k t i of the other schools is a relatively unimportant person in this school. "She is M â t r i k a, the basis of knowledge" (*Ṣiva Sût.* i. 4). Mâ t ṛ i k a is the alphabet, treated as the mother of the universe, who associates human

* This word 'idamtâ' can be compared with 'haecceitas' of Duns Scotus.

experiences with the words that describe them and whose body is formed by the mantras which are themselves made up of letters. She is thus but the power behind mantras. Of the three şaktis, jñâna, kriyâ, and ichchhâ, the first two are attached in this school direct to the âtmâ, so that the mother of the universe loses her predominance. *Siva Sûtras*, i. 13. says "Ichchhâ şakti is Umâ, the girl." As Kshemarâja explains, in the case of the Yogî who has attained the highest state, his desire is invincible and the power of his desire is the virgin Umâ.

Thus, from more than one side, the metaphysical position of the Pratyabhijñâ school approximates to that of Ṣaṅkara. As the Pratyabhijñâ is professedly based on the Ṣâkta and Ṣaiva Âgamas, it raises a presumption that Ṣaṅkara and his Prâchârya, Gauḍapâda *, must have derived their philosophy from the Âgama schools. According to tradition both were Ṣâktas. Ṣakti worship is the chief one followed in the Advaita Muṭṭs which are presided over by those who claim today to be the pontifical successors of Ṣaṅkara. Gauḍapâda is believed to have been author of *Subhagodaya* and Ṣaṅkara of *Saundarya-*

* It is noteworthy that Gauḍapâda is scarcely a proper name ; it is a descriptive epithet, the reverend Gauḍa.

† Even in Kâlidâsa's time the Âgamas were so prevalent that he complains of their manifoldness. V. *Raghuvaṃṣa*. X. 26.

lahari, both poems in praise of Ṣakti. They practised the Ṣrîvidyâ—the famous Ṣâkta discipline. So it may well be that the source of the advaita, like the source of all other modern Hindu sects, has to be sought for in the Ṣâkta Âgamas. Till the Âgama literature is edited, published and translated, the history of the development of the Hindu religion during the last 2,000 years cannot be written. Bühler records a Kâshmîri tradition that Ṣaṅkara was vanquished in argument by Abhinavagupta who lived three centuries later. No conclusion can be based on vague legends carried down the stream of uncritical tradition.

iii The Vaishṇava Âgama.

The Vaishṇava Âgamas are said to be 108 in number, very few of which have been printed. They seem to be developments of the Bhâgavata, the Pâñcharâtra and the Sâttvata schools which are mentioned in the *Mahâbhârata*. The differentiation into schools seems to have originally depended on the specific mantra, which was the shibboleth of each school. Thus it appears that the Bhâgavatas adopted the 12- lettered Mantra, the Pâñcharâtras, the eight-lettered one (Om namo nârâyaṇâya). The Bhâgavatas are, at present, an insignificant community scattered in the

Telugu* and Maharatta country and have, so far as could be ascertained, forgotten the fact of the importance of their cult in the history of religion in India, their fundamental ideas and practices having been adopted by the Râmânujîyas and Mâdhvas and the later schools of Bhakti. Râmânuja treats Bhâgavata, Pâñcharâtra, and Sâttvata practically as synonymous terms in his *Bhâshya* on *Vedânta Sûtras*, II. ii. 40-43, perhaps because their doctrines were similar, while their mantras differed. The 108 Agamas already referred to are all called Pañcharâtra Âgamas.

The *Pâdma Saṃhiṭâ* gives their names; but judging from the contents, some of them e. g. *Bhâradvâja*, are quite modern and hence very much later than the *Pâdma Saṃhitâ* itself. This raises the presumption that some of these were lost and new ones written up to take the place of the lost ones. Indeed Vedânta Deṣika, writing in the XIV century says that in his time many of them could not be found. Moreover as they were kept secret there was plenty of room for forgery. But the *Pâdma Saṃhitâ* and *Lakshmî tantra* are decidedly very old. Their tenets are much nearer the Ṣâkta and Ṣaiva teachings than the post-Râmânujîya Vaishṇava doctrines discussed later on in this section.

* Where they are called Karaṇakamma.

The word Pâñcharâtra is explained in *Pâdma Saṃhitâ* (I. i. 73) to be that which turns the other five Ṣâstras into night (râtri) these other Ṣâstras being the Ṣaiva, Yoga, Ṣâṇkhyayoga, Bauddha and Ârhata promulgated respectively by Siva, Brahmâ, Kapila, Buddha and Arhata. This derivation is, on the face of it, fanciful. The *Pâdma Saṃhitâ* also speaks of four schools of Pâñcharâtra (1) Mantra Siddhânta, accepting one Form (of God), (Ekamûrti) (2) Âgama Siddhânta, accepting four Forms, (3) Tantra Siddhânta, accepting nine Forms, and (4) Tantrântara Siddhânta, accepting a four-headed or three-headed Form. (*Ib.* I. i. 80-83). Of these four schools, the *Pâdma Saṃhitâ* claims to belong to the Tantra Siddhânta. The fundamental doctrines of the earlier schools of the Vaishṇava Âgamas are explained in the following quotations.

"Brâhma is characterized by bliss (ânanda); (he is) the beginning, changeless, always undifferentiated, self-knowing, faultless, superlatively subtle, self-determined, the ruler, self-luminous, spotless, infinite, indestructible, tranquil, invisible, capable of evolving (the world), unchangeable, one full of conciousness of bliss (Chidânanda), the essence of consciousness (chidrûpa), omnipresent, supreme, devoid of past and future, the

Lord called V â s u d e v a, the source of all beings, Î ş v a r a, the Supereme P u r u s h a, of a stainless nature, eternal, without waves, without disturbance, boundless, beyond the g u ṇ a s, with g u ṇ a s, * the giver of all desires. (I. v. 29-34). †

"His form has been described to be threefold, gross, subtle, and supreme. The gross is called S a k a l a (divided); the subtle, Sa k a l a-n i s h k a l a; the supreme (form) of Him is N i s h k a l a (undivided), O, lotus-born. The thousand-headed § and other forms are the s a k a l a form of the Paramâtmâ; the form which has feet etc. and is made of light is s a k a l a-n i s h k a l a; the first form of S a c h-c h i d â n a n d a ‡ is called N i s h k a l a." (*Ib.* I. vi.

* He transcends the three g u ṇ a s of matter but is the possessor of six g u ṇ a s explained *infra.*

† This passage and the succeeding verses not quoted here show a striking resembance in ideas and phraseology to the description of P a r a m B r a h m a in *Bhagavadgîta* Chap. xiii, showing that both are derived from the same original Â g a m a source.

§ Described in the *Purusha Sûkta.*

‡ It is noteworthy that the word s a c h c h i d â n a n d a, so freqnently used in the post-Ş a ñ k a r a a d v a i t a schools as the description of P a r a m B r a h m a occurs in this Â g a m a text and, so far as I have been able to search, *not* found in the *Şañkara Bhâshya* on Bâdrayaṇa's S û t r a s. This shows that a d v a i t a, like v i ş i s h ṭ â d v a i t a, derived a fresh accession of doctrines and ideas from the Â g a m a s, after it passed from the founder to the later teachers. Among the Upanishads, this expression first occurs in the *Nṛisimha Tâpanî* and *Râma Tâpanî,* which are, apparently earlier than the time of Vidyâraṇya and later than that of Râmânuja.

30-40). The Paramâtmâ has two natures, Prakṛiti and Vikṛiti. Prakṛiti is the synthesis of Sattva and other guṇas; Vikṛiti is Purusha, called Paramâtmâ. She (Prakṛiti), the woman who has the three guṇas as her essence, in whom the individual beings (chetana) are established creates the whole world. By His command she sustains it all." (*Ib.* I. vi. 41-43).

In the *Lakshmîtantra*, Lakshmî describes her Lord and herself in clear terms. "Paramâtmâ is characterized by absence of pain (nirduḥka) and enjoyment of boundless bliss . . . They call Him the Path, the end of the Path, Paramâtmâ. That which is understood by the word ego is called the Âtmâ. The ego whose nature is unlimited is called Paramâtmâ. That is called ego, Paramâtmâ, the eternal, by whom all this, moving and motionless, is embraced. He is Vâsudeva, the Blessed, considered the supreme Kshetrajña. He is called Vishṇu, Nârâyaṇa, Viṣva (The All), Viṣvarûpa, (having the Universe as His form). All this world is enveloped by His Ahantâ (egoity). Truly that is not, which is not enveloped by Ahantâ. He is everywhere tranquil (ṣânta), changeless (nirvikâra), eternal, Infinite, devoid of limitations of space, time, etc. He is called Mahâvibhûti (Infinite Glory), because he extends infinitely. He is Brahma, the Supreme abode, the Light

without a substratum; of six qualities* similar to the ocean of immortality (a m ṛ i t a), waveless, shining. He is one, undifferentiated conciousness (c h i d g h a n a), tranquil, free from rising or setting. He is called B r a h m a, the secondless, being possessed of ṣ a k t i, which is not different from Him." (*Lakshmîtantra*, II. 1-10).

"The Blessed one, V â s u d e v a, of the nature of consciousness, not limited by space, time, etc., is P a r a m B r a h m a, devoid of (the three) g u ṇ a s, spotless, blissful, always the same, with the six g u ṇ a s, without old age or death. I am His supreme Ṣ a k t i, A h a n t â, eternal, unchanging. My activity is of the nature of desire to create. I create of my own independent power, by means of a myriad myriadth part of a myriad myriadth part (of myself). I become two kinds of beings—the knower and the known, (c h e t y a m, and c h e t a n î), c h i t-ṣ a k t i being the enlightener of both. S a ṃ v i t, that is my nature, attains the states of the knower and the known. My nature of S a ṃ v i t is pure, independent, full. Like the juice of the sugarcane, it attains solidity by Y o g a. Hence the said knower (c h e t y a) attains chit-tva (the state of an individual j î v a). As firewood,

* The six G u ṇ a s, to be carefully distinguished from the three G u ṇ a s of matter, are J ñ â n a, B a l a, A i ṣ v a r y a, V î r y a, Ṣ a k t i and T e j a s or O j a s and will be presently discussed.

embraced by fire, becomes fiery (tanmaya), so chetya, embraced by saṃvit becomes chinmaya (filled with the light of consciousness). The nature of chit is undifferentiated as blue or yellow, pleasure or pain. It is differentiated by changes due to manifold upâdhis. Of its own power, a huge form (the manifested world) is built out of (a) small (one). The chidrûpa that is differentiated into subject and object is spotless, supreme, neither objective nor subjective." (*Ib.* xiv. 1—10.)

In another passage, Lakshmî clearly describes the relations of the three categories, Param-âtmâ, Ṣakti, and Jîva. "He is the Âtmâ of all beings, their ego, called Hari; I am the Ahantâ (egoity) of all beings, the eternal. By whatever bhâva (form) Vâsudeva, the eternal, is imagined (bhavatah), that bhâva I am called. Thence, Brahma the eternal goal, is of the nature of Bhavatbhâva. Bhavat is the God Nârâyaṇa; I, the supreme Lakshmî, am Bhâva. Hence Brahma, the eternal, is called Lakshmînârâyaṇa.* Only when enveloped by Ahantâ is it possible to cognize 'ego'; what is cognized as 'I' is Ahantâ. Know that the connection, the identity of nature (tâdâtmya)

* These lines are a little obscure. The relation between Vishṇu and Lakshmî is that between noumenon and phenomenon or abstract and concrete, corresponding to the Prakâṣa and Vimarṣa of the Ṣâkta schools.

between me and my Lord is due to Avinâbhâva (unbroken association) and Samanvaya (immediate connection). Without Ahantâ 'Ego' becomes indescribable and uncognizable. Ahantâ without the cognition of 'Ego' is baseless (nirâdhâra), and uncognizable. The Bhavatbhâva perceptible as Samastha (synthesis) and Vyastha (analysis) is conceived in the world as paroksha and aparoksha, that which can be (objectively) realized or not. When Brahma is not awake, she, Ahanṭâ, Parameşvarî is not awake, and remains with all the world taken into her lap. What is called his waking (unmesha), like moonrise on the ocean, that is I, Nârâyaṇî Ṣakti, of the nature of desire to create (Sisṛikshâ). What is called the winking (nimesha) of the Paramâtmâ, during annihilation, that am I, Narayaṇî Ṣakti known as sushuptâ, desirous of sleeping. Aişvarya, indestructible, unlimited, develops in me, the Sisṛikshâ, who rise from God, the Lord of Lakshmî. That Supreme Brahma is consciousness (Jñâna), all-seer, faultless. Ahantâ is, of the nature of consciousness (jñânâtmikâ), all knower, all-seer. The supreme form of both of us, Brahma and me, is of the nature of consciousness. The rest, Aiṣvarya, Vîrya, etc., are eternal qualities (dharma) of Jñâna. The inner form, Ego,

is called J ñ â n a r û p a, the form of light like crystal...The indestructible supreme A i ṣ v a r y a of mine when I rise (out of N â r â y a ṇ a) is called I c h c h h â (desire), in the various t a t t v a-ṣ â s t r a s by the learned. Being the P r a k ṛ i t i (essence) of the world, (I am) called Ṣ a k t i. My effortlessness when I create is regarded as B a l a; (also) my filling all the created world is called B a l a; though I am always P r a k ṛ i t i, my being devoid of change is V î r y a. Milk gives up its nature (of milk) when curd is formed out of it; such change is never (produced) in me when I become the (manifested) universe. Hence knowers of t a t t v a (reality,) regard V î r y a as absence of change. V î r y a, (also) called V i k-r a m a is (by some) regarded as a part of A i ṣ v a r y a. My independence of assistance in doing all works is called T e j a s, the sixth G u ṇ a, by the knowers of t a t t v a s. T e j a s is defined by some as the power of defeating others. Some t a t t v a-knowers regard this as (part of) A i ṣ v a r y a, These five G u ṇ a s are regarded as flowing from (the first g u ṇ a) J ñ â n a. The six g u ṇ a s, J ñ â n a and the rest, are my body." (*Ib.* II. 12-35). "N â r â y a ṇ a, the God, is the eternal P a r a m â t m â, always the ocean of j ñ â n a, b a l a, a i ṣ v a r y a, v î r y a, ṣ a k t i and o j a s. He is beginningless, not limited by space, time and form. I am his supreme Goddess, shin-

ing supreme with the six guṇas, the ṣakti (goddess, power) that causes all effects, eternal, called Ahantâ. My nature (svarûpa) is saṃvit (conciousness), Pure, Free, Full. All jîvas are established in me; all of them are in me. I make manifest all the world, of my own free will (svechchhayâ), on Âtmâ as the substratum; in me the world is reflected as birds in water. Of my own free will, independent (of extraneous help) I start manifestation, I, the author of the Five Actions.* The author of manifestation am I, called chit-ṣakti. My contracted form, (i. e. the jîvâtmâ), he is Pure, Free, undifferentiated conciousness (chidghana). In me does the world shine as the mountain in a mirror. Like a diamond-stone, he (the jîva) shines everywhere pure. His characteristic (dharma) is chaitanya, like the stainless radiance of the Sun. By it does shine the jîva, with (the light) suitable (to him) of his own accord. The jîva, too, always does the Five Actions. His activity as in blue, yellow, etc., (differentiated objects) is called creation by the wise. (His) attachment to objects is called sustenance (sthiti). His giving up an object grasped on account of the desire to grasp a new one, is called destruction (saṃhṛiti) by those that know the tattvaṣâstras. Its vâsanâ (deposits in the mind) is tirobhâva, its dissolution, anugraha.

* Sṛishṭi, sthiti. saṃhṛiti. tirobhâva, anugraha.

His characteristic is grasping and enjoyment always destroying (what he enjoys) like fire. The jîva always feeds little by little my brightness." * (*Ib.* xiii. 18-29.)

In the later Vaishaṇava schools, namely the Viṣishṭâdvaita and the Dvaita Vedânta, though to a large extent based on the Pâñcharâtra Âgamas, Lakshmî, the really active factor of the cosmos is degraded to an obscure position. One subsect regards Lakshmî as a sort of intermediary in the matter of the grace that leads to Moksha; in another, she is inferior even to the Âchârya. The earlier Pâñcharâtra Âgamas are utilized much more by the rival Ṣaiva school than by the modern Vaishṇavas.† In another point have the modern Vaishṇava schools gone away from the position of the Âgamas. The relation between the individual soul, called Kshetrajña (as in the *Bhagavadgîta*), and the Paramâtmâ, is much nearer the Advaita position than would be palatable to the modern Viṣishṭâdvaitîs and Dvaitîs who regard this work as authoritative. "It is taught in the Ṣruti that the Âtmâ of the Para and the Kshetrajña is one. The limitation of the Kshetrajña is known to be due

* Each act of concious life is a manifestation of my power.

† Compare the quotations in the *Spandapradîpika* with those in the *Tattvatrayam*.

to the difference of bodies, as one image is differentiated into many in many mirrors. K s h e t r a (the body) is made of the five,* (gross) elements (b h û t a) etc.; the j î v a is established in it; the wise s û r i s † (Gods) by their eyes of wisdom know him, the k s h e t r a j ñ a, to be the supreme, which cannot be reached by B u d d h i, untouched, transcending the manifested, beyond the supreme, V i s h ṇ u" (*Ib.* I. vi. 15-18). "As the A k â ṣ a in a pot moves when the pot is moved, truly there is no difference between the P a r a and the J î v a" (*Ib.* I. vi.20).

The modern V i ṣ i s h ṭ â d v a i t a is a school of eclecticism, blending the R â m â n u j î y a V e d â n t a philosophy and Â g a m a cosmogony and practices. R â m â n u j a, himself, though the Â c h â r y a, *par excellence*, of this sect, and though he pleaded for the orthodoxy of the P â ñ c h a r â t r a books, expounds only the V e d â n t a philosophy and discipline. But his followers have neglected R a m â n u j a's philosophy and brought into greater prominence Â g a m a doctrines and practices. The modern V i ṣ i s h ṭ â d v a i t a is clearly expounded in Pillai Lokâchârya's *Tattvatrayam*, a Tamil work of the age of

* (1) Gross elements (2) subtle elements (3) j ñ a n e n d r i y a s (4) K a r m e n d r i y a s (5) a n t a ḥ k a r a ṇ a.

† In the V a i s h ṇ a v a tradition, the s û r i s are beings who were never bound.

Sâyana. This work is much read by the Srîvaishṇavas, who are a fairly widespread sect in Southern India. The *Tattvatrayam* is an exposition of the three ultimates—Îṣvara, Chit and Achit. "Chit is Âtmâ. The nature of Âtmâ is (being) other than body, sense-organ, Manas, Prâṇa, Buddhi which are each superior to the one preceding it; (Âtmâ is) not-unconscious, blissful, eternal, infinitely small, imperceptible, inconceivable, indivisible, immutable, the seat of knowledge; (He is) inspired, supported and disposable by Îṣvara (*Tattvatrayam.* i·3-4). "His size is but atomic (minute); his characteristic is the union of knowledge and bliss; of the dimensions of a trasareṇu (mote) and shining with millions of rays" (*Vishvaksena Saṃhitâ* quot. in Maṇavâla's comment. on *Ib.* i 14). Whereas chit is aṇu, Îṣvara is Vibhu, infinite and this constitutes an eternal difference between the two. The individual Soul resides in the heart. "He is a knower and hence an agent and an enjoyer" (*Ib* i. 29) "Chit is the seat of knowledge. If he were knowledge merely, we should say 'I am knowledge' and not 'I know'." (*Ib.* i. 27, 28.) This relation between the Soul and consciousness as substratum and quality (dharmadharmibhâva) differentiates Vîṣishṭâdvaita from Sâṅkhya and Advaita and approximates it to Nyâya and Vaiṣeshika. This school like the last, also

admits that the Âtmâ is the actor and the enjoyer, unlike the Sâṅkhya and the Advaita which conceive of action and enjoyment as belonging to matter. The individual souls are of three classes, baddha, mukta, and nitya, those who are in bondage, those who are emancipated, and those who were never bound. (*Ib.* i. 42).

"Achit is the unconscious, and the seat of vikâra (phenomenality). It is of three kinds, Ṣuddhasattva (pure sattva), miṣrasattva (mixed sattva) and sattva-şûnya (devoid of sattva). Ṣuddhasattva is a rarefied state of matter, pure Sattva, without the admixture of Rajas and Tamas, eternal, productive of knowledge and bliss, capable of modification not by Karma but by divine will into chariots, towers, pavilions, palaces etc. (in Vaikunṭha), of infinite brilliance, and difficult to be measured by the eternally emancipated and by Îşvara himself. This (state of matter) is regarded by some to be unconscious and by others conscious." (*Ib.* ii. 1-6.) Though this superlatively refined state of matter is by some regarded as conscious it is different from the individual soul and from knowledge. "Mişrasattva is that species of Achit which is compounded of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, causes the destruction of the knowledge and bliss of souls in bondage, produces false knowledge, is eternal, affords a field for Îṣvara's sport (i. e.

creation etc.,) evolves into similar and dissimilar forms by differences of place and time and is called Prakṛiti, Avidyâ and Mâyâ. It is called Prakṛiti because it causes changes (vikâra); it is called Avidyâ, because it destroys knowledge; it is called Mâyâ, because it has wonderful creative power." (*Ib.* ii. 9-10).

"Sattva Ṣûṇya is Time. It is the cause of the evolution of Prakṛiti and material objects; itself changes as Kalâ, Kâshṭâ (small periods of time), is eternal, the field of Îṣvara's sport and His body. The other two classes of Achit are (1) fit to be experienced (Bhogya) by Îṣvara and Âtmâ, (2) means and fields of (their) enjoyment. '(Those) Fit to be experienced' (Bhogya) are objects; 'means of enjoyment' are organs like eyes &c., 'fields of enjoyment' are the four places and all bodies. Of these, the first Achit (superfine matter) is bounded below and unbounded around and above; the middle Achit (ordinary matter) is bounded above but unbounded below and around. Time (the last Achit) is the same everywhere. Time is Nitya (eternal) in Paramapada (the supreme abode of Îṣvara), and here (in the manifested worlds), anitya (finite)." (*Ib.* 43-48). 'Eternal Time' is called Akhaṇḍa, unbroken into finite periods, infinite duration undifferentiated by the rate of flow of changing states of consciousness. Finite Time is Khaṇḍa,

consisting of periods divided as seconds, minutes etc. These two are called Time and No-Time in *Mait-Up VI.*

Îṣvara, the third tattva, "is opposed to all evil, infinite, self-illumined, blissful, shining with hosts of auspicious qualities like Jñâna, Ṣakti etc. the cause of the creation, maintenance and destruction of all universes, the Refuge of the four kinds of men, 'the afflicted, the enquiring, the solicitous and the sage' (*Bhagvad-Gîtâ* vii. 16) the giver of the four kinds of fruits—virtue, objects, love and release, of a splendid form, and the Lord of Lakshmî, Nîlâ and Bhûmî." (*Ib.* iii. i.) Lakshmî and the other two are Goddesses manifesting the three Ṣaktis of knowledge, action, and inertia. The auspicious qualities referred to are wisdom, power, forbearance, mercy, love, activity, righteousness, friendship, gentleness, and accessibility. (*Ib.* iii. 10)

"His 'splendid form' is infinitely superior to forms (like Ânandamaya) and qualities, worthy of Him alone, eternal, one, constituted of Ṣuddhasattva, not obstructive of wisdom like human bodies, illmunative of His Divine nature which therein is like the gold placed in a ruby cup, the treasury of His hosts of qualities like delicacy etc, of infinite brilliancy, fit to be meditated on by Yogîs, dazzling all

beings, generative of all enjoyments and dispassion, always delightfully beheld by the eternally free beings, quenching the afflictions of all like a lotus tank, the root of all avatâras protecting all, the substratum of all, and ornamented by implements and ornaments." (*Ib.* iii. 40.) The 'implements and ornaments' are various symbols of the divine attributes conceived as existing in physical shapes in his Divine Form.

The fortunes of Vishṇu, among the gods of India, have been the most varied. In the earliest Vedic age, he was the 'highest,' * being placed in the sky and the 'last', † in the series of Gods to whom a portion of the sacrificial food was to be offered. He was the friend of Indra and the supporter of the world. In the age of the Brâhmaṇas, he became the 'sacrifice', the supreme Purusha, whom the Gods stretched on the sacrificial altar. The Nirukta tried to explain him away as the sun. In the early Âgamas, he became the Param Brahma and his cosmic duties were discharged by "his goddess", Lakshmi. Finally in the Purâṇas and in the popular imagination of modern India, he is the second person of the Trinity, always sleeping stretched leisurely in his couch (of Âdiṣesha the cosmic serpent) and comforted by three wives, Ṣrî, Bhû, and Nîlâ, on the

* *R. V.* 1. 22. 20. *Ait Brâḥ.* I. i. i.

† *Âṣval. Ṣr. Sût.* iv. 2.

ocean of milk which extends through all space and interfering with the affairs of the world as an a v a t â r a, only when his help is invoked by his colleague and son, B r a h m â . The Ṣ â l a g r â m a a fossil ammonite shell of Tertiary times is his favorite haunt and is treasured in the homes of his devotees and the modern V a i s h ṇ a v a sips the water in which the fossil ammonite is washed to the chanting of the P u r u s h a s û k t a ,* for disinfecting his inside of the bacillus of sin !

* The P u r u s h a S û k t a and the G â y a t r î, which every orthodox Hindu recites daily in his worship were also used in ancient times in the P u r u s h a m e d h a, when the human victim was bound and about to be immolated. *Ṣ a t . B r â h .* XIII. 6. 2. 9, 2.

The following chronological note has been furnished by Mr. Gopinatha Row.

That side of the V i s h ṇ u-cult which concerned itself with temple worship became popular in Southern India in the age of the 12 Â l v â r s, V a i s h ṇ a v a saints [of assorted castes] who lived between the 6th and 9th cent. A. D. and produced Tamil literature collected as the four thousand verses (*Nâlâyira prabandham)* and fixed as the sacred Tamil V a i s h ṇ a v a canon by N â t h a-M u n i, who lived in the reign of Râjarâja I and the earlier Râjendra-Choladeva I (985-1030 A. D.) His grandson, Â l a v a n d â r, otherwise, Y â m u n a wrote the *Siddhi-trayam*, the first exposition of the fundamental ideas of the V i ṣ i s h ṭ â d v a i t a V e d â n t a, as well as *Âgamaprâmâṇyam* and thus paved the way for the amalgamation of the V a i s h ṇ a v a Â g a m a and the V e d â n t a teachings.

Râmânuja lived from 1055-1137 A. D. Pûrṇa-prajña, otherwise Madhva is said to have been born in 1206 A. D. The third in descent from him was Narahari-tîrtha, Dewan Regent of Kaliṅga, (Orissa) during the minority of Vîra Nârasimha Deva. His successor, Akshobhyatîrtha was a contemporary of Vidyâ-raṇya, like the two well-known expounders of Râmânuja, Vedânta Deṣika and Pillai Lokâchârya. Akshobhya's disciple, Jayatîrtha is the greatest among the expounders of the Mâdhva cult. From Akshobhya there arose a branch, the first member of which was Krishṇa Chaitanya, the prophet of Bengal. Vallabha, the founder of the Krishṇa-Bhakti cult, a Telugu Brahman of the Nellore District, was a contemporary of Krishṇa Devarâya of the Vijayanagaram dynasty (1500-1527 A. D.) and a contemporary of a late Mâdhva teacher, Vyâsatîrtha.

The Ṣaiva temple-cult spread among the Tamils more extensively than the corresponding Vishṇu-cult and gave birth to a more extensive Tamil literature. The Tamil Ṣaiva saints, Ṣivanaḍiyârs, were 63 in number. The greatest of them was Tiruñana Sambandha, who converted the powerful Pâṇḍya King, Kûn Pâṇḍya from the Jaina to the Saiva cult. Ṣankarâcharya, who lived in the later half of the 8th. century refers to Sambandha as Dra-viḍa Ṣiṣu (*Saundaryalaharî*, sl. 75). Hence Sambandha and his very militant friend, Appar, (or Vâgîṣar) who conducted a vigorus crusade against the Jaina religion must have lived and worked about 650 A. D. Another famous Ṣaiva teacher, Sun-daramûrti lived about 850 A. D. He was a protege of Narasinga Munaiyaraiyan of Naḍu Nâḍu (in the South Arcot Dt.). The Tamil songs of these a Ṣiva Saints are called *Tevâram*. About 100 years later lived Mânikka vâṣagar, author of *Tiruvâṣagam*, edited and translated

by Dr. G. U. Pope. Nîlakaṇṭha wrote a Bhâshya of the Vedântasûtras to suit the tenets of the Ṣaiva Siddhânta, and it is called Ṣaiva Viṣishṭâdvaita Bhâshya. Meikaṇḍa, (1236 A. D.) and Umâpati Ṣivâchârya, (1313 A. D.) wrote voluminous Tamil works expounding the same.

The following note has been furnished by my friend Mr. V. Venkayya, Govt. Epigraphist, Ootacamund.

The Nânaghâta inscription begins with invocations to Indra Saṅkarshana, Vâsudeva, Yama, Varuṅa and Kubera.

The worship of Bhagavat Saṅkarshana and Vâsudeva and a Vaishnava temple are mentioned in a still earlier inscription. *Ind. Ant.* Vol XVIII p. 190.

That the worship of Siva is more ancient than the time of the founder of Buddhism is rendered probable by the tradition that the Ṣâkyas were worshippers of Ṣiva. The Chinese pilgrim Hiouen Tsang was shown near the eastern gate of Kapilavastu the old temple of Îṣvara, where the infant Siddhârtha was taken by his father, because "the Ṣâkya children who here seek divine protection always obtain what they ask." According to the legend the stone image then raised itself and saluted the prince. That this legend is very ancient is proved by the fact that the scene is represented on the Amarâvati stûpa (*Ep. Ind.* V. 3.) which has probably to be assigned to the Maurya Period.

Section IV.

The Vaiṣeshika and the Nyâya.

These schools were based on the logical processes of Definition and Deduction. They were uncompromisingly anti-monistic in their aim. Even the Sâṅkhya, while admitting each Purusha to exist absolutely apart from other conscious beings, conceives all unconscious substances from Buddhi downwards to be successive transformations of one substratum—matter, but these schools do not attempt to derive one kind of substance from another. They divide objects into genera and species, define them by these marks, but refuse to be attracted by the eternal mocking mirage of monism that has produced so much bad metaphysics and worse science even in our days. The earliest Vaiṣeshika book we have is the Sûtras of Kaṇâda, and the earliest Nyâya book, the Sûtras of Gautama and these are not much later than the age of Buddha, while the Vaiṣeshika-Nyâya system, the ancient rival of the Sâṅkhya-Yoga system, and also of the Vedânta system, must be older. Praṣastapâda, who lived not much later than the 1st century A. D. wrote a *Bhâshya* on the Sûtras of Kaṇâda. This Bhâshya is not a commentary but a systematic restatement and amplification of the Vaiṣeshika system, utilizing where

possible the words of Kaṇâda. Vâtsyâyana, was the first commentator on the *Nyâya Sûtras* and he lived sometime before the 6th cent. A. D. In later days the Vaiṣeshika and Nyâya schools got very much mixed up, so that in modern works on Tarka (Logic) so-called, the part contributed by the Vaiṣeshika school could scarcely be disentangled from that contributed by the Nyâya school. Similarly the Sâṅkhya and Yoga are one and the Vedânta and Âgama have in modern times become inextricably one, making it extremely difficult to discover the historical development of each philosophical idea.

A. *Vaiṣeshika.*

The Vaiṣeshika school analyses padârthas into six. Padârtha literally means the meaning of a word, the thing which corresponds to a word and is generally translated category. It is more properly, a fundamental general concept under which can be subsumed what are indicated by words. These are six according to the early Vaiṣeshika—substance (Dravya), quality (Guṇa), action (Karma), Sâmânya, (the relation of a thing to its genus), Viṣesha (differentia) and Samavâya (coinherence). (*Vaiṣ. Sût.* I. i. 4). Kaṇâda restricts the word

Artha to the first three (*Vaiṣ. Sût.* VIII. ii. 3) and Prâṣastapâda extended it to the others also. * In later days a seventh category, Abhâva (non-existence), was added to the list and the total Padârthas acknowledged to-day are thus seven.

The characteristics of substance are that it serves as a substrate of qualities and actions and is a coinherent cause. (*Ib.* I. i. 15). Qualities like colour, and actions like expansion, cannot exist *in vacuo* but require substance as their Âdhâra (substrate). " A substance is not destroyed either by its effect or by its cause." (*Ib.* I. i. 12). Thus the threads are not destroyed when they become woven into cloth, but coinhere in the cloth: But "qualities (are destroyed) in both ways." (*Ib.* I. i. 12); when one taste is produced by a combination of a number of others, each of these latter loses its individuality. " An action is destroyed by its effect" (*Ib* I. i. 14); the tension of a bow is destroyed when disjunction of the arrow from the bow is produced. The characteristics of quality are that it inheres in a substance, it is without qualities, and is not a cause of (or) is concerned with conjunctions and disjunctions."

* Bodas, in his introduction to the *Tarka Samgraha* p. 30-31 has proved that *Vaiṣ. Sût.* I. i. 4. is an interpolation made later than the age of Srîdhara, the author of *Nyâya Kandali* (991 A. D).

(*Ib.* I. i. 16) "The characteristics of action are that it inheres in one substance, it is without qualities and is the sole cause of conjunctions and disjunctions" (*Ib.* I. i. 17, 30). Kaṇâda also discusses s â m â n y a (nature of genus), v i ş e s h a (nature of species) and s a m a v â y a, (coinherence), though he does not include them in the categories, for they are not objects (a r t h a) of perception. "Generality and speciality are b u d d h y a p e k s h a m, conceptual. (*Ib.* I. ii. 3). The *Summum Genus*, "that which is a genus (without being a species) is B h â v a (existence), for it is the most extensive concept." (*Ib.* I. ii. 4). "Substantiality (d r a v y a t v a), qualitativeness (g u ṇ a t v a) and activity (k a r m a-t v a) are both general and specific. (And so all others) except ultimate species, (the atoms etc.)" (*Ib.* I. ii. 5-6.) In the later V a i ş e s h i k a, the word v i ş e s h a (difference) has been restricted to what is called here, a n t y a v i ş e s h a, ultimate species, the detailed description of which gave the name V a i ş e s h i k a to this school.

The last p a d â r t h a, according to Praşastapâda is coinherence, S a m a v â y a. Kaṇâda defines coinherence to be "that by which (we speak) of cause and effect, that the one is in the other" (*Ib.* VII. ii. 26). Praşastapâda discusses S a m a-v â y a fully. "The connection of what are inseparably connected and are in the relation of substrate and accessory which causes the cognition

'here' is S a m a v â ya. From the cognitions, 'Here, in the threads(is) the cloth,' 'Here, in the grass (is) the mat (woven from the grass), 'Here, in D r a v y a (are) D r a v y a, G u ṇ a and K a r m a,' 'Here in D r a v y a, G u ṇ a and K a r m a (is) S a t t â, 'Here, in D r a v y a (substance) is D r a v y a-t v a m (substantiality),' 'Here in G u ṇ a (quality), is g u n a t v a m (qualitativeness),' 'Here, in k a r m a (action) is K a r m a t v a m (activity),' 'Here in eternal (atoms) are the ultimate species (a n t y a v i ş e s h â h),' we can understand there is some connection between the members of these (pairs). This (connection) is not S a m y o g a (conjunction like that between a pot and the milk placed in it)." (*Vaiş. Darş.* Bombay Ed. p. 66) Of these p a d â r t h a s, the first three, D r a v y a, G u ṇ a and K a r m a possess S a t t â. S a t t â is defined thus:—"Whence we say of D r a v y a, G u ṇ a and K a r m a that they *are*—that is S a t t â. S a t t â is an a r t h a (a thing) different from substance, quality and action. (*Ib.* I. ii. 7-8). "Existence is one, for 'to be' is no specific mark (of things) nor has it specific marks of its own." (*Ib.* I. ii. 17.) "Existence is uncaused and eternal" (*Ib.* IV. i. 1). Thus the S a t t â of the V a i ş e s h i k a s is a general concept and other than D r a v y a, G u ṇ a and K a r m a, and hence is not a noumenon, a reality behind phenomena, like the P r a k ŗ i t i of the S â ṅ k h y a s. Praşastapâda notes that

the other three padârthas, Sâmânya, Viṣesha and Samavâya are characterized by Svâtmasatva, which Udayana explains as being devoid of Sattâ (*Praṣastapada bhâshya* p. 30.)

The first of these padârthas has been described as substance. The ultimate substances are uncaused and eternal. They are of two classes, aṇu and vibhu, atomic and pervasive. The idea of an atom is derived from the consideration of the divisibility, or as it is called avayavovayavîprasanga, the relation of the constituent parts and the constituted whole. The divisibility of matter must end somewhere; if not, there would be no differencc of size between Mount Meru and a grain of mustard, for both would be made up of an infinity of parts. Matter of the size of a trasareṇu, a mote in the sunbeam, contains three dvayaṇukas, double atoms. Each dvayaṇuka is made up of two paramâṇus atoms. Five are atomic substances, earth, water, air, fire and manas. Four are pervasive substances, time, space, âkâṣa and âtmâ.

Of these nine eternal, ultimate substances the most important is Âtmâ, by which all other substances are cognized.

" The objects of sense are universally known. The universal cognition of the objects of sense proves that there is a substance other than (those)

objects of sense (which cognizes them). It is an invalid argument (which says that cognition is a quality of the body or the senses), because of the unconsciousness of the causes of the sensation and consciousness of the effects *i. e.* the cognition." (*Ib.* III, i. 1—5). "The (cognition in the) term 'I' being characteristically different (from every other cognition) no scriptural testimony is required" to prove the existence of the soul (*Ib.* III. ii. 9). On the contrary, "the cognition of the Ego is an immediate intuition of an entity other (than the body), because it applies to the soul that reflects on itself and nothing else" (*Ib.* III ii. 14).

This rejection of scriptural testimony for the existence of the Âtmâ is in direct contradiction to the Vedânta, which admits scripture *i. e.* testimony, of either supersensuous beings or teachers (gurus) who have gained an experience not attained by ordinary men as the only evidence of the existence of the Âtmâ, for Vedânta asserts the existence of a universal Âtmâ, which is not given in ordinary human consciousness. That 'I am' every one will admit. That 'I am more than I am now' is the fundamental position of the Vedânta and this can but be a matter of faith till that greater I is actually experienced. The Sâṅkhya and the Vaiṣeshika which are essentially rationalistic cannot help being schools of individualism.

The soul is "manifold, because of the distinctness" of one man's experiences from every other (man's) (*Ib.* III. ii. 21). Moreover "the activity and inactivity observed in one's own soul are marks (to prove the existence of different souls) in others." (*Ib.* III. i. 19). As Ṣaṅkara Miṣra, a commentator on the Sûtras says, "Activity and inactivity produced by desire and aversion are (two) species of effort. From them are born bodily functions called muscular actions having for their object the attainment of pleasure and avoidance of pain. Hence, when we see muscular action in a body other (than our own), we infer (the existence of) another soul for this muscular action is born from effort, because it is a muscular action like our own muscular action and that effort is born from some soul or based on some soul because it is an effort like our own effort."

"The marks of the (presence of the) soul (in a body) are the outgoing and in going breath, the opening and closing of the eyes, vitality (that builds up tissue), the motion of manas, affection of the other sense-organs, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volitional effort." (*Ib.* III. ii-4).

The play of breath in a body is the result of a constant effort of the soul to keep up the life of the body exerted as much during sleep as during waking moments. This is called 'the conation that is the basis of vitality (jîvanayoni pra-

y a t n a); winking and the anabolic processes are also due to the same conation. The movements of m a n a s in bringing the Â t m â and the organs of sense into conjunction to produce perception depend upon desire and effort both of which reside in the Â t m â . Pleasure and pain reside in the Âtmâ which is their substratum. Thus the Â t m â of the V a i ş e s h i k a s comes nearest to the Western conception of the soul. As in European philosophy, desires, conations and preceptions are conceived as qualities of the soul, and not as processes of subtle forms of matter, the object; but the V a i ş e s h i k a school clearly separates conciousness from these, which it does not regard as modifications of consciousness as is held in the West. Consciousness is separate from them and can and does exist apart from them.

Time is another ultimate substance. The marks of its existence are "the notions of later, simultaneous, slow and quick." (*Vaiş. Sût.* II. ii. 6). "It is called a cause as it does not exist in eternal things and exists in non-eternal things." (*Ib.* II. ii. 9). D i k, space is another substance whence (rises) the notion "this is (so far) from here." (*Ib.* II. ii. 10). Time and space are substances, because they do not inhere in any other substance and possess actions and qualities and are eternal. (*Ib.* II. ii 7. 11). Time is one and so is Space though they appear manifold, on account of accidental quali-

ties added to them. (*Ib* II. ii. 8, 12) The division of time into minutes, hours, etc. and into past, present and future and of space into East, West, etc, are not due to their inherent qualities but to the course or position of the Sun. The conception of time as past, present or future is due to the distinction of the states of objects into antecedent non-existence, present existence and subsequent non-existence. These distinctions being transferred to Time lead to its division into past, present and future, though it is really one. Like the soul, these two substances are v i b h u, pervasive and infinite and not a ṇ u, atomic. It must be noted here that Space is called D i k, which literally means, direction. It is the distance between two objects measured along a straight line. Modern H i n d û s use A k â ş a for space, whereas A k â ş a, being the substrate of sound is a definite substance with qualities attached thereto. The idea of infinite space does not seem to be discussed in Hindu books. The U p a n i s h a d s speak of 'Â k â ş a m B r a h m a'; this can but be the manifestation of B r a h m a as 'subtle sound', not mere infinity of extension, devoid of any extended thing, which is the modern conception of infinite space.

M a n a s is another eternal substance. It is the organ that brings into contact the soul and the objects of sense through the sense-organs. "The proof (of the existence) of M a n a s are

existence and non-existence of cognition on the proximity of the soul and sense-objects (according as Manas serves as their medium of contact or no). (*Ib.* III. ii. 1). It is atomic (indivisible and invisible) because it can be in contact with only one sense-organ at a time whereas if it were all-pervading it could be in contact with all sense-organs and we could have a number of sensations at the same time. As we cannot imagine it to be constituted by constituted parts it follows that it is eternal. It is an ultimate substance because on it as substratum takes place the conjunction with sense-organs to produce cognitions.

In the substances are 'Earth', 'Water', 'Fire', 'Air' and Âkâṣa. Of these the first four are aṇu, atomic and the last is vibhu, pervasive. The sensation of sound is a quality which inheres in in Âkâṣa. The sensation of touch inheres in the atoms of 'air.' 'Fire' has two qualities, colour and touch, 'Water' has three qualities, colour, taste and touch. 'Earth' has four, colour, taste, smell and touch. Thus these four represent four hypothetical elementary substances, which combine and produce the perishable objects of the universe. The latter are kârya or effects which derive their qualities on account of the Samavâya or coinherence in them of their causes—the eternal substances. In the words of the Sûtras, "the nature of the effect (is derived) from the nature of

the cause" (*Ib.* IV. i. 3.) These effected (objects) are also distinguished by being avayavî, complex, consisting of body, organ and object. (*Ib.* IV. ii. 1.)

Kaṇâda does not mention a God or Supreme Creator among his ultimate substances. When the Vaiṣeshika philosophy in much later days chiefly under the influence of the Ṣaiva cult developed the notion of a personal creator, the commentators attempted to derive the notion of a Supreme God from a misinterpretation of one sûtra. This sûtra (I. i. 3) runs thus:—'Tadvachanâdâmnâyasya prâmâṇyam'; it means 'The authority of the scriptures (is due) to (their) describing it. 'It' refers to Nihṣreyasa (highest good) in the previous sûtra, where Nihṣreyasa is said to be derived from Dharma and hence this sûtra points out that the Veda is authoritative because it points out the way to the highest good. The later commentators have tried to wrench this passage out of its context and understand by 'Tad' the absolute Brahma of the Vedânta. This sûtra recurs again as the last of the work (X. ii. 9), and there, again, the reference is not to Brahma but to the unseen effect of vedic ceremonial. Another sûtra is also wrongly explained to refer to God. It is II. i. 18. and runs, 'Saṃjñâkarmatvasmadviṣishṭânâm liṅgam'. This means 'The action of naming'

(a substance) by Beings higher than ourselves, is the mark of (the existence of) that substance", because, as the next sûtra says, "they name substances on account of direct vision of them" (II. i. 19). Their vision being developed by Yoga, they see substances invisible to us, like air, or akâṣa and then name them. Hence the fact of their naming a substance is a proof of its existence. This sûtra occurs amidst the proofs of invisible substances beginning with Vâyu and has absolutely no reference to God.

B. *Nyâya.*

The Nyâya and the Vaiṣeshika agree in fundamental points; the Vaiṣeshika being a school of Metaphysics tinged with Logic and the Nyâya, being a school of Logic tinged with Metaphysics. The Nyâya, therefore, does not analyse the universe into its constituent parts. It discusses Metaphysical questions only casually. It does not define Padârtha or Dravya, but Prameya, what is to be proved. The Prameyas are twelve, Âtmâ, body, sense-organs, sense-objects, cognition, manas, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and beatitude (*Ny. Sût.* I. 9.) The five Elements, Time and Space are introduced incidentally.

The existence of the Âtmâ is proved first by the consideration that a sense cannot be the soul,

"because, through both sight and touch, we apprehend a single object" (*Ib.* III. i), which would be impossible unless something other than those sense-organs synthesised those sensations into an object. The body is not the soul, because "when the body is burnt up (after death) sin would become non-existent," for there would be none to suffer for the sin (*Ib.* III. 4.) It might be held (by some) that the mind is the soul, "because the argument that establishes (the existence of) the Âtmâ apply (also) to the mind." (*Ib.* III. 16). Not so, "since there is a knower and an organ of knowledge" (*Ib.* III. 17.) This Âtmâ is eternal "because to him that is born there occur joy, fear and grief by relation to his memory of previous experience" (*Ib.* III. 18.) "because of his desire for the (mother's) breast from his habit of eating before death (*Ib.* III. 22) and because we do not see any birth devoid of desire." (*Ib.* III 25).

The five "elements are earth, water, fire, air, and Âkâşa." (*Ib.* I. 13). "Of odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, those ending with Touch (are qualities) of Earth; rejecting each preceding one in succession they belong to water, fire and air; the last belongs to Akâṣa." (*Ib.* III. 61). The elements are found both in the objects of sense and in the sense-organs, "because only what have the qualities can be the organs (which can perceive them) (*Ib.* III. 6.)

The N y â y a, like the V a i ş e s h i k a, believes in the eternal existence of atoms. "As the atoms have real existence, no p r a l a y a (destroys them). What are beyond being cut are atoms. '(If it is said that) it is impossible (for such a thing to exist), because the A k â ş a must (pervade) and divide (the atom, for otherwise) Â k â ş a would not be all-pervasive, (we reply that) the words 'within' and 'without' apply to effects and do not exist in what are not effects because they refer to what are other than causes." (*Ib.* IV. 81-85). (If it is argued that the atoms) must have real parts, because all bodies having form must have a collection of parts and (also) all bodies that conjoin (with others), (we reply that) the atoms cannot be given up because it would occasion a *regressus ad infinitum* and because a *regressus ad infinitum* is not proper" (*Ib.* IV. 88-90).

As the Y o g a added to the S â ṇ k h y a the conception of an Î ş v a r a, so the N y â y a to the V a i ṣ e s h i k a. But the Î ṣ v a r a of the N y â y a S û t r a s is concerned only with the adjustment of fruits of action. Some actions are followed by consequences immediate and visible; but others are not. This is adjusted by a Supreme Being called Î ş v a r a. "Î ş v a r a is a cause, for we do not see (all) the fruits of action. (If it said), this can not be, for in the absence of (the individual's) action, fruits

cannot come forth, (we reply) action is not the (whole) cause, for (it is) caused by Him." (*Ib.* IV. 19-21). The later N y â y a developed the notion of God, the creator. U d a y a n a's *Kusumâñjali* is devoted to this one question. Its main arguments will be summarised in the next chapter.

The N y â y a ranged itself against idealism and affirmed the existence of the external world, independent of the cognizing mind, thus opposing certain schools of Buddhism and, in later days, the P r a t y a b h i j ñ â school and the more degenerate forms of the A d v a i t a. "If it is said that Real existence cannot be perceived because things are known only by means of cognition, just as the existence of a cloth cannot be perceived when the threads are removed (*i. e.* cognition is a part of real existence and objects cannot exist independent of cognition), (we say, no,) for this is no argument on account of the falsehood of the assertion in the analogy. The threads and the cloth are different entities, (though) they are not perceived separately because of the inherence (of the thread in the cloth)". (*Ib.* IV. 91-93). "(The theories that] the relation of cognizer and cognised is like the relation [of man) to things (experienced) in a dream, or like jugglery for the city of the G a n d h a r v a s or a mirage cannot be proved, because of the absence of any proof." (*Ib.* IV. 96-98.)

It is noteworthy how each school of thought

has used a different name for the man other than his bodies, the study of whose nature is the starting part of all philosophy. The Sâṅkhya calls him Purusha, a word of uncertain etymology, [1] but originally meaning 'male,' a very curious designation of the inactive witness of the dance of Prakṛiti. The Drashṭa of the Yoga is a very appropriate term. The Âgama schools prefer Chit or Chaitanya, which in later Saṃskṛit at least, means active and thus denotes the Âgama conception fairly accurately. The Vedânta popularized the word Âtmâ, which means, self, nature, essence, in accordance with its tendency to regard the whole world as being rooted in one noumenon, Brahma, that which grows into or that which fills the Universe. The Vaiṣeshika and Nyâya schools also accepted the word, perhaps because they felt it to be a non-committal term. They attributed so many functions to 'the soul' that they avoided words like Purusha, or Chaitanya which had definite connotations attached to them and preferred the vaguer word Âtmâ. It must not be forgotten that these words, though in later philosophical discussions treated as synonymous, have definite meanings depending upon their derivation and their definition in each School.

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1 The Vedic etymology, he who bides (ṣî) in this strong hold (pur) (*Ṣat. Brâh.* xiii. 6. 2.-1.) is fanciful.

Thus though the Sâṅkhya, the Yoga, the Vaiṣeshika and the Nyâya are all schools of individualism, yet we see that there is a great difference between the Purusha of the former two and the Âtma of the latter two. 'Purusha' is pure chitiṣakti (power of conciousness, of illumination) and nothing more. But in the Nyâya-Vaiṣeshika systems the Âtmâ is the substratum of a number of qualities—involuntary vital action, voluntary action, desire, aversion, cognition, pleasure, pain, etc.,—in fact, all that is described by the Sâṅkhya, as the modifications of the internal organ; this difference is due to the difference of the darṣana, the original view-point and the consequent difference of the line of investigation adopted. The Sâṅkhya-Yoga schools base their metaphysical and psychological theories on their realization of Pure Being (Kaivalya) as the result of the discrimination of mutable Prakṛiti from immutable Purusha. Conciousness of Pure Being is described as 'the conclusive, incontrovertible absolute and pure knowledge 'I am not I', nought is mine, I am not' (*Sâṅkh. Kâr.* lxiv). A sense of being with the consciousness of Ego dissolved and the consciousness of non-ego ignored, is best called Kaivalya, alone-ness, as the Sâṅkhya has named it. To one who experiences Kaivalya, all change, mutability, all phenomenality cannot but be re-

garded as outside, objective; hence Prakṛiti, the changeable, in his view includes all that is not Purusha; and the mental functions of knowledge, action and desire which the ordinary man regards as belonging to the world of self and not to the outside world, is but Prakṛiti to the Sâṅkhya. But the Vaiṣeshika or the Naiyâyika has as his goal the abolition of pain consequent on birth in physical bodies which is caused by desires for objects. He therefore sets about analysing the composition of objects and when he learns to estimate them at their proper value, he ceases to hanker for them, thereby abolishing birth and pain. His aim being the cessation of the pain of compulsory incarnation of the soul, when this point is reached his analysis of the world stops. Hence he regards the âtmâ as possessing all the qualities which cannot be explained by the seven substances—earth water, fire, air, âkâṣa, time and space—which are outside man. These qualities of the âtmâ are involuntary vital action, voluntary action, desire, aversion, cognition, and control of the organs of sense (jñânendryas) and the organ of attention (manas). The realization of the âtmâ as possessed of these qualities is as legitimate a goal of life and a release (moksha) as that realized by any other discipline; and hence the Vaiṣeshika explanation of the cosmos is as valid as any other.

It is not a philosophy subservient to or leading up to any other but one solution of the riddle of the universe, self-consistent and final and as true as any other.

The monists of India, on account of the fancied superiority of their metaphysics to the atomic theories of the Vaiṣeshikas and the Naiyâikas superciliously turned the names of the founders of these schools, Kaṇâda and Gautama, to ridicule. The former name is by them paraphrased as Kaṇabhuk, eater of atoms and the latter is as Akshapâda, he who has eyes in his feet, to help him in his search of atoms. But the atomic theory is by no means a less valid explanation than any other.

Section V. *Pûrvamîmâṁsâ.*

The Vedic literature consists of various strata of different ages mixed up in almost hopeless confusion. First of all, there are the very ancient hymns belonging to the age when the ritual was yet simple and the Rishis * sang hymns in praise of Indra and Vishṇu, Mitra and Varuṇa as occasion arose for them and propitiated them with meat and soma to avert a calamity that immediately threatened them in their individual or tribal lives or to gain some urgent desire of their hearts. † There are, again, other hymns which show that the sacrificial ritual had already become highly complicated and which refer to the various functionaries therein. ‡

When the age of inspiration ended, the work of compilation of the hymns floating in the memory of the people began. Between the *composition* of the hymns (Ṛiks) and prose formulœ (Yajus) and their *compilation* as the Vedas there must have elapsed a period long enough to cause the original purposes and occasions of the mantras to be largely forgotten. The whole literature was now the holy Ṣruti and had to be used for recitation during sacrifices so that no part of the precious revelation might be wasted.

* The Rishis were originally 'rune-masters'.

† *e. g. R. V. X.* 103-8-12.

‡ *e. g., R. V. I.* 162,3.

Even in this early age, the sentences of the hymns were dislocated from their context and used as M a n t r a s and not understood as literature. There is a tradition referred to in the *Vishṇu Purâṇa* (III. iv. ii.), that at first the V e d a was one and called the Y a j u r v e d a and Vyâsa * separated it into four, each part being a collection of the mantras to be recited by one class of priests officiating at the sacrifices. The A d h- v a r y u was the actual performer of the sacrifices and for his use was compiled the *Yajurveda* which contains the M a n t r a s (poetical or R i k and prose or Y a j u s), with which he was to accompany each detail of the ceremonies from the simple D a r ş a p û r ṇ a m â s a i s h ţ i (new and full moon sacrifices) to the highly complicated A ş v a m e d h a and P u r u s h a m e d h a (Horse-sacrifice and human sacrifice). The *Yajurveda* is the most complicated, because it is the V e d a of the A d h v a r y u who performs the actual work of the sacrifice and hence it follows closely the order of the various ceremonies. We can

* D a t t â t r e y a is also said to have done the same work perhaps in another age. *Mâgha* xiv. 79.

† Probably the first *Yajurveda* referred to in the *Vishṇu Purâna* contained the M a n t r a s of the other priests till Vyâsa compiled separate manuals for the different classes of priests. Even now the *Black Yajur Veda* is a confused mass of S a m h i t a and B r â h m a ṇ a, which Yâjnavalkya separated into the *Vajasaneya Samhita* and *Şatapatha Brâhmaṇa* which together form the *White Yajur Veda.*

therefore understand why it was the first to be compiled. The Hotâ invited the Gods to the sacrifice and praised them by reciting hymns. In a sense he represented the ancient Ṛishis who composed the hymns, for his function was to invoke the Gods by praise. His recitations were long and not generally correlated to definite acts as in the case of the Adhvaryu. Hence in the Veda compiled for him was included many of the original hymns in the form in which they were composed, *i. e.* without detaching individual verses from their context. Hence it happens that the *Rig-Veda* contains so many connected compositions—a fact which has led some European scholars to think that it was compiled earlier than the *Yajur-Veda* while others go so far as to regard it as a 'historical' work. The Udgâtâ was the singer of select hymns during the sacrifices and for his benefit the *Sâma-Veda* was compiled. Thus was constituted the *Trayîvidyâ,* which contained what may be called the national or rather tribal religious ceremonial of the ancient Hindus. The domestic ceremonial, which affected home life and embodied the wishes and aspirations of the ordinary folk, was in the earliest times the office of the Atharvaṇa, the family 'medicine-man' and the hymns used by him were collected in his Veda. Even the Ṛig Veda, as it is, contains bits absolutely like the Atharva Veda

as when *R. V. VIII.* 91-5 refers to the desire of a maiden for a peculiar hirsute decoration and the necessary ritual to secure that growth. Later on, when the increasing complexity of the sacrificial ritual required a supreme director of ceremonies called Brahmâ and a distinct house ritual, called Gṛihya, * nominally based on the Trayî (the three Vedas) was evolved, the Atharva Veda was technically associated with the Brahmâ and actually fell into comparative oblivion. From the earliest times the Trayî-vidyâ, the imposing ritual of the sacrifices loomed large in the imagination of the Hindus and from the frequent references to it and its constant glorification in the early literature, have resulted two misconceptions (1) that the Atharva Veda is later than the others, (2) that it deals with black magic and is somewhat disreputable. The Atharva Veda contains a great number of Sûktas also found in the Ṛig Veda; but

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* The elaborate series of house rites, from Garbhâdhânam to Sapiṇḍîkaraṇam, which are the chief relics of Vedic ceremonies still fairly common among the 'twice-born' form the so-called Smârta Karma, while the Yajñas are the Ṣrauta, though the Mantras accompaying both belong to the same age. The Mantras of the former, collected in groups called Mantrapâṭha or Mantraprasna were floating hymns from ancient times and, of course, never formed part of the Trayî which was compiled for purposes of Yajña, and are hence generally regarded as Khila, fragments of a supposed lost canon.

this does not mean that the former borrowed from the latter. They were compiled for different purposes and tapped the same original source. Just because it was at least as old and as sacred as the rest that it was assigned to the Brahmâ when that office was invented. The magic of the Yajur-Veda is as primitive as that of the others. The Adhvaryu regards everything he touches or uses, stones, grass, fire, as a fetish and flatters the spirit behind it so that he may not harm him, just as the Atharvaṇa charms neualgia away from a man by praising the spirit that causes it. The following extract from the *Âpastamba Ṣrauta Sûtras* with the mantras referred to there proves the magic of the Vedic Yajñas to be as crude as any other magic.

" Having heated the Sânnâyya vessels on the Gârhapatya fire with the invocation, 'may the Râkshasas be burned, may those intent on mischief be burned,' taken the Upavesha with 'you are bold, give me the Brahma' (*Tait. Sam*; I. i-7), taken out from the north side of the Gârhapatya fire a live coal with 'May quarrel and fear be removed, may the army that comes (against us) be removed,' he (the Adhvaryu) places the pot on it (the live coal) with 'Thou art the milk-kettle of Mâtariṣvâ, thou art Heaven, thou art Earth, thou art the bearer of all, be firm (in your place on the coal), by (your) transcendent

power ; do not fall down, (*Ib.* I. i-3). Or (he places the pot on the coal) with, 'O, two cooking pots. I place (you) on (the fire) for avoiding the miscarriage of the Y a j ñ a. May (you) hold for I n d r a's sake the boiled (milk), yielded by the cows, and the curd, (*Tait. Brâh. III.* vii. 4. 34.) Having placed fire round the pot, from right to left with 'Become heated by the t a p a s of B h ṛ i g u and A ṅ g i r a s' (*Tait. Sam.* I. i. 7), he places the Ṣ â k h â p a v i t r a in it (the pot) with the tips to the East with 'you are the p a v i t r a of the V a s u s hundredfold, you are the p a v i t r a of the V a s u s, thousandfold, (*Tait. Saṃ* I. i. 3). He places the Ṣa k h â p a v i t r a (with the tips) to the North in the morning. Having grasped the pot from behind, he is silent. Or he is (so), holding the p a v i t r a. [Having thus made the pot ready for boiling the milk, he proceeds to milk the cow.] He grasps the ropes (for tying the calf, before milking), with 'Thou art the rope of A d i t i.' The Y a j a m â n a consecrates (the rope) which is being grasped with, 'Thou art of thirty-three threads. Come with holiness. May this rope for tying the calf serve the calf well (not hurt it).' (*Tait. Brâh.* III. vii. 4. 33). He (the A d h v a r y u) ties the calf (to a post) with 'Thou art P û s h â, (*Tait. Brâh.* III. vii. 4. 39). He invites (the milker) with 'Tell me (when the calf has been) taken (to its) mother.' (The milker) calls (the A d h v a r y u)

with 'I take (the calf to its mother).' He takes the calf with 'I take (O cows, your) calves to you who are without disease and are the increase of wealth' (*Tait. Brah.* III. vii. 4. 40.) The A d h-v a r y u commands, 'Do not walk between the cows to whom the calves have been taken and the V i h â r a (the place of the three sacred fires).' If (any one, goes between the (calves) taken (to the cows) and the V i h â r a, he shall say. 'Do not carry off the S â n n â y y a.' (The milker) says 'sit.' The milker sits with, 'I admit calves to you, who are without disease and are the increase of wealth. I, who live, sit near you who are living, who are overflowing with strength-giving milk and ghî' (*Tait. Brâḥ.* III vii. 4. 40). A ṣ û d r a shall not milk or shall milk. He milks into a wooden pot. The Y a j a m â n a accompanies the admitted (calf), the milked (cow), the sound of the streaming (milk) with, 'I admit calves to you, who are without disease and are the increase of wealth, 'May D y â v â p ṛ i t h v î milk for this y a j ñ a. May D h â t â, S o m a, V â y u and V â t a, may they give wealth to the Y a j a m â n a (*Tait. Brâḥ.* III. vii. 4. 41)." Except that the magic* here is more complicated than in the Atharva veda, there is nothing to distinguish it

* Well does this explain Krishna's stinging description of the followers of the veda as 'a v i p a s c h i t a,' uninspired (*Bh. Gîta.* ii. 42). Milking a cow and placing a pot on fire required so much adulation of the Gods and abject fear of them!

from the latter. The four *Saṃhitas* suffixed the needs of a fairly long period of time.

After this period there must have occured a break of culture, long enough to allow of the language of the *Samhita* to become obscure to a later generation. The language changed during this period to that of the *Brâḥmaṇas*, which is midway between Vedic and classical Samskrit. The meanings of the hymns having become obscure, they began to be applied indiscriminately for sacrificial purposes and interpreted in fanciful ways. Discussions frequently arose in the assemblies of the priests about details of the rituals, applications of mantras, etc. To settle such questions, what were called Nyâyas were frequently utilized. The Nyâyas are analogies, or inferences or proverbs which make statements probable or acceptable and are even now largely used for purposes of argumentation. The Ahikuṇḍala Nyâya (the analogy of the snake and its coils being one and yet more than one), Sthâlîpulâka Nyâya (judging of the state of rice in the cooking-pot by examining one grain) are illustrations of the humble beginnings of Logic. Such Nyâyas form the backbone of all bhâshyas of all the modern sects. Decisions on considerations like these and cruder ones too are

* Col Jacob has published a collection of them under the name *Laukika nyayâñjali*.

scattered throughout the B r â ḥ m a ṇ a s, which contain besides, traditions, real or imaginary, regarding the composition of particular mantras, cosmogonic speculations, etc.

In time the B r â h m a ṇ a s, too were added to the holy canon and became fixed as a part of the revealed V e d a. With the extension of the Scripture to include "the M a n t r a and B r â h-m a ṇ a," the task of the exegete became more difficult and complicated. The work of explaining the various discrepancies of the Veda and solving the various difficulties of the ritual became a profession and the scheme of N y â y a s * was developed into the M î ṃ â ṃ s â Ṣ â s t r a. A collection of such is the *Sûtras* of Jaimini. On them Upavarsha is said to have commented and Sabara wrote his Bhâshya. Jaimini is referred to and his opinions controverted by Bâdarâyaṇa in his *Brahma Mîṃâmsa Sûtras* and could not have lived very much later than the 6th century B. C. when Vedic sacrifices were so rampant as to evoke the Buddhist reaction headed by Gautama Siddhârtha.

The object of Jaimini's *Sûtras* is to expound D h a r m a. "Now, then, the investigation of D h a r m a (duty). D h a r m a has for its purpose

* M î m â m s â, both P û r v a and U t t a r a is still called N y â y a. M â d h a v a speaks of J a i m i n i y a N y â y a m â l a and V a i y â s i k a N y â y a m â l a The N y â y a of Gotama is a development of the same humble and popular N y â y a s but on rationalistic lines.

what follows from a scriptural injunction. Now (commences) the examination of its origin. When there is a connection between Purusha and Indriyas, Buddhi * (perception) is produced. Such perception is not the origin (of duty), for it deals with what exists (at the time of perception while duty does not then exist)". (*Pûr. Mîm. Sût.* I. i. 1-4)

Thus according to Jaimini, the sanction of Law must be from what transcends perception, human or superhuman. Even the highest Purusha is limited by his organs of perception and is hence incompetent to prescribe duty with authority. The authoritativeness of the Vedic injunctions is derived from the fact that they deal with objects beyond the reach of experience of man or of the Devas. Hence there is no room for an Îṣvara in the Mîmâmsâ system. The Karma Kâṇḍa of the Vedas, *i. e.*, the Vedas *minus* the Upanishads had not worked out except vaguely and that in the latest passages the idea of Brahma being the noumenon of the universe. Even the doctrine of the Âtmâ, man's continued existence apart from those he lives in the various bodies he inhabits seemed to have been an open question for a very long time as is proved by Nachiketas' second question to Yama about the continuity

* Buddhi, intellection, is a function and not an organ according to Mîmâṃsakas and Naiyâyikas.

of man's postmortem life with that before death and by Yama's remark that the Gods themselves were in doubt (*Kath. Up.* i. 20-22). The question was, in Gautama Buddha's time, still so fluid that he could ignore it while preaching his special displine. Similarly the original m î m â ṃ s â let these questions severely alone and contented itself with establishing the authority of the Veda and the binding nature of the Vedic rites. The only possible way of proving this authority without invoking the sanction of a personal being, high or low, was to argue that the Veda existed from all eternity. This could be only if the words of the Veda were uncreate, *i. e.* if the connection between a word and the object that the word names were itself eternal. The M î m â m s â S û t r a s therefore, say :—

"Because the connection of sound and sense is unborn. Hence it conveys unerring knowledge with regard to matters which cannot be reached (by perception and inference). This is the authority aecepted by B â d a r a y a ṇ a, because it requires no further proof." (*Ib.* I, i. 5). Like Jaimini, Bâdarâyaṇa has to rely entirely on the final authority of the Veda to prove the existence of conscious B r a h m a, as the noumenon of the universe, for this cannot be proved "by perception and inference" (*Ved. Sut.* I. i. 5). He therefore generally accepts the position of Jaimini that the

V e d a s are eternal, though the Devas and the world are not so, because of the identity of names and forms before and after P r a l a y a (*Ib.* iii. 28 30).

Jaimini gives the following reasons to prove the eternity of sounds. (1) Sound is eternal because it serves to convey meaning. The object referred to by a name always rests, as it were, upon the name. (*Mîm. Sût.* I. i-18). (2) It is recognised by all simultaneously. How could this be possible if it were a vanishing thing? (*Ib.* I. i-19). (3) It is incommensurable. One sound repeated ten times is not ten sounds, as it would be if sound were a mutable substance. (*Ib* I. i-20). (4) There are no grounds for expecting its destruction. (*Ib.* I. i-21). (5) (If sound were a modification of some other substance,) there would be no appropriate object to be perceived by the organ of hearing. Each sense-organ corresponds to an elementary substance in the world. Hence sound is an elementary substance and not a mere v i k â r a (mode) of another. (*Ib.* I. i-22). (6) It is seen that the v e d a also proclaims the eternity of sound (*Ib.* I. i. 23.)

The objections of the N a i y â y i k a s to the theories of the eternity of sound are summarised in *Ib.* I. i. 6-11, as follows :—

Sound is a product because (1) We see it produced. (2) It dies. (3) We use the phrase 'he makes a sound'. (4) It is perceived at once by different

persons far and near. Therefore it cannot be one and immutable. (5) It is susceptible of prakṛiti-vikṛiti. Sounds change from one to another in sandhi. Thus dadhiatra becomes dadhyatra. (6) It is augmented by the number of those that make it. These objections are met in *Sûtras* I. i. 12-17. It is admitted by both schools that the perception of sound is momentary. But the non-perception of sound which is always existent is due to the want of union of the hearer and the sound, the object of hearing. Sound exists always but becomes manifested as nâda, (noise), conjunctions and disjunctions of air, when uttered by a man. These vibrations of air serve to connect the pre-existing sound with the auditorium of the hearer. The phrase 'makes a sound' means the starting of these vibrations, which of course are transitory. The fact that many persons hear the same sound at the same time does not prove that it is not one and immutable. Herein it resembles the sun, which being one and immutable, is still seen by men remote from one another at the same time. In Sandhi one sound does not change into another, but the second sound (in the illustration) is substituted for the first. Lastly when there is an increase of sound, it is the manifesting nâda (air-vibrations) that is increased, not the original substance, Ṣabda.

If we remember that in Indian philosophy, mental states are modifications of matter, it is not difficult to understand this M î m â m s a k a theory that the connection between sound and sense is eternal. A mental concept of an object being a modification of subtle matter is permanently attached to the substratum of the name of the object in the same grade of matter. An uttered name is n â d a, which is a temporary manifestation of the eternal sound; this latter is a permanent modification of that Â k â ş a which is also the material of the organ of thought. Hence a thought exists permanently attached to its name; in other words n â m a and r û p a are one; the thought and the name rise together in consciousness. This explanation also helps us to understand why manifestation is always called n â m a r û p a in Hindu books, and why Uddâlaka in trying to illustrate to Şvetaketu the knowledge that makes us hear what cannot be heard and perceived what cannot be perceived says, "As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the change is a *mere matter of words, nothing but a name* (v â c h â r a m b h a ṇ a m v i k â r o n â m a d h e y a m)" (*Chând. Up.* vi. 1. 3.)

This idea of the eternity of the meaning of a word is not so ridiculously old-fashioned as some people think it is. Sir Oliver Lodge writes in *Life and Matter*, which may better be entitled, 'the metaphysics of a physicist', "The connection between

soul and body or more generally between spiritual and material, has been illustrated by the connection between the meaning of a sentence and the written or spoken word conveying that meaning. The writing or the speaking may be regarded as an incarnation of the meaning, a mode of stating or exhibiting its essence. As delivered, the sentence must have time relations ; it has a beginning, middle and end ; it may be repeated, and the same general meaning may be expressed in other words ; but the intrinsic meaning of the sentence itself need have no time relations, it may be true *always*, it may exist as an eternal "now," though it may be perceived and expressed by humanity with varying clearness from time to time." (p. 115) Max Müller remarks on this Mîmâmsaka doctrine that the philosophers of India understood that the study of language was an integral part of philosophy.

"They had evidently perceived that language is the only phenomenal form of thought, and that, as human beings possess no means of perceiving the thoughts of others, nay even their own thoughts, except in the form of words, it was the duty of a student of thought to inquire into the nature of words before he approached or analysed the nature of what we mean by thought, naked thought, nay skinned thought, as it has been truly called, when divested of its natural integuments, the word. They understood what even modern philosophers have

failed to understand, that there is a difference between *Vorstellung* (presentation or percept) and *Begriff* (concept), and that true thought has to do with conceptual words only, nay, that the two, word and thought, are inseparable, and perish when separated." *(Six Systems of Indian philosophy p. 526).*

After establishing to his satisfaction the eternity and consequent authority of the Veda, Jaimini proceeds to consider the inconvenient questions of the rationalists of his age with regard to those numerous passages of the Veda which have nothing to do with the Dharma of Yajña, but deal with ordinary worldly matters. To explain this was invented the theory of Arthavâda, subsidiary, explanatory statement. Whatever in the veda was not a commandment was explained away as an explanatory statement. In the schools of the Mîmâmsâ, this fruitful suggestion of separating the sentences of the Veda into various classes was worked till ultimately was elaborated the division of Vedic sentences into five classes viz., Vidhi, Mantra, Nâmadheya, Nishedha, and Arthavâda. A Vidhi is an injunction occuring in the Veda and is of four kinds, (1) Utpatti-vidhi, an injunction that originates others (2) Viniyoga vidhi, one in which the auxiliaries of sacrifice are mentioned (3) Prayoga vidhi, injunction of the main sacrificial action (4) Adhikâra

vidhi, which deals with the position one enjoys as the result of a sacrifice. * A Mantra is a sentence that serves to remind one of matters connected with sacrifices. Those Mantras that do not serve this purpose contribute in some unknown way to the success of the sacrifice †. Nâmadheya includes specific names of special kinds of sacrifices, like Udbhid, Chitra etc. Nishedha refers to sentences prohibiting certain actions. Lastly, Arthavâda passages are those that are subsidiary to vidhi or nisheda and

* Another classification of Vidhis is (1) Apûrva Vidhi referring to what is unknown, *e. g.* 'One desirous of heaven should sacrifice' (2) Niyama Vidhi referring to what is only partially explained, *e. g.* 'he beats the paddy,' meaning, husks it. (3) Parisamkhyâ Vidhi, excluding one of two alternatives. This classification has nothing to do with the four main classes of Vidhis mentioned in the text.

† It is noteworthy how the relation between Mantras and Brahamaṇas became reversed in the time of Jaimini, thus showing the enormous antiquity of the Mantras. Jaimini's conception of the Veda as primarily dealing with Dharma can apply only to stray sentences in the Brâhmaṇas and not at all to the mantras. Hence a mantra is degraded to the position of a sentence which cleverly describes a sacrificial action or serves to remind one of it (*Mîm. Sût. II. i. 31-32*). Instead of the Brâhmaṇa being an adjunct to the Mantra, it is the reverse; the Mantras exist so as to subserve the sacrifices ordained in the Brâhmaṇas. What a contrast to the ancient view of the Mantras as a force impelling the Gods, making the Gods themselves grow in strength (*R V. vi. 17 13, vi. 44-1 3*)!

contain either praise or blame. It is of three classes (1) Guṇa-vâda is the statement of a quality contrary to ordinary perception, *e. g.* 'the sun is the sacrificial post'; (2) Anuvâda is a statement agreeing with human experience, *e. g.* 'fire is a remedy against cold'; (3) Bhûtârthavâda is a statement which is not related to other means of proof. *e. g.* 'Indra raised the thunderbolt against Vritra'*. Gradually the word Arthavâda acquired the meaning of what may be neglected and every inconvenient passage became an arthavâda.

Besides the question of the eternity of the connection between sound and meaning, another metaphysical question was worked out in the schools of the Mîmâṇsâ—that of Apûrva or potential energy. Sacrificial acts are not followed by visible (dṛishṭa) fruits. The question, then, rises, how can it act so as to produce a result in the future; 'action at a distance' of time being inconceivable. Therefore it was conceived that sacrifices produced an unseen change (saṃskâra) which when the time came operated to bring about the fruit of the sacrifice. This idea is expounded by Jaimini in a brief sûtra (II. i. 5), "chodanâ, again, ârambha" which is thus commented on

* For further discussion of these terms the reader is referred to Dr. Thibaut's edition of the *Arthasaṅgrahaha*, of which the above is a condensation.

by Ṣabara. "By chodanâ we understand Apûrva. 'Apûrva, again' (exists, for) 'Ârambha' is ordained, as in 'Let one desirous of svarga, sacrifice.' Otherwise, the ordinance becomes fruitless, as the sacrifice ends (and is not continued till the fruit is seen). If the sacrifice ends without producing anything else, the fruit cannot be (produced) in the absence of anything. Hence it produces (something). It cannot be said that it (the Yâga) does not itself die, because its fruit is declared; (for) we cannot find any form of (the persistence) of Karma (other than Apûrva). That is said to be Karma which takes its substratum (from one place) to another place; it cannot inhere in the Âtmâ, for Âtmâ is everywhere.

Âtmâ's action (knowledge) being everywhere is evidence of its being everywhere and not of its going (to one place) from another place for the absence of motion does not contradict (the causality of the Âtmâ). (Moreover) the material with which sacrifice was associated (ghî etc.) is also destroyed (burnt up); as the material is destroyed, it is inferred, the sacrifice, too, is destroyed. The material is destroyed because its ashes are perceived. If it is said that though it is burnt, it still exists, (we reply) that while the existing things (ashes etc.,) are seen, it is not seen. If it is said that the fructification is

evidence (of the existence of the material), one must explain why it is not perceived. If it is thought that (its not being perceived) is due to any one of the causes of invisibility, subtility etc,* it becomes speculative predication. Then it becomes a question whether Apûrva should be predicated or that (cause). It is more reasonable to predicate a new substance and to, predicate a new property (of the material). If it is said that the Karma has no substratum, that, too, can be disproved similarly. Though a new property is predicated of it, it cannot obtain motion. Hence (it is concluded) that the sacrifice is destroyed; as it is destroyed, there exists Apûrva." This Apûrva, then, is the unseen substance in which inheres the fruit of the many sacrifices of the Veda.

Jaimini's sûtras are, of course, highly disappointing viewed at from the standpoint of the philosopher, but we must remember that Jaimini does not contemplate the analysis of the universe from any special philosophic standpoint. Nor was it possible for him to do so, weighted as he was with an extraordinary load of ritual to be gone through, teeming with a crop of questions of exegesis, whose solutions did not require anything

* Cf. *Sânkh Kâr.* vii. The fact that Saukshmyât is placed at the head of the list of the causes of invisibity here shows that Sabara does not quite from Îṣvara Kṛishna but from a Sâñkhya Sûtra now unknown.

more than grammar and logic. But his followers feeling that his darşana could hold its own against its rivals only if it discussed the current questions of philosophy included the means of proof (Pramâṇas), the padârthas of the Universe and many other philosophical questions in their discussions of Mîmâmsâ. They are divided into two schools—the Gurumata of Prabhâkara and the Bhâṭṭa of Bhaṭṭa Kumârila.

The following reference to the views of the first of these two schools is taken from the *Sarva-Siddhânta rahasya* attributed to Ṣankarâchârya* "Dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Sâmânya, and Paratantratâ† (dependence) are five categories; with Ṣakti, Sâdrişya (similarity) and Sankhya (number), they are eight. Viṣesha and Abhâva are not (categories), separate from the earth and other objects in which they inhere. (*Ib. Chap.* IX). Âtmâ is other than Buddhi, Indri-

* An incomplete mss. copy of this work with Ṣesha Govinda's commentary thereon was kindly placed at my disposal by Mr. Paravastu Ranganâthasvami proprietor of the Ârsha Library, Vizagapatam.

† Explained by Ṣesha Govinda to be the Samavâya of the Vaiṣeshika's. "It has beginning and ending. No sensible man will hold that when the material is either distroyed or not produced, the relation can remain independent of the material." Herein the Prâbhâkaras differ from the Vaiṣe-hikas.

ya, and Ṣariras. It is not limited by space (vibhu), eternal. It becomes manifold in various bodies. It manifests itself in the cognition of objects. In the cognition, 'I know the pot,' there are three things at the same time; the pot as object; the subject enters in it as 'I', knowledge manifests itself as self-luminous." (*Ib*). A fairly complete metaphysical system was evolved by Bhaṭṭa Kumârila who lived a little before Ṣaṅkara's time, in his voluminous *vârttika* on Ṣabara's Bhâshya, divided into three parts are called *Ṣloka vârttika, Tantravârttika* and *Ṭupṭika.*

The doctrine of the eternity of Sabda was violently attacked by the Nyâya, Vaiṣeshika and Sâṅkhya schools, who all the while pretended the Vedâ to be authoritative.* Patañjali, the author of *Mahâbhâshya* modified the theory by regarding the substance of the Veda to be eternal, but the words not so. He says, "It is said 'the Vedas are not created (things); the Vedas are eternal'; their sense is eternal, but the order of letters (words etc.) is not eternal, through their difference are produced the versions of the Kaṭhas, Kalâpas, Mudakas, Pippalâdakas, etc." (*Mahâbhâshya* IV. iii. 101.)

Bhartṛihari, the famous writer of the 7th. century A. D., expounds the doctrine of the sphoṭa in his Kârikâ called *Vakyapadiya.* "Those that know sound know that there are two

* *Ny, Sût.* ii. 81 ff. *Vai. Sû.* vi. 1. 1; *Sâṇ. Sût.* v. 45. ff.

sounds in the words that we speak; one, the cause of sound; the other is used for indicating an object." (*Vâkyapadîya* I. 44). The two sounds referred to are, first, what exists in the mind before the word is actually pronounced, and, second, the pronounced word. "Some of those that follow the ancient path say that these two are different in nature. Others say, we divide in two by our thought what is really one. Just as the light (potential) in the fire-stick (a r a ṇ i) is the cause of other lights being produced, so the sound (s p h o ṭ a) in the mind (b u d d h i) is the cause of the various sounds heard (n â d a). It is first thought out by the mind, then associated with some meaning and then is grasped (by the hearer) as sound. N â d a is produced in succession (in time); but s p h o ṭ a is not before or after (*i. e.* produced in successicn). What is not successively produced appears as if gradually made and thus appears divided. As a reflection seems to take on the motion of the water in which it is seen (lit. exists), being under the influence of the action of the water, that is the relation of s p h o ṭ a and n â d a." (*Ib.* i. 45-49). S p h o ṭ a is, thus, the potential word which exists in the mind *i.e.* the mental antecedent that is revealed by the uttered word, as water reveals the moon reflected in it. Kumârila, attacks this s p h o ṭ a theory in his *Ṣloka Vârttika* on behalf of the Pûrva Mimâmsâ and

Ṣaṅkara, in his *Bhâshya*, (*Ved. Sût.* iii 29) on behalf of the Uttara Mimâmsâ.

The theory of the eternity of sound, like most other theories developed in India, has its roots in the Ṛig Veda, in various hymns of which Vâgdevî is praised. She is often the Gâyatri metre personified; She is called Sarasvatî, Sâvitrî, Satarupâ etc. In the Brâhmaṇas she became the solitary companion of the First Born (Brâhmâ the creator) and co-operated with him in the work of evolving Name and Form. In *Ṣat. Brâh.* X. vi. 5. 4., it is said, 'his mind entered into union with speech' and in the same place she is identified with Aditi. As she represents the power of the Mantras, she later became identical with the Ṣakti of the Agamas. In the schools of the Ṣaiva cult, where the goddess loses her predominance, the conception reappears *Mait. Up.* vi. 22. as the Ṣabda Brahma, first mentioned in the Bhartṛihari, expounds the doctrine in the *Vâkyapadiya* from the standpoint of the philosophy of grammar.

Vijñâna Bhikshu (who lived in the XVI century), in his *Yogasâra-Saṅgraha* claims the Sphoṭa theory as belonging to the Yoga school and gives a clear exposition of the theory. "Sound is of three kinds. (1) the object of the organs of speech (2) the object of the sense of hearing and (3) the object of Buddhi alone. Of these the sound marked

off (as belonging to) the throat, palate and other places is the object of the organs of speech, as produced by them, the sound produced by the sound in the ear and different from the organs of speech, is the object of the sense of hearing, as being perceived by it.* Words, like 'pot,' etc., however, are the objects of Buddhi alone, for they are grasped by the Buddhi alone, as will be explained. These words manifest meanings, and are hence called Sphoṭa (manifester). That word is other than the letters which are pronounced one by one by the organ of speech, for each letter dies very soon (after it is uttered) and cannot unite (to form a word) and hence one (whole) word (for the ear to deal with) cannot exist and there will be nothing to denote the meaning (if we except the Sphoṭa). The cause of this Sphoṭa is a specific effort. If it were due to pronunciation by means of many distinct efforts, it will not be possible to regard it as one word, and to refer to one meaning. The discloser of this sphoṭa is the cognition of the last letter preceded by a series of letters. To Buddhi alone belongs the perception of Sphoṭa, for as Buddhi alone can cognize

* The motion of the organs of speech is what is here called the sound that is the object of the organs of speech. The sound heard in the ear is the sound that is the object of the sense of hearing.

a succession (of letters) it is simpler to attribute the disclosure of the S p h o ṭ a to the cognition of this succession than to anything else; because they coexist.

Hence the s p h o ṭ a cannot be cognized by the ear, for it is impossible for the ear to grasp a succession (of sounds), as *gha* followed by *ṭa*; moreover, sounds (of single letters) which die in the instant (they are made) cannot unite (with succeeding sounds); hence, as the impression of the letters already pronounced and their memory reside in the a n t a ḥ k a r a ṇ a, the a n t a h k a r a ṇ a, alone can properly be the auxiliary (of the perception of s p h o ṭ a)" (*Ib.* iv.)

Section VI. *The Bhagavadgitâ.*

It has been already pointed out that the *Bhagavadgîtâ* * was an early attempt to weld together the V e d â n t a, the S â ṅ k h y a and the Â g a m a points of view. † Two passages have already been quoted (p. 72-3) describing the conscious supreme B r a h m a—the one real cosmic ultimate of the V e d â n t î s. In other passages Krishna propounds the sharp distinction between P u r u s h a and P r a k ṛ i t i deliberately using the S â n k h y a technical terms. "Know P r a k ṛ i t i and also P u r u s h a to be both without a beginning; know that changes of form and g u ṇ a s spring from P r a k ṛ i t i. The origin of the making of causes and effects is P r a k ṛ i t i; P u r u s h a is the experience, of pleasure and pain. P u r u s h a, established in P r a k ṛ i t i, experiences the qualities

* This name has been translated 'the song celestial', 'the Lord's song', etc., though there is absolutely no lyrical touch in it. This translation is perhaps due to reminiscences of 'the song of Solomon', and the early life of the boy Kṛishna and his flute-playing described in the *Bhâgavata purâṇa* and the *Gîtagovinda*. The *Bhagavadgîtâ* is the 'divine poem'; or rather 'the proclamation, in verse, by the Lord.'

† Hence it has lent itself to the tortures of the B h â s h y a- k â r a s who have commented on it each from only one point of view. All existing translations, too, have been done consciously or unconsciously only from the point of view of one the three great modern sects—Ṣ â n k a r a, R â m â n u j î y a and M â d h v a.

born of P r a k ṛ i t i ; his attachment to g u ṇ a s is the cause (of his birth) in good and bad wombs. Onlooker and permitter, lord, experiencer, the great lord, and the supreme self (p a r a m â t m â), too, is he called, P u r u s h a , who is supreme here (in this body)". (xiii. 19-22) " O mighty-armed, learn from me the five causes declared in the S â ṅ k h y a system (as necessary) for the accomplishment of all actions ; the body, the agent, the several organs, the various kinds of several activities, and the presiding deities, the fifth; whatever action man does by his body, speech and mind, right or wrong these five are the causes thereof. That being so, he who from imperfect understanding sees the lone self to be the actor, verily that fool sees not" (xviii. 13-16).

The Â g a m a analysis of the Universe into three factors is also expounded. " Î ş v a r a dwells in the heart-region of all beings, O Arjuna, causing, by his wonder-working power, all beings to revolve as if mounted on a machine" (xviii. 61.) " Another,* indeed, is the Supreme P u r u s h a, called P a r a m â t m a, who, having entered the three worlds* sustains (them), the changeless Î ṣ v a r a." (xv. 17.)

In the previous Stanza, Krishna has been speaking of the mortal and immortal P u r u s h a s, " loke," which word may mean either " in this world," or as in xv. 18, in the Ṣ â s-t r a s not based on the Veda, as the rationalistic Yoga or Nyaya.

In various passages Kṛiṣhṇa claims to be that Îṣvara. "I am unborn, the changeless Âtmâ, the lord of beings" (iv. 6), "I am the origin and the end of the whole universe. Nothing exists higher than I, O Dhanañjaya. All this is strung on me as rows of gems on a thread." (vii. 6-7). The other two tattvas are the two Prakṛitis of Îṣvara. "The discrete Prakṛiti, that is mine, is eight-fold, Earth, water, fire, Vâyu, Âkâṣa, Manas, Buddhi and Ahaṅkâra" (vii. 4.) "The great elements, Ahaṅkara, Buddhi, Avyakta, the organs ten and one, the five ranges of the (sense) organs, desire, hate, pleasure, pain, the (bodily) whole, intelligence, constancy, this is the field (kshetra) described briefly along with its modifications." (xiii. 5-6). This is the lower Prakṛiti, corresponding to the Idaṃtâ of the Ṣâktas, Aṣuddhamâya of the Ṣaivas, Achit of the Vaishṇavas. "Know my other Prakṛiti, higher than this, who becomes living (Jîva), O mighty-armed, (and) by whom this Universe is upheld." (vii. 5). "Being a portion of myself, it becomes in the world of the living an eternal living being and attracts to itself the sense-organs of which Manas is the sixth". (xv. 7.) This category is called in the Âgamas Tejas or Ojas and these words occur in xv. 12-14. "What Tejas (light-energy) in the sun brightens up the world, what in the moon, and what

in fire, that Tejas know to be mine. I enter the Earth and support life by my Ojas (energy); becoming Soma, the essence, I nourish all plants. Becoming Vaişvânara (the fire of life), I enter the bodies of breathing beings and united with Prâṇa and Apâna (two kinds of winds on which the vital fire is carried), digest the four kinds of food."

These three systems Kṛishṇa, in other passages, tries to transcend and he indicates a Supreme Reality, higher than the conscious One Brahma of the Vedântîs, the dual Purusha and Prakṛiti of the Sâṅkhyas and the triple Îṣvara, Chit and Achit of the Âgamikas. This is called 'Brahma-tat' (vii. 29.), 'Aksharam Brahma paramam' (viii. 3.), 'my supreme abode' (viii. 21.), 'the supreme seat' (viii. 28.). Kṛishṇa calls himself "the pratishṭhâ of Brahma, the undying, the changeless, the eternal, the Dharma, the unending bliss" (xiv. 27). Pratishṭhâ means pedestal, and hence vehicle. As Krishṇa's acknowleging a higher entity than himself goes against the grain of all schools of Vedânta, every commentator, from Ṣaṅkara onwards has expended a good deal of ingenuity in explaining away the obvious meaning of this passage. §

§ The various interpretations of this sloka are discussed in my forthcoming *Study of the Bhagavadgîta.*

This 'Supreme abode' which Kṛishṇa differentiates so carefully from himself, the Purushottama, and also from a Purusha, higher than himself, whom he seems to refer to by the adjectives Kavi, Purāṇa, etc. in viii-9., and by the name Âdi Purusha in xv. 4, is frequently called '*Padam*' or, *Gati*, path. "Verily there exists higher than that Avyakta (*i. e.* Mûlaprakṛiti) another Avyakta (undifferentiated, noumenon) eternal, which is not destroyed, when all beings are destroyed. It is called Avyakta (the absolute), Akshara (the unchanging); they call it the Supreme Path. Having reached it, no one returns. That is my Supreme abode." (viii-20-21). "There* the sun does not shine, nor the moon, nor fire; having gone there they return not; that is my Supreme abode." (xv. 6.). In this "Supreme abode" the author of the *Bhagavad Gîtâ* finds the one noumenon into which the ultimate tattvas of the other schools merge. This is the foundation of all that is; on which are established Purushas from the lowest to the highest, out of which rise all the elements of the evolved world. It is not conscious being nor is it unconscious being but "that beyond," 'the knower and the known and the Supreme fixed dwelling place' (xi-38.)

* In opposition to the world supported by the Îṣvara referred to in xv. 12.

This Supreme Reality as Kṛishṇa conceives it is different from the Nirguṇa Brahma of Ṣaṅkara. This latter is the Saguṇa Brahma or conscious Universal Being shorn of 'name and form' used for purposes of meditation; when these distinctions are negatived, it is the higher. (*Ved. Sût. Bhâsh.* iv. iii. 4.) Beginningless Avidyâ (ignorance) according to Ṣaṅkara leads us to attribute 'name and form' to that which is not thus limited and this, according to Ṣaṅkara, is the Param (higher) Brahma, which is Sat, and opposed to Avidyâ which is Asat. This doctrine of Avidyâ being the cause of 'name and form' is not found in the *Bhagavad Gîtâ*; nor again the doctrine of Mâyâ, which Ṣaṅkara's later followers have elaborated, by which they conceived that the Param Brahma, the one without attributes, who is Sat, Chit, and Ânanda becomes in some inexplicable way entangled in Mâyâ which is neither existent nor non-existent and thus evolves or rather degenerates into the Saguṇa Brahma or Îṣvara and begins to weave the universe out of nothing. This doctrine is a travesty of the attempt of the early thinkers to find the common noumenon of Sat and Asat.

Râmânuja on the other hand tries to whittle down all the passages where Krishna describes this supreme noumenon, "whence speech

returns along with mind, being unable to reach" this high level thought. He interprets paramdhâma as a locality, a region of space which Nârâyaṇa has delimited as his special province where he holds his court seated on his serpent throne, the hoods of the serpent acting as his royal umbrella and to which he admits his 'elect' as a matter of favour!

The teachings of the *Bhagavad Gîtâ* have suffered more than those of any other Indian book from the hands of the Commentator.* It is not cryptic in style like the Sûtras; but yet, from the great veneration paid to it on account of its supposed authorship and on account of its real superiority to every other scripture, Indian or non-Indian, so many Bhâshyakâras have attempted to use it for buttressing up their special theories and expended their tender mercies on it. Its teachings and its locutions, technical or otherwise have been violently tampered with by the commentators who did not possess what we call a 'literary conscience'. The commentator did not aim to discover what exactly his author thought or attempted to express, but used the text for supporting his own special theories. If any passages were inconveniently opposed to the commentator's theories, they were to be explained away

* e.g., ii. 16. has been so done to death that it is impossible to discover what its author meant thereby.

by utilizing grammatical and etymological tricks. Thus the *Svetâṣvatara Upanishad* is indispensable to the Vaishṇavas; but it sings the praises of Rudra and not Vishṇu. Hence Rudra is explained by Raṅgarâmânuja,* as *Saṃsâra rujo drâvayati*, who drives away the disease of saṃsâra. (*Ṣvet. Up. Bhâsh* iii. 2). In the *Chhândogya Upanishad*, Janaṣruti who learns the Samvarga Vidyâ from Raikva is called a Ṣûdra (*Ib.* iv. 2. 3). Since the Ṣudra is unfit for Brahma Vidyâ, Ṣankara explains that the word Ṣûdra *can* be etymologised as ṣuchâdravaṇa, the rushing of grief. (*Ved. Sût. Bhâsh.* I. iii. 4.). *Bhagavad Gîtâ* xiv. 27 is explained in two possible ways by Ṣaṅkara. Everywhere it is a case of how inconvenient passages can be explained away and not what the original author thought. The more ingenuity displayed by the commentator, though in violation of what we nowadays regard as laws of evidence, the greater is the admiration of the devout follower. Even European scholars have quietly succumbed to the spell of Ṣaṅkara's verbal gymnastics so much so that Max Müller, Deussen and Gough in translating passages from the Upanishads put into them matter found not in the

* A recent Vaishṇava commentator of the Upanishads who slavishly follows Ṣaṅkara, except where Viṣishṭâdvaita points have to be driven in. Rân ânuja did not comment on the Upanishads.

text but only in *Ṣaṅkara Bhâshya.* No interpreter of other people's thoughts, especially the thoughts of the ancients can escape reading some of his own thoughts into his author's book, but we might at least honestly strive to minimize this tendency and strenuously avoid reading a third man's thoughts also therein.

Besides this one fruitful source of confusion, another more potent one has also been operative. These different schools of Vedânta have in modern India all become orthodox revealed religion. The Vedânta being orthodox, it was felt that the other schools ought to be assimilated to it and hence the commentator has felt it necessary to furnish the Sâṅkhya, Pûrva Mîmâṃsâ and Vaiṣeshika schools with a God for whom Kapila, Jaimini and Kaṇâda had no place or need in their systems; to mix up the Îṣvara of Yoga, the Paramâtma of Nyâya and Brahma of Vedânta; to confuse the non-committal word Purusha of Sâṅkhya with the Jîvâtmâ of the *Upanishad*; to identify Brahma, Paramâtmâ, Purushottama and Îṣvara wherever they occur in the *Bhagavad Gîtâ.*

This spirit has in recent times been further complicated by the necessity for extolling the Advaita at the expense of the other schools. Hence has been invented the extraordinary theory of the temporary validity of the other schools as

steps leading to the Advaita, which Madhusûdana Sarasvati propounded in his *Prasthâna bheda* and Vijñâna Bhikshu in his *Sâṅkhya pravachana Bhâshya.* (*Vide* Muir's Original Sanskṛit texts iii. pp. 194-202). The immediate reality of which every one can be certain is the momentary experiences of changing states of conciousness, the kaleidoscopic changes of Chittavṛitti. Metaphysics is the attempt to classify them, pigeonhole them under general categories which will systematize them, reduce the chaos of immediate experience into an intelligible cosmos. These cosmic ultimates must necessarily be concepts of the mind and not objective realities independent of the mind. The mind analyses its own experiences for the purpose of guiding its own function in ordered ways, so as not to be a helpless waif in the buffeting of the waves of experiences and memories. The fact that different minds are attracted by different methods of metaphysical analysis indicates that minds themselves are coloured by different temperaments and hence each self-consistent metaphysical system, if it explains all the experiences of the inquiring mind is as valid as the others. Cosmic ultimates are not material, objective realities that can be reached or acquired. There cannot possibly be any merit in devoutly believing in the 'correctness' or orthodoxy of any particular system. But

each mind has to find out what system attracts it, what method of analysis appeals to it and following that method, analyse its experiences, train to distinguish its place in the cosmos, so that the enlightening consciousness bound up with it might 'free' itself from the mind in which it is involved and soar to its own levels wherefrom there is no return to bondage.

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CHAPTER III.

THE WORLD-PROCESS.

THE question of the nature of the world-process, what kind of change in the material of the universe underlies its endless Becoming has also been variously answered. The material of which any substance is made is called U p â d â n a K â r a ṇ a m ; we have seen in the last chapter that the material of the world is held by the Nyâya-Vaiṣeshika school to be heterogeneous— nine different substances going to make up the cosmos. All the other schools teach that the material cause of the world is homogeneous, the Sâṅkhya-Yoga regarding it as unconscious matter and the rest as conscious B r a h m a. Hence have arisen two opposed theories, called the Â r a m b h a - v â d a, the theory of atomic combination and the P a r i ṇ â m a v â d a, the theory of transmutation. The former theory holds the atoms of matter, *i. e.* of elemental earth, water, fire and air to be Â r a m b h a U p â d â n a m, lit. originating material, material which originates all objects of the world without losing each its own specific nature, just as yarn, when woven into cloth,

still retains its own character as yarn. In the other theory the cause of the world is Pariṇâma Upâdânam, material which undergoes transmutation, *i. e.*, loses its distinctive character when evolving into objects, just as milk loses its character as milk when it becomes curd, as the flower is no more the flower when it becomes the fruit.

This divergence of theory with regard to the nature of the world-process necessarily led to a difference of view with regard to the relation of cause and effect. The Nyâya-Vaiṣeshikas hold the Asatkâryavâda, the theory of the non-existence of the cause in the effect, and the other schools hold the opposite theory—the Satkâryavâda, the identity of cause and effect, the potential pre-existence of the effect in the cause.

A. Ârambha vâda.

Kaṇâda, in *Vaiṣ. Sût.* VII. ii. 7. says, "causal and effected substances are not one and identical, because unity and identity are not cognized between them." Yarn is the cause of the cloth into which it is woven but we cognize yarn as different from cloth. The connection of cause and effect is hence one of coinherence, Samavâya. "That is coinherence whence (we say) of cause and effect, this is here." *Ib.* VII. ii. 26. The conjunction of a thread and a pot on which it lies is accidental, but that of a mat and the grass

blades of which it is constituted is Samavâya coinherence. "A substance is said to be a cause on account of its inhering in its effects." *Ib.* X. ii. 1. The ultimate substances of the universe are the causes of all objects, which are produced by their conjunctions. These constituent substances preserve each its own qualities but yet combine to produce objects with qualities previously non-existent. "An effect is non-existent previous (to its being produced) because actions and qualities cannot be predicated of it." *Ib.* IX. i. 1.

The same subject is referred to by Gautama in the *Nyâya Sûtras* IV. 48-50. The first of these Sûtras explains the opponent's view, (Pûrvapaksham) and the succeeding two, the view of the author of the Sûtras (Siddhântam). They run as follows:—

"(The effect, before it is produced,) is neither non-entity, nor entity, nor again entity-non-entity because entity and non-entity are incongruous." *Ny. Sût* IV. 48. On this Vâtsyâyana comments thus:—"Before (an effect is) produced, the effect to be produced cannot be a non-entity, because of the necessity of the material, *i. e.*, a particular material is used for producing a particular object; all materials do not produce all objects. Hence it cannot be held to be a non-entity. It is not an entity; because it is not admissible to predicate existence of that which is produced, before its

production. It is not an entity-non-entity, because entity and non-entity are incompatible with each other, for entity is the admission of an object and non-entity is the denial of an object. These two are opposed to each other and not the same". This argument is refuted by Gautama in the next two sûtras. "That which is produced is truly a non-entity before its production, because both its production and destruction are witnessed by us." (*Ib. 49.*) "(Though the effect before its production) is a non-entity, it is determined by the mind.", *i. e.* conceived by the mind. (*Ib. 50.*)

This fundamental position of the Vaiṣeshika and the Nyâya Schools was forced on them by their scientific (as opposed to metaphysical) temper. When we deal with the actual objects of the universe, analyse and reconstruct them, we find that qualities which do not exist in the constituents appear when an object is constituted out of them and that therefore the Asatkâryavâda rests on a solid basis of experimental fact. That in the later developments of Indian philosophy, this theory was eclipsed by the rival one of the Satkâryavâda was due to the fact that the foundations of science laid by the Vaiṣeshikas and Naiyâyikas of old were overlaid with a load of verbal gymnastics and dull dialectics, just as in Europe, the science of ancient Greece was choked out of life by the logic of the Schoolmen. But that the

A s a t k â r y a v â d a itself is a valid concept, accepted by modern science is proved by the following extracts from Sir Oliver Lodge's *Life and Matter.* " A property can be possessed by an aggregation of atoms which no atom possesses in the slightest degree." (*Ib.* p. 91) " It must not be thought that aggregation only produces quantitative change and leaves quality unaltered. Fresh qualities altogether are liable to be introduced or to make their appearance at certain stages—critical stages—in the building up of a complex mass." (*Ib.* p. 186.) " It may be said that a sun differs from a dark planet only in size ; for it is just the fact of great size which enables its gravitative shrinkage and earthquake-subsidence to generate an immense quantity of heat and to maintain the mass for eons at an excessively high temperature, thereby fitting it to become the centre of light and life to a number of worlds. The blaze of the sun is a property which is the outcome of its great mass. A small permanent sun is an impossibility. Wherefore, properties can be possessed by an aggregate or assemblage of particles which in the particles themselves did not in the slightest degree exist." (*Ib.* p p. 72-3).

The N y â y a - V a i ş e s h i k a theory of the production of the cosmos by perpetual conjunctions and disjunctions of atomic as well as non-atomic substances is called Â r a m b h a - v â d a . The basic axiom of the *Vaiṣeshika Sûtras* is " D r a v y -

âṇi dravyântaram ârabhante" (*Ib.* I. i. 10), substances originate other substances, without themselves being destroyed. Probably as Râmânuja points out in his *Ṣrî Bhâshya*, II. i. 15, the word ârabh is â+labh, to touch, to grasp and the Vaiṣeshika conception of the essential cosmic process is that the elementary substances embrace one another to form objects and while such a conjunction lasts, a new property is produced; when an object is destroyed, the atoms are disjoined, that property disappears and the atoms are free to form fresh conjunctions. This conception is the same as the picture of the behaviour of atoms in the atomic theory of modern chemistry.

The atoms were conceived as "round, extremely minute, invisible, incapable of division, eternal in themselves but not in their aggregate forms". (Davies, *Hindu Philosophy*, p. 128). They were called aṇu (atom) or paramâṇu (ultimate atom). The combination of two atoms constitues a dvyaṇuka, (two-atom), or molcule. Molecules combine into objects.

The formation and destruction of the various objects of the universe is due to the conjunctions and disjunctions of the four kinds of atoms. The following account of the evolution of a red baked claypot out of a black unbaked one is taken from *Siddhânta Muktâvali* and given as a specimen of the degeneration to

which the valid Vaiseshika ideas attained for want of pursuing them with the help of the experimental method of modern science. "From conjunction with fire an action (is produced) in the ultimate atoms which exist combined as d v a y a-ṇ u k a s, molecules, (of the unbaked pot); thence a disjunction of the ultimate atoms from each other; thence the destruction of the conjunction which had produced (the molecule); thence the destruction of the molecule; thence the destruction of the blackness (of the ultimate atom); then the origination of red etc. (in the ultimate atom); thence the action auxiliary to the production (â r a m b h a) of a (new) object; thence disjunction (of the atom from the space it occupied temporarily); thence the destruction of the previous conjunction (with space soon after its reduction to the state of ultimate atoms); thence the conjunction (of the atoms) to produce (the red baked pot); thence the production of molecules (d v a y a ṇ u k a s); thence the origin of red etc. (in the molecule)". This maze of words constructed by unrestricted ingenuity satisfies the cravings of the modern Hindu Nyâya-Vaişeshika philosopher and does duty for physics in his studies. Endless disputations displaying a diabolical ingenuity beguile his tedium and satisfy his instinct for physical research!

Who started this complicated dance of the atoms? It has been pointed out in the last chapter

that the Sûtras of Kanâda do not contemplate a supreme creator. The question then arises, who first set the atoms in motion and started the world process. Kaṇâda occupies an agnostic position with regard to this. He proves the existence of an adrishṭa, unseen, cause of some actions. These are actions other than that due to an impulse (e. g., the action of fire on a bamboo), an impact (e. g., the action of an axe), or a conjunction (e. g., of a harness with a horse). These latter three actions are explicable, referable to a known agency. There are actions other than these, caused by an unseen cause. (*Vaiș Sût.* V. ii. 2), like circulation of sap in trees, (*Ib.* 7.). "The upward flaming of fire, the sideward motion of wind, the first action of atoms and of manas are due to an unseen cause". (*Ib.* 13.) Kaṇâda thus deliberately avoids predicating a cause of creation. Praşastapâda teaches the orthodox modern Hindu theory of creation by Brahmâ and destruction by Ṣiva. "At the end of one hundred years of the measure of Brahmâ, He reaches the time of his release. Then Maheşvara, the Lord of all the worlds desires to destroy (all beings) so that all living beings that are troubled in saṃsâra may enjoy a night's rest. Then cease the functions of all the adrishṭa (unseen, potential result of acts) of all beings, that causes the bodies, sense-organs and great elements. Then, by the action of the desire of Maheṣvara and the union

of Âtmâ and the atoms, is produced a disjunction of the atoms that produce the body and the sense-organs. Hence their union ceases and they become destroyed and sink back into Paramâṇus (ultimate atoms). Similarly, of the great elements—Earth, water, fire and air, by the same cause, each is destroyed and absorbed into the following one. Then the disjoined ultimate atoms alone remain. Then Âtmâs remain with the potential deposit of their good and bad deeds attached to them. Afterwards, for the experience of the living beings, (is born) the desire of Maheşvara to create. Then the adṛishṭa resumes its functions in all Âtmâs. By the support of this adṛishṭa and the union of Âtmâ and atoms, an action is produced in the ultimate atoms of Air. They become mutually conjoined into a molecule of two-atoms etc., in proper order. Thus is produced a great wind which moves in the Akâṣa. Then therein similarly a great ocean of water is produced by the atoms of water and it flows in a great flood. Then in that very ocean by the ultimate atoms of earth, conjoining in the regular order into molecules etc., a great earth is produced and remains firm. Then in that very ocean by the atoms of fire is produced in the order of molecules etc. a great collection of rays of fire which remains burning. When these four great elements are thus born, by the mere will of

the Supreme Îşvara, a huge sphere is born from the atoms of fire supported by the atoms of Earth. Therein He creates Brahmâ, with four lotus-faces, the grandfather of all the universe as well as the worlds and commands Him to create all beings. Being commanded by Maheşvara, Brahmâ, possessed of wonderful knowledge, dispassion and power knows the fruits of the acts of all beings and creates his sons—the mind-born Prajâpatis, Manu, the Devas, the Rishis and the Pitṛis, the four castes from his face, arms, thighs and feet, and all other beings high and low, each endowed with knowledge, enjoyment and length of life according to their Karma. He endows them with virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power, each according to his desire." (*Praşast. Bhâ.* Bombay Edn. p. 18-19.)

It was also pointed out in the last chapter that the Nyâya Sûtras conceive of God as the cause of the distribution of the fruits of action, because such fruits are not always visible soon after the action. A definite refutation of all atheistic systems was undertaken by Udayana, the great teacher of Nyâya, in his *Kusumâñjali*, probably written in the 12th century. This book is remarkable in that it is the only Sanskrit theological book solely and directly dealing with the question of the existence of God, like the numerous European books on the subject,

by the Schoolmen and by Protestant theologians. It is divided into five chapters, each chapter being regarded a cluster of Kusuma flowers. In the first chapter Udayana establishes that there is an adrishṭa, an unseen cause of events of the world. Thus far Kaṇâda went but Udayana goes one step further, by blending the Nyâya with the Vaişeshika position and pointing out that adrishṭa cannot operate as a cause, except by means of the concurrent energy of Îşvara (*Kusumâñjali* i. 18. 19). He, then, demolishes the atheism of the Mîmâṃsa by pointing out that as right knowledge of the Veda requires an external source, since even the Veda is destroyed during pralaya and it has to be repromulgated at creation, Îşvara is proved to be the source of traditional knowledge. (*Ib.* ii. 1). He then meets the arguments that are generally used to prove the non-existence of God from the six methods of testimony, perception (pratyaksha), inference (anumâna), analogy (upamâna), tradition (şabda), presumption (arthâpatti), and non-perception (anupalabdhi). The general trend of the argument here is that as the various methods of proof themselves depend on Him for their validity they are paralysed by "looking into His face" and though they are unable to prove His existence, they are enough to disprove arguments against it. (*Ib.* III. 23.)

Udayana then disproves the Mîmâṃsa argument that even if God existed, he could not be a source of right knowledge, for this consists in knowing what was not known before. He rebuts this by defining right knowledge to be intuitive unerring perception. (*Ib.* IV. 6.) Finally Udayana offers eight positive arguments. "From effects *, combination, sustenance, traditional arts, traditional knowledge, Ṣ r u t i, texts and number (underlying creation), can be proved an omniscient, eternal Being". (*Ib.* V. 1.) Thus was the Nyâya-Vaiṣeshika once for all wedded to theism and it continues to affect modern Indian thought chiefly through the Ṣ a i v a and V a i s h ṇ a v a sects.

B. Pariṇâma Vâda

The Sâṅkhya, the Yoga, the Vedânta, and the Âgama schools conceive of the relation of cause and effect differently. They maintain the S a t - k â r y a v â d a, the theory that the effect exists in an unmanifested form in the cause. The following five arguments are given in the *Sâṅkhya Kârikâ*, ix, to uphold the theory that the effect exists antecedent to its manifestation. (1) A non-existent thing cannot be produced. Oil cannot be pressed out of sand. (2) To produce every effect we take an appropriate material. For making curd we take milk, not water. (3) Any effect does not

* The argument from design.

result from any cause. (4) An agent does only what it is able to do. (5) The effect has the same nature as the cause. Cloth has the same nature as the threads of which it is woven. The Sâṅkhya thus reverses the Vaiṣeshika view. The latter holds that the thread coinheres in the cloth; therefore the cloth which did not exist before its production, has been originated by its cause, the thread. The former holds that the cloth inheres in the thread in an unmanifested form before its production and its production is therefore but the manifestation of a latent object.

The *Vedânta Sûtras* devote a section (adhikaraṇa) to the Satkâryavâda, the doctrine of the identity of cause and effect. "That they (cause and effect) are not different (is to be inferred) from the words "*Origin*, etc." (*Ib* II. i. 14). The word '*origin*' is found in *Chh. Up.* VI, i. 4., "As my dear, by one lump of clay all that is made of clay is known, the change being a name having its '*origin*' in speech." The next Sûtras (15-16) give further reasons. "From perception (of the cause) when (the effect) exists"*. "From the later existing (in the original cause)"; in the sentence 'This, my dear, in the beginning was but Sat', (*Chh. Up.* VI. ii. i.), it is said that this evolved world was in the beginning merely the causal

* Ṣankara interprets this Sûtra thus :—" From the perception (of the effect) when (the cause) exists.

entity, in other words, the effect was concealed in the cause. The Âgama schools also accept the Satkâryavâda generally; though they seldom discuss this fundamental question of philosophy.

The Satkâryavâda—the concept of the "persistence of the really existent", underlies all philosophy, ancient and modern. "Whatever really and fundamentally *exists* must, so far as bare existence is concerned, be independent of time. It may go through many changes, and thus have a history; that is to say, must have definite time-relations, so far as changes are concerned; but it can hardly be thought of as either going out of existence, or as coming into existence, at any given period, though it may completely change its form and accidents; every thing basal must have a past and a future of some kind or other, though any special concatenation or arrangement may have a date of origin and of destruction..............The thing that *is*, both *was* and *shall be*" (Lodge. *Life and Matter*, pp. 101-3).

Both the Satkâryavâda and the Asatkâryavâda, though opposed to each other as theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive when used for explaining the cosmos. Explanation is a mental attempt to form a picture of what is outside the mind. An explanation must be self-consistent; otherwise it fails; but a self-consistent explanation should not be imagined to include *the whole of*

the facts of the cosmos we try to understand.

It is noteworthy that this old world dispute between the Satkâryavâda and Asatkâryavâda rages to-day in an acute form among the biologists. Are variations that underlie evolution due to innate causes, but manifestations of latent qualities? Or do they arise from something like a chemical combination of the germ and the sperm plasms? Do they evolve as response to environment? Or are they due to spontaneous impulsion? How far are the characteristics due to heredity? What are the limits of educability? All these questions are being discussed on the basis of one assumption or the other.

From the Satkâryavâda it follows that the world material becomes gradually transmuted into various forms to produce the succession of phenomena that forms the evolution of the world. This theory is called the Pariṇâmavâda, the theory of evolution or transmutation, for the noumenon of the object is Pariṇâma Upâdânam, material that changes form and not Ârambha Upâdânam, originating material.

1. Sâṅkhya.

The material that according to the Saṅkhya (and the Yoga) undergoes transformation to produce the world is homogeneous Pradhâna or Mûlaprakṛiti. The impulse that sets Pradhâna

in motion cannot be a supreme Person; "because an intelligent person engages in actions either for his own gain or on account of benevolence; these (motives) cannot apply to the creation of the world which therefore cannot be due to an intelligent person. God, who can have no desires unfulfilled, can desire to gain nothing from the creation of the world. Nor can his engaging himself in creation be due to benevolence; for, before creation, jîvas have no sense-organs, bodies, objects (and hence cannot experience pain); in the absence of pain, how can there be a benevolent desire to remove it? If (we say that) benevolence rises on observing pain after creation, (we commit) the fault of arguing in a circle, (inferring) creation from benevolence and benevolence from creation." (Vâchaspati Miṣra, *Tattva Kaumudi*, 255). Therefore the impulse to creation is a blind, unintelligent impulse. "As the unconcious milk flows (of itself from the cow) for the nourishment of the calf, so Pradhâna begins to evolve for the release of Purusha (*Sâṅ. Kâr.* lvi). The mere contiguity of the cow and the calf is enough to set the milk flowing from the cow: so the mere contiguity of Purusha and Prakṛiti causes a movement in the latter. Then there results "a union of both, like that of a lame man (mounted on the back of) a blind man. Hence starts creation." (*Ib.* xxi.). Purusha is lame, having

no powers of action: Pradhâna is blind as it does not possess the illumination of consciousness. When they are united, "thence, on account of that union, the unconscious seems to be characterized by consciousness; though the guṇas act, the inactive (Purusha) becomes as if he were an actor." (*Ib.* xx.). The first result of the union is the disturbance of the inert condition in which the three guṇas subsist during Pralaya when matter is avyakta, unmanifest. They blend with each other in varying proportions and thus the course of evolution (Sañchara) is started. This evolution runs in three parallel lines—the cosmic, the individual and the objective or the adhidaivata, the adhyâtma and adhibhûta.

The first product (vikâra) of Pradhâna from its union with Purusha is Buddhi, cosmic or individual. It is the first result of the reflection of the intelligence of the Purusha on unintelligent Pradhâna, of the first cancellation of the contrast and distinction between pure subjectivity and pure objectivity. It is the certitude (adhyavasâya) caused by the identification of the subject with the object which underlies all mental processes. "In cognition in a single act the contrast is virtually superseded as regards both the one-sidedness of subjectivity and the one-sidedness of objectivity. At first, however, the supersession of the contrast is

but implicit. The process as such is in consequence immediately infected with the finitude of this sphere, and splits into the two-fold movement of the instinct of reason, presented as two different movements. On the one hand it supersedes the one-sidedness of the Idea's subjectivity by receiving the existing world into itself, into subjective conception and thought, and with this objectivity which is thus taken to be real and true for its content it fills up the abstract certitude of itself. On the other hand, it supersedes the onesidedness of the objective world, which is now, on the contrary, estimated as only a mere semblance, a collection of contingencies and shapes at bottom visionary. It modifies and informs that world by the inward nature of the subjective, which is here taken to be the genuine objective. The former is the instinct after truth, cognition properly so called: the theoretical action of the idea. The latter is the instinct of the Good to fulfil the same, the practical activity of the idea or volition." (*Logic of Hegel*, *Wall.*, p. 363). B u d d h i, thus, is the root of the universe and cosmic B u d d h i, B r a h m â* is the world-creator. Krishṇa speaking in the *Bhagavadgîta* as the cosmic P u r u s h a says "To me, M a h a t-B r a h m â is the Y o n i; therein I set the germ;

* B r a h m â and other Gods are Purushas, just like ordinary human beings.

thence the birth of all beings, O Bhârata. Of the beings of all forms arising in all wombs, O Kaunteya, Brahmamahat is the Yoni, I the father, giver of the seed" (XIV. 2-3).

From Buddhi is evolved, Ahaṃkâra, the organ of self-consciousness and (necessarily) of other-consciousness. After the first faint glimmering of differentiated consciousness comes the stage when the individual identifies himself with the definite portion of space occupied by his body (gross or subtle) and says, 'this is I', 'that is not-I'. Now Ahaṃkâra is developed; the relative consciousness which alone all of us are familiar with, becomes possible. This Ahaṃkâra is a function of matter, for till the Purusha identifies himself with a portion of matter and regards other portions of matter as outside himself, the cognitions of I and of Not-I cannot be experienced. This is true as much of the cosmic Gods as of the individual man and of the hosts of animals which stand below man in their evolution. Cosmic Ahaṃkâra is Rudra. The highest development of self-consciousness in man is union with Rudra. Hence Ṣaṅkarâchârya makes the refrain of most of his Ṣiva Stotras, "Ṣivoham," (I am Ṣiva), "Ṣivaḥkevaloham", (I am pure Ṣiva), "Pratyagâtmâ Ṣivoham", (I am Ṣiva, the ego of introspective meditation).

From the Ahaṃkâra develop the eleven or-

gans in the Adhyâtma (individual) and the corresponding deities in the Adhidaiva and also the Adhibhûta (objective universe). The Taijasa (bright) Ahaṃkâra develops into the deities. The Sâttvic or Vaikhârika Ahaṃkâra acted on by Rajas produces the Manas, the five sense-organs, and the five action organs, making up the eleven organs. The Tâmasa Ahamkâra, dark egoism, becomes transformed into the five tanmâtras (*Ib.* xxiv, xxv). Thus is started the triple line of evolution the whole scheme of which is given below in tabular form.

	adhyâtma (individual)	adhidaiva (cosmic)	adhibhûta (objective).
1.	Buddhi	Brahmâ	Certitude
2.	Ahaṃkâra	Rudra	Egoism
3.	Manas	Chandra	Saṅkalpa
4.	Ear	Âkâṣa	Sound
5.	Skin	Vâyu	Touch
6.	Eye	Âditya	Sight
7.	Tongue	Varuṇa	Taste
8.	Nose	Earth	Smell
9.	Voice	Agni	Utterance
10.	Hands	Indra	Grasping
11.	Feet	Vishṇu	Walking
12.	Organ of Pâyu	Mitra	Excretion
13.	Upastha	Prajâpati	Ânanda.

Of these the first three are organs of knowledge and action; the five next are organs of knowledge; the five last are organs of action. These thirteen Karaṇas (instruments) with the five Prâṇas, five Mahâbhûtas, Pradhâna, and Purusha make up the twenty five tattvas (principles) of the cosmos the enumeration of which gave the name of Sâṅkhya (counting) to this school.

The word tanmâtra means 'that merely', the pure essence of a sensation conceived as a modification of subtle matter. The illuminated (Sâttva) aspect of it becomes the fundament of a sense organ; the dark (tâmasa) aspect of it becomes the rudiment of the corresponding sense-object—Sûkshmabhûta.

The conception that the organ of a sensation and the object that possesses and produces that sensation are modifications of the same material essence is in keeping with the idealism that underlies Hindu philosophy. Western science has led philosophy into an *impasse* by generalising the objective causes of sensations into vibrations of material particles which philosophy by no stretch of imagination can assimilate with anything like sensations. The Sâṅkhya regards the tanmâtras, *i. e.*, pure sound etc. to exist inside the perceiving sense-organ and in the world as well. To form a sense-organ it is acted on by sattva, it takes an illuminated form; to form a sûkshmabhûta, subtle,

(ultimate) element, it takes a tâmasa, dark, resisting form ; and when there is a contact between these two forms, the sense organ and the sense object, sensation results by the illumination of the object by the sense organ.

This concept that sensation is not a mode, a function, of intellect but an element, a constituent of matter, perhaps looks paradoxical but is not so difficult to conceive as it looks. All admit that smell exists as infinitesimally small particles of matter shot off from odorous substances. According to modern physical notions light is but a case of electricity and all matter is but electricity. Hence "atoms of light" are infinitesimally small particles of matter. Extending this to the other three sensations it is not impossible to conceive the five sensations to be the five (metaphysical) elements of matter out of which objects and the sense-organs which perceive them are evolved. Physics attempts to form a picture of the universe by making or conceiving mechanical models of the action of the complex objects of the universe. Such models are extremely helpful in what is called scientific explanation. So far the formation of scientific hypotheses is valid. But when one steps beyond and says that the plan of the universe is a copy of the many mechanical models conceived by the scientific man, it is but the intrusion of bad metaphysics into good science.

The only valid metaphysical explanation of the universe is the analysis of it into five elementary sensations or tanmâtras as the Hindu calls them.

These tanmâtras are Aviṣesha, (lit. unspecific), perceptible only to the Gods whose bodies and sense organs are subtle. When they become Viṣesha, specific, differentiated, they give rise to subtle bodies, to the bodies that spring from a father and mother and the Mahâbhûtas (empirical elements). (*Ib.* xxxviii). The tanmâtras first evolve into empirical elements called Mahâbhûtas, or Sthûlabhûtas (gross elements). From Ṣabda tanmâtra is evolved Sthûla Âkâṣa; this mixed with Vâyutanmâtra becomes Sthûla vâyu, and so on, each 'gross element' (mahâbhûta) containing the properties of all the elements above it and serving as the basis of their differentiation. This process of differentiation is called Panchîkaraṇa—quintuplication. These gross elements thus evolved constitute on the one hand the objects of the physical universe and on the other the physical bodies (with the physical sense organs) which form the habitat of the incarnating Purushas. The creation of these bodies is called liṅgâkhya Sarga, evolution of bodies, related to Bhâvâkhya Sarga, evolution of characteristics. (*Ib.* lii). These bodies are of fourteen kinds,

of which eight are divine, *i. e.* subtle, namely, (1) Brâhma, that of Brahmâ; (2) Prâjâpatya, those of the creating hierarchies, of Manus, and of Rishis, (3) Saumya, those of the lunar beings; (4) Aindra, those of Gods of the rank of Indra; (5) Gândharva, those of the attendants on Indra and beings of that order; (6) Râkshasa; (7) Yâksha; (8) Pâiṣâcha, those of three classes of demons. The ninth class of bodies is that of man; the other five are infra-human —domestic animals, wild beasts, birds, creeping animals and immovables (vegetables and minerals). These three groups of bodies, divine, human, and infra-human are respectively characterised by Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas. (*Ib.* liii, liv). Hence the Gods lead a life of indolent pleasure; man, one of activity and the beings below man are enveloped by ignorance; but all beings—high or low act not out of any imaginary principle of free will but all action in the manifested universe is the mechanical result of the play of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. These three kinds of bodies are also called Ûrddhvasrotas, Arvâksrotas and Tiryagsrotas, *i. e.* those whose vital energy flows upwards, downwards and horizontally. (*Vish. Pur.* V.)

This completes the evolutionary process and provides a large variety of bodies in which Purushas may reside and experience the pain arising

from decay and death till, (on attaining Moksha) they are released from connection with the Liṅga-deha. (*Sânkh. Kâr.* lv.)

2. Yoga.

The Yoga school accepts *in toto* the scheme of the past evolution of the Universe as taught by the Sâṅkhyas; but its especial concern is more with the future release of the soul that is bound and the means of securing that desirable consummation. The Satkâryavâda is accepted in *Yoga Sûtras* iv. 12. "The past and the future (forms of things) exist is their essence, the cause (of development of various) properties is due to change (of time, place etc.)". The substratum contains in it all forms in latency and they manifest themselves in due time. "They are (either) visible or subtile and are of the nature (of modifications) of the Guṇas." (*Ib.* iv. 14). These suble and visible forms of objects start their course of evolution on account on the contiguity of the seer and for his sake. "Though variegated by innumerable impressions (mental deposits of souls associated with the objects) they exist for another (*i. e.* the seer) because they operate on account of association (with him)." (*Ib.* iv. 23).

The stages of evolution are four. "The stages (of the evolution) of the Guṇas are the specific,

(viṣesha), non-specific (avisesha) the liṅgamâtra and the aliṅga. (*Ib.* ii. 19). The "specific' (viṣesha) or complex comprises the objects of the world. The 'non-specific' are the simple pure sensations (tanmâtra) of which all objects are compounded and the Ahaṃkâra —the foundation of the cognition of I and not-I. The liṅgamâtra, the mere characteristic, the touch of matter that colours the pure consciousness of the Purusha and characterizes him as a bound soul, is Buddhi. The aliṅga is the characterless, homogeneous Pradhâna.

After all objects are evolved they continue in a state of constant flux, for flux is life. This flux is of three kinds, Dharma, Lakshaṇa and Avasthâ. (*Ib.* iii. 13). This triple flux affects objects and the organs of perception and the action by means of which we contact them. (*Ib.*) Dharma is change of characteristic. Thus when a pot is made of a lump of clay, the (material) clay gives up the characteristics of a lump and takes on the characteristics of a pot. This is the flux of Dharma, affecting the Dharmî (material), clay. This flux—change of characteristic—consists of two moments, (1) the rise of the new characteristic (of the pot), (2) the destruction of the old characteristic (of the lump). Dharma is thus the flux of form while the Dharmî, material, is permanent; the various characteristics,

the outgoing and the incoming ones are both existent, only when the former is held in check (nirodha) the latter manifests itself. Thus when the *lumpiness* (piṇḍatva) of clay is held in check, its *pot-hood* (ghaṭatva) is in manifestation (vyutthâna). Dharma itself, is subject to a triple flux, called Lakshana, the flux of time. The form of a pot is a Dharma of clay. This form has three states with reference to time—future, present and past. So long as the pot is not made, but is only as it were immanent in the clay, it is *prospective pot-hood* (anâgata ghaṭatvam). This quality of capability of becoming a pot is held in check (nirodha) and *present pot-hood* (vartamâna ghaṭatvam) comes into manifestation (vyutthâna) when a pot takes shape. Similary a statue exists in latency in marble before the sculptor carves it. Carving is the act of keeping the latency under control so that the actual statue may manifest itself. When, finally, the pot is broken, its *persent pot-hood* is held in check and its state as a past (atîta) pot is manifested. Thus goes on this procession of each form of each object from a prospective to a present and on to a past state (Lakshaṇa), each presenting two moments, Nirodha and Vyutthâna, one moment merging and another manifesting itself. The flux of an object with regard to time is thus

analysed, so that the fundamental idea of Sat-kâryavâda, that nothing is created, nothing destroyed, may be consistently followed in explanation of the world-flux. While the triple fiux of Lakshaṇa takes place, Dharma is fixed. The idea of Lakshaṇa as a procession of temporal states of a form is indicated by each state being called an Adhvâ (way). Each adhvâ contains a Nirodha and a Vyutthâna, one state checked and another manifested. Nirodha and Vyutthâna are always acting. If the former is strong and the latter is weak, a certain state is kept under control; when the latter is strong and the former is weak, manifestation of a state results. Thus Nirodha and Vyutthâna, each has two phases; in Nirodha, Nirodha is strong and Vyutthâna is weak; in Vyutthâna, Vyutthâna is strong and Nirodha is weak. Each of these phases is called an Avasthâ. Thus Dharma is the flux (Pariṇâma) of Dharmî, Lakshaṇa is the fiux of Dharma and Avasthâ is the flux of Lakshaṇa. This intricate analysis of the flux of objects taken from Vyâsa's *Commentaries on Yoga Sûtras* III. 13, reminds us of the barren hair-splitting of the Nyâya-Vaiṣeshika School; its only virtue, if it is virtue at all, being a consistent carrying out of the doctrine of *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* Chittavṛitti, the flux of psychoses, is

similarly analysed, but this will be discussed elsewhere.

3. Vedânta.

So early as in the age when the Ṛiks were composed, was the momentous question raised, "what was the wood, what was the tree, out of which they fashioned the heaven and the earth? Inquire mentally, ye sages, what was that on which he took his stand when establishing the worlds?" (*Ṛigveda*, X. 81. 4). The question was answered in the *Taittirîya Brâhmaṇa*, II. viii. 9. 6., "Brahma was the wood, Brahma the tree from which they shaped the heaven and the earth. Ye sages, I tell you, he stood on Brahma supporting the worlds." This process of world-shaping is called pariṇâma, the march of forms on an unchanging material substratum, in *Ved-Sût.* I. iv. "(Brahma is the materical cause of the universe) as it is said He meditated ('may I become many, may I grow forth'), as both (creation and dissolution) are referred in the Veda directly (to Him, as in *Tait. Brâh*, II. viii. 9. 6. above quoted), as (it is said) He Himself made Himself (*Tait. Up.* II. 7.), by pariṇâma" (*Ved. Sût.* I. iv. 24-27).

The question, then, rises, how can Brahma, who is conscious Being evolve into the forms of unconscious (jaḍa) material objects? This diffi-

culty does not occur in the S â ṅ k h y a p a r i ṇ â m a v â d a wherein unconscious material objects evolve out of an unconscious causal proto-matter. The Sâṅkhya therefore objects to the Vedânta appropriating his theory "on account of the difference of that (*viz.* the world, from Brahma)" (*Ved. Sût.* II. i. 4.) The Vedânta Sûtras meet this objection tersely, " But it is seen" (*Ib.* II. i. 6). that the world presents many instances of things of different nature related as cause and effect, e. g. hairs and nails grow out of man, scorpions out of cow dung, worms out of honey. To this crude way of meeting this difficulty, the Â c h â r y a s add each a clever supplementary argument derived from their sectarian teachings. Ṣaṅkara argues that evolution of the objects that constitute the world is illusory (v i v a r t a p a r i ṇ â m a) and Brahma is but the seeming material (v i v a r t a u p â d â ṇ a m),* "Brahma becomes the substratum of all phenomenal changes like evolution etc., superimposed on him by A v i d y â (ignorance); in His real nature he remains beyond all phenomenal changes and untransformed" (*Comm. on Ved. Sût. II.* i. 27). Râmânuja attributes to Brahma even in his causal state (K â r a ṇ â v a s t h â), a subtle body made up of individual souls and the elements of matter that have become absorbed in Him. During the K â r y â v a s t h â, when the

* Hence the a d v a i t a is called the v i v a r t a v â d a.

world is in manifestation, it is this body of His that evolves, He Himself being the unchangeable, avyakta.

Thus all schools interpose between Brahma that is Pure Conscious Being and the evolved world, a state of proto-matter which is held to be real or illusory according as consistency with their fundamental metaphysical position requires. The hiatus between Brahma and this proto-matter is the weak point of all Vedânta theories. This original state of proto-matter, Mûlaprakṛiti as the Sâṅkhyas call it, is called Asat in the Vedas. "Asat was this at first, from it sprang Sat (*Tait. Up.* II 7. 1; *Chh. Up.* III 19. 1.) "Sat is founded upon Asat. Beings (bhûtas) are founded upon Sat." (*Athar. Ved.* XVII i. 19). "From Asat, Manas was created. Manas created Prajâpati. Prajâpati created beings." (*Tait. Brâh* II. ii. 9. 10). "Asat was this at first. They say, 'what is this Asat? The Ṛishis say that 'At first Asat existed'." (*Sat Brâh* VI. i. 1. 1,) By Asat, therefore, is meant a state when distinct objects were not evolved, a state of homogeneity, *

* "Sat denotes the existence of things in the manifold forms of the external world, the *Daseyn* of Hegel, the *Natura Naturata* of Spinoza and Asat is the opposite of this, or the formless Prakriti. . . . Sat corresponds in each separate form to the 'being-this' of Hegel . . . 'By virtue of its predicate of merely being-this, every something is a finite' and therefore it is an *effect*, because otherwise we

the chaos of the Greeks. This state is also called T a m a s, to be distinguished from T a m a s, one of the three guṇas. "T a m a s existed, enveloped by T a m a s, in the beginning" (*Ṛig-Veda* X. 129. 3). "In the beginning T a m a s alone was this." (*Mait. Up.* V. 2). By T a m a s, darkness, was symbolized a state when nothing objective is manifested. Another and frequently used symbol of the unmanifested state of matter, is 'water'. "All this was undifferentiated water." (*Ṛig-Veda*, X. 129. 3.) "At first all this was water, (nothing) but water." (*Ṣat. Brâh.* XI. i. 6. 1. 9, *Tait. Sam.* VII. i. 5. 1., *Tait. Brâh.* I. i. 3. 5., *Tait. Âraṇ.* I. 2 3. 1.)

S ṛ i s h ṭ i, creation, started with an agitation of this primeval matter. S ṛ i s h t i is more properly emission, the emission of energy into the waters, which started the work of evolution. This first starting of creative activity is described in the earlier writings as a 'desire'. "Desire (K â m a)

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could only conceive it as absolute being and therefore unlimited . . . Dr. Muir, however, refers to the commentators on the Rigveda who explain A s a t as meaning 'an undeveloped state', and adds that if we accept this statement there will be no contradiction. A s a t does not mean simply an undeveloped state, but the state of pure or formless existence of the primal substance from which all forms have sprung. It is clear, however, that if A s a t means an undeveloped state, then S a t must mean, not the essence of anything, but a developed state". Davies. *Hindu Phil.* pp.-136-8. But Davies forgets that sometimes S a t *is* used for the essence, the noumenal entity as in *Chh. Up.* VI. ii. 1. 2.

first arose in it, this was the seed of mind, that which was first. Wise men, by mental introspection, have found this bridge between Asat and Sat". (*Ṛig-veda* x. 129. 4.) "Being Asat, it desired 'may I become Sat'" (*Tait. Bråh.* II ii. 9. 1.) In the theistic Âgama schools, this desire is furnished with a motive, that of leading individual souls to salvation (Moksha); but this idea is not found in the early literature. On the contrary, it is said that creation is "not on account of any (special) purpose but is a mere sport (lîlâ), such as we see in ordinary life (when people play)" (*Ved. Sût.* II. i. 32. 33). The desire that underlies the evolution of the world, the will to manifest is not due to the motive to gain something thereby ; nor is it due to constraint, but spontaneous, self-initiated out-flow of energy.

"From Asat came Sat". "From Asat was created Manas". These words Sat, Manas, indicate the earliest beginnings of evolution, the stage when existence could be predicated, when homogeneous proto-matter was streaked with the first marks of differentiation. "It (Sat) developed, it became an egg" (*Chh. Up.* III. xix. 1.) "Manas created Prajâpati". This represents the next stage, Prajâpati, on the one hand and the world-egg on the other. The former was the Âdi Purusha, the first male, the creator with some elements of personality in

him ; the latter was the first discrete form of the universe; These are the two lines of evolution. * The work of Prajâpati is described variously in various cosmogonic hymns. Most frequently it is described as Tapas (meditation accompanied by austerity). " He desired, ' may I become many, may I produce children.' He performed tapas; after he performed tapas, he emitted all this; and whatever there is. Having emitted it, he entered into it." (*Tait. Up.* II. 6.) " Prajâpati desired, ' may I produce children.' He performed tapas; he became pregnant. He became yellow-brown. Hence a pregnant woman becomes yellow-brown. Being pregnant with a fœtus, he became exhausted. Being exhausted, he became black-brown. Hence an exhausted person becomes black-brown." (*Tait. Brâh.* II. iii. 8. 1.) Prajâpati's work is also conceived as a sexual act. " The Âtmâ, in the form of a Purusha, was this at first. Looking around, he saw (there was) none but himself. . . He desired a second. He was as much as a man and woman locked in embrace. He made himself fall asunder in two parts. Thus arose man and wife. He cohabited with her. Thence men were born." (*Ṣat. Brâh.* XIV. iv. 2. 1.) Creation is also described as due to uttering mantras. " With ' Bhûḥ,' Prajâpati

* In some legends Prajapati came out of the golden egg, *Ṣat. Brâh.* XI. i. 6. 2.

generated this; with 'Bhuvaḥ', the intermediate region; with 'Svaḥ,' the sky". (*Ib.* VI. i. 4. 11). It is also conceived as a sacrifice. The ritual of the Vedic sacrifice was supposed to be an earthly copy of this sacrifice of creation. Vishṇu is generally referred to as the sacrificial victim. Lastly, creation is sometimes described as an act of self-sacrifice. "Brahma, the self-existant was in contemplation. He thought, 'there is no infinity in this contemplation. I shall sacrifice myself in beings and beings in myself.' Then sacrificing Himself in all beings and all beings in Himself, he acquired superiority, self-effulgence and lordship." (*Ṣat. Brâh.* XIII. vii. 1. 20.)

The Golden Egg of the universe developed in "the period of a year. It burst in two. The two halves became (one) golden and (the other) silver. The silver (half) is this earth, the golden (half) the sky; the chorion, mountains, the amnion, cloud and mist; the bloodvessels, rivers and the fluid, the ocean." (*Chh. Up.* III. 19. 1-2.)

The order in which the various beings were created also varies in different accounts. The *Taittirîya Brâḥmaṇa* makes it out to be Asuras, Fathers (Pitṛis), men, Devas (*Ib.* II. iii. 8. 1.). The elements were created in the order in which the Sâṅkhya makes them evolve. "From that Âtmâ sprang Âkâṣa, from Akâṣa air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth, from earth herbs, from

herbs food, from food retas (seed,) from retas m en." (*Tait. Up.* II. 1.). By 'man' here we must here understand his gross body, for in the previous series he appears between the Fathers and the Devas. All this work of evolution is done by the Supreme Brahma. "The making of names and forms (belongs) to Him who renders (the elements) tripartite, according to the teaching of the Ṣruti" (*Ved. Sût.* II. iv. 20). Making the elements 'tripartite' refers to *Chhândogya Up.* vi-2, where ṭ e j a s â p a s and a n n a m (fire, water and food or earth, as usually interpreted) are alone mentioned ; from such crude speculations, the Sâṅkhya elaborated its well-thought and finished analysis of the Universe. When this was done, though the Vedânta was directly opposed to the fundamental Sâṅkhya teaching and the author of the Brahma Sûtras devoted two sections of the work to refute the Sâṅkhya heresy, by appealing both to reason and revelation, it accepted the Sâṅkhya scheme of transmutation ; its promulgator Kapila has become an incarnation of V i s h ṇ u and his philosophy a revelation as unassailable as the self-promulgated Veda.

The Vedânta has elaborated the Vedic scheme of three regions, the earth, the sky, and the intermediate region (a n t a r i k s h a) into three cosmic spheres, the Vedânta scheme being perhaps a rival of the Vaishṇava scheme. The *Mâṇdûkya*

Upanishad is the first to propound the scheme: "B r a h m a that is this Atma is four-footed. The first foot is V a i ṣ v â n a r a, seated in the waking consciousness, sensing external objects, with seven limbs * and nineteen doors *, experiencer of the gross († compounded) world. The second foot is T a i j a s a, seated in the dreaming consciousness, sensing internal objects, with seven limbs * and nineteen doors *, experiencer of the † elementary (subtle) world. Deep sleep (s u s h u p t a m) when the sleeper desires nothing whatsoever, dreams not at all; becoming one with the state of deep sleep a mass of (undifferentiated) consciousness, filled with bliss, the enjoyer of bliss, he is P r â j ñ a. the third foot. This is the Lord of all, this the omniscient, this the indweller of all, this the cause of the birth and death of all beings. Not

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* The orthodox explanation of the seven limbs is that they are the Heaven, the sun, wind, Â k â ṣ a, water, earth and fire conceived as v a i ṣ v â n a r a 's head, eye, breath, heart, bladder, feet and mouth. The nineteen doors are the ten organs of sense and action, five prânas and the four parts of the internal organ m a n a s, b u d d h i, c h i t t a and a h a m-k â r a m. This can scarcely be the idea of the author of the Upanishad, for the division of the internal organ into four parts belongs to the age of Sankara and not earlier. Anquetil's suggestion that they are the five elements, the ten organs, three gunas and mind is a better guess, but not sufficiently convincing.

† cf. P a ñ c h î k ṛ i t a and a p a ñ c h î k r i t a, a v i ṣ e-s h a and v i ṣ e s h a, of the Sânkhya, v. p. 273.

sensing the internal, not sensing the external, not sensing both, no mass of sentiency, not conscious, not-unconscious, unseen, unusable, untouchable, indefinable, inconceivable, indescribable, the essence of the intuition of the one Âtmâ, where the world is not, the unchnaging, the blissful, the one without second, that, which is to be known, is the Âtmâ, the fourth (foot)." (*Mâṇḍ. Up.* 2-7).

Nṛisimha Tâpini Upanishad, II. i, is a commentary on the *Mâṇḍûkya Upanishad* and presents a systematic parallelism between the three states of the individual consciousness and of the cosmic consciousness as follows :—

States	Individual	Cosmic
Waking.	Viṣva.	Vaiṣvânara.
Dream.	Taijasa.	Hiraṇyagarbha.
Sleep.	Prâjña.	Îṣvara.

The worlds and bodies corresponding to these three states of consciousness are called Sthûla Sûkshma and Kâraṇa, gross, subtle and causal (the fourth, Turîya, being the Absolute). The three worlds are also called Virâṭ, Svarâṭ and Samrâṭ.

(4) ṢAIVA AND ṢÂKTA ÂGAMAS.

The Sâṅkhya divided the objective universe into twenty-four tattvas,* which with the Purusha make up the twenty-five principles that constitute the macrocosm and the microcosm. The Ṣaivas analyse the universe into thirty-six tattvas. Between Prakṛiti and Buddhi they interpolate Guṇa as a tattva separate from either. Thus there are twenty-five tattvas below Purusha, who is the twenty-sixth. Above him there are five, called Pancha kañchuka, the five-fold envelope, *viz.*, Niyati, Kâla, Râga, Vidyâ, and Kalâ. Above Kalâ, there are Mâyâ, Ṣuddha Vidyâ, Îṣvara, Sadâṣiva and Ṣiva tattvas.

These thirty-six tattvas are divided into three classes, the highest, Ṣivtattva, being a class by itself, the next three, Sadâṣiva., Îṣvara and Suddhavidyâ being the Vidyâtattva and the thirty-two beginning from Mâyâ and ending with the earth being the Âtmâtattva.

The first of the Âtmâtattvas is Mâyâ, not

* Tattva, lit, that-ness has various connotations. Sometimes it means reality, as opposed to phenomenality, a real, ultimate factor of the cosmos. But in the Sâṅkhya and Ṣaiva Ṣâstras it more often means a definite stage of evolution, a stage having individual characteristics of its own. The tattva trayam of the Vaishṇavas are, again, three real, and ultimate *factors* of the cosmos and not stages of the evolution of *Prakṛiti.*

the Ṣuddha Mâyâ mentioned in p. 158. Mâyâ is the root of the universe. It is "eternal, one, pervading, of the form of objects, the substratum in which the potential results of actions (Karma) inhere, impure and common to all Sakalas. It is, during manifestation, the cause of the subtle and gross bodies etc. of the Pralayâkalas, which end with pralaya. As the trunk, the leaf, the fruit, etc., latent in the seed grow (therefrom, so the universe) from kalâ to kshiti (earth) (develope from Mâyâ)." (*Paush. Ag.* iii. 2-4). "It first evolves into the subtle tattvas (Kalâ etc.), by manifesting the power of sight (dṛikṣakti, power of perception) in the âtmâ; then it evolves into the gross worlds and bodies. The subtle Kalâ etc. first bind the man (aṇu); then the gross." (*Ib.* iii. 61-62). Kalâ is the first tattva evolved from Mâyâ. "Kalâ overcomes in all ways the malas (impurities) that obstruct the manifestation of chaitanya and thus helps chaitanya to manifest. Chaitanya is of the form of cognition and activity and is the auxiliary of the Âtmâ; (when) it is obstructed, Kalâ manifests it. Kalâ does not manifest the Âtmâ in its entirety, but makes the chaitanya shine partially, as Kalâ works in accordance with Karma." (*Ib.* v. 2-5). Vidyâ, the next tattva, evolves from Kalâ; without it the Atmâ cannot derive experience of pleasure and pain. "That instrument with which the

Âtmâ who has become an actor sees the oprations of Buddhi is called vidyâ in the Ṣaiva Ṣâstras." (*Ib.* v. 9.) Vidyâ is different from Chit-Ṣakti; for the latter shines only when Buddh and other material modifications are destroyed. Chit-Ṣakti leads to pure knowledge, whereas Vidyâ causes the knowledge that is bondage. Vidyâ is thus a reflection of the light of consciousness (prakâṣa) as kalâ is a reflection of power, independence (svachchhanda). "Râga inclines to (worldly) experience one who is attached to it; for the one without desire has no enjoyment (of pain and pleasure); nor is there satisfaction for one who is subject to enjoyment of impure (bliss)." (*Ib.* v. 22-23). Râga is a reflection of chit ṣakti or ichchâ-ṣakti. "Râga is of two kinds, of the form of images and of the form of latent (desire); of these the former (attaches men) to objects." (*Ib.* v. 37). After Râga comes Kâla, time, which makes manifests the aforesaid tattvas as past, present and future. "Without (the flux of) time, nothing can be born, nothing die; hence time is a cause (of objects) as the wheel is (a cause) of a pot" (*Ib.* v. 50). Time is not eternal; for eternity is being outside time (*Ib.* v. 66). Niyati is the force that attracts a man to the results of his Karma, whether he desires them or not. It also determines what bodies, organs, etc., each man is to get.

Karma by itself has no power to afflict man. Ṣiva's power has to intervene, in the form of Niyati (*Ib.* v. 83-88). The Purusha clothes himself with these 'five envelopes' developed from Mâyâ being set thereto by Ṣiva. The name Purusha applies only to the sakalas; they are enveloped by ignorance (avidyâ) which comes from Prakriti; the Vijñanâkalas and Pralayakevalas are not called Purushas. (*Ib.* vi. 2-4). Prakṛiti is also the stuff of which the worlds which the Purusha is to experience are made. It is the first of the gross developments of Mâyâ, Kalâ and the other four (pañchakanchuka) being subtle ones. It is also called Avyakta (*Ib.* vi. 18). In it the guṇas are in equilibrium (*Ib.* vi. 21). From Prakṛiti evolve the Guṇas; from the Guṇas, Buddhi. The rest of this part of evolution is substantially the same as that taught in the Sâṅkhya school.

The Vidyâtattvas (to be distinguished from the tattva called Vidyâ, the thirtieth in the series) are three modifications of the highest tattva, that called Ṣiva. This Ṣivatattva is nishkala, undifferentiated, where Ṣuddhamâya, with all its activity ended, becomes absorbed (reaches laya); from it radiate the powers of consciousness and action; it is indestructible, omnipresent. Eternal, unchanging, omniscient (lit. with face in all directions). (*Paush-Âg.* i. 18-20).

S a d â ș i v a is the next t a t t v a, the first of the three V i d y â t a t t v a s. "When Ș u d d h a-m â y â, the ș a k t i of Ș i v a begins her life of activity, then Ș i v a passes to the state of B h o g a Ș i v a (lit., Ș i v a that experiences, the first stage of differentiation); he is S a d â ș i v a, also called S â d â k h y a, not really separate from Ș i v a. When Ș u d d h a m â y â is actually active, B h o g a Ș i v a passes on to the stage of A d h i k â r a Ș i v a (lit., Ș i v a that superintends or rules); he is then Î ș v a r a, not really separate from S a d â ș i v a (*Ib.* i. 25-26). The body of five m a n t r a s referred to in the previous chapter belongs to S a d â ș i v a, for the highest, undifferentiated Ș i v a t a t t v a, can scarcely be said to have a body, even one composed of m a n t r a s.

B i n d u, otherwise Ș u d d h a M â y â, also Ș i v a ș a k t i, the active counterpart of these three highest t a t t v a s is not counted as a separate t a t t v a; so that the Ș â k t a â g a m a s give her prominence and throw the Ș i v a s in the background. "The l a y a and other (two) different states of Ș i v a already described have B i n d u as their substratum; she is the same as K u ṇ ḍ a-l i n î (the globular)." She it is that binds A n-a n t a and the rest to the bondage of their (respective) activities and releases them therefrom. Moreover at the time of creation the world beginning with that of m a n t r a s proceed from her and

become absorbed in her." (*Ib.* ii. 1-4). "Her activity in manifesting tattvas determines the four (highest tattvas), Ṣivatattva, Sâdâkhya tattva, Îṣvara tattva, and (Ṣuddha) Vidyâ tattva." (*Ib.* ii. 32-33). "Ṣuddha Vidyâ is the cause of true knowledge" (*Ib.* ii. 40).

Besides this line of evolution of the various 'principles' of the Universe, the Ṣaiva Âgamas also describe the evolution of hosts of beings, succeeding the rise of Mâyâ. "Then at first he creates eight qualified Kevala souls (aṇus), accompanied by Vâmâ and other Ṣaktis and surrounded by the 7 crores of mantras." (*Mṛig. Ag.* iii. 1). They are here called kevala because they belong to the class already described as Vijñâna kevala, those that have Âṇava mala sticking on to them but are rid of Karma and Mâyâ. They are Ananta, Sûkhshma, Ṣivottama, Ekanetra, Ekarudra, and Ṣikhandî, lords of lords (Râjarâjas). "Then the Lord being manifested Ananta and the rest, creates from Mâyâ tattva (the knot), the 118 (Îṣvaras) whose bodies begin from Kalâ." (*Ib.* iii. 9). These evidently, are subject to two malas.

"Afterwards the Lord enters into those rulers of the worlds (bhuvaneṣvaras) who are tainted (with the three malas) from whom all this

(universe has arisen) and whose work depends upon (their) karma." (*Ib.* iii. 10). They are Brahma, Vishṇu, Rudra, (the destroyer of a minor universe, to be distinguished from the great Lord), and the rest, who thus are Sakalas. These beings inhabit various spheres, called Bhuvanas into the description of which it is profitless to enter.

The line of separation between the Ṣaiva and Ṣâkta Âgamas so far as mythology is concerned is generally faint; but the more rigorous Ṣâkta schools, while accepting the Ṣaiva analysis of the tattvas substitute hierarchies of female divinities for the Ṣaiva deities. Parâ-ṣakti, the Supreme Goddess is always surrounded by hordes of followers, like the queen of the amazons. One hierarchy is that of the 16 Nityâs —Mahâ Tripurasundarî, Kâmeṣvarî, Bhagamâlinî, etc; another consists of Mantriṇi, Daṇḍinî, Nakulî and other Devîs. Their names, functions and the Mantras which appeal to them form the chief subject matter of Ṣâkta books. They are generally distinguished as Îṣvarîs when pure Sattva, Rajas and Tamas excluded, forms their essence, and as Yoginîs when they are tainted by Rajas and Tamas. No useful purpose will be served by a more detailed study of these divine charmers.

Varivasyâ rahasya expounds the secret teach-

ings with regard to the starting of the process of creation, quaint and interesting. "This is the order of creation. A man, desirous of begetting offspring, on account of the adṛishṭa (karma) of the son to be born, contemplates his own powers and himself enters, in the form of Ṣukla, the wife that is the half of his body; . . . then the wife in the form of ṣoṇita enters within the ṣukla; thence the bindu swells out, like the seed of the banyan and the udumbara; then in the order in which the sprout etc. generate, in process of time, children etc. are generated; when the sun's rays enter a mirror opposite the sun, the sun's rays and rays from the mirror become mixed and start as a bindu of light and fall on a wall. Similarly, on account of the Adṛishṭa (karma) of (all) beings, Brahma who is Prakâṣa, becomes desirous of creating the world which had been absorbed in himself, turns to see his Ṣakti, enters her in the form of a bindu of light and becomes a bindu of ṣukla. Thence Ṣakti, becomes ṣoṇita and enters into it. The bindu that results from their commingling swells out. Then is produced a special substance called Hârdakalâ (heart-ray). That has to be learnt from the lips of a Guru and cannot be written in books." (*Ib.* ii. 15. *Com.*)

Lalitâ Sahasranâma bhâshya quotes from a Ṣâkta work the following elaborate description

of the stages of creation. First is (1) the ghanî-bhûta stage, when karma absorbed in pralaya is not ripe for manifestation and matter is a homogeneous mass. When the ripening is beginning it, is (2) vichikîrsha. Mâyâ becomes charged with ripened karma and Brahma becomes endowed with Mâyâ and is ready to create; this is (3) Avyakta or Kâraṇa Bindu (the causal seed). From it starts (4) the Kârya Bindu (effected seed), who is Parâ Vâk, Chit. Thence issues (5) Nâda, Sûkshma Vâk, chidachit; thence, Bîja, (gross) seed, sthûla, Achit. Stages 3, 4, 5, 6 form the Avyakta Îşvara, Hiranyagarba and Vaiṣvanara of the Vedânta (explained in section 3), as also their Ṣâkta analogues. *viz*, Ṣântâ, Vâmâ, Jyesṭhâ, and Raudrî, otherwise, Ambikâ, Ichchhâ, Jñâna, and Kriyâ.

(5) Vaishṇava Âgamas.

The *Pâdma Samhita* describes the cosmic beings and spheres in the following terms "There is the eternal, incomparable, Light, eternally-satisfied, spotless, the all-form, the formless, beyond Tamas, without destruction. On account of (creative activity) comes out from this eternal Being, Vâsudeva, two-handed, single-clothed, like pure crystal, with the brilliance of thousands of lacs of crores of moons, fires and suns, seated in a

sphere of rays, with c h a k r a (discus) and other implements as his marks, with Ṣ r î v a t s a (a curl of hair) and K a u s t u b h a (a jewel) on his breast, shining with a garland ornamented with a crown, a necklace, armlets, bangles, etc., wearing a yellow cloth, graceful, the first spotless King. He is known as V â s u d e v a ; from (His) four-faced Being all created things (came). He is to be meditated on by Yogîs always in the centre of the lotus of the heart. The wise (s û r i s) see him as the supreme goal of V i s h ṇ u. From V â s u d e v a was born another V â s u d e v a, single-faced, four-armed, endowed with the discus and other implements. (He keeps) the discus for the protection (of the world); the all-loving, again, has the lotus for the purpose of creation ; the (conch called) p â ñ c h a j a n y a for release (m u k t i), also the mace for destruction ; with the ṣ r î v a t s a and k a u s t u b h a on his breast, ornamented with a garland ; black like the peacock's neck ; with a yellow cloth, born with him. This Lord V â s u d e v a is the author of creation, protection, destruction, and release. For some cause or other he divided himself into two ; of these one was V â s u d e v a, like a pure crystal, the second was N â r a y a ṇ a, of the colour of a blue cloud. From V â s u d e v a (came) S a ṃ k a r s h a ṇ a, from him (the latter) was born P r a d y u m n a. From P r a d y u m n a, was born A n i r u d d h a. All these are four-

armed. V â s u d e v a is known to have the six g u ṇ a s, j ñ â n a and the rest, in equal quantities; the forms (m û r t i s) to be serially described, (come) from possessing different quantities of the g u ṇ a s. He who has excess of j ñ â n a is named S a ṃ k a r s h a ṇ a; P r a d y u m n a has an excess of b a l a; on the excess of A i ş v a r y a, (comes) A n i r u d d h a; from the four m û r t i s are born twenty-four m û r t i s, as many lamps (are lighted) from one lamp". (*Pâdma Sam.* ii-7·12).

The functions of these beings are described in the *Lakshmîtantra.* "A n i r u d d h a creates this; P r a d y u m n a maintains what he creates; the S a ṃ k a r s h a ṇ a eats (destroys) what is thus created and maintained." (*Ib.* iv. 19.) In variance with this Lakshmî describes the course of creation in chap v. of the same book. "I, desirous of creation, with a small drop (b i n d u) of mine, start the pure creation, of the full six g u ṇ a s. Before my form is altered by the formation of that b i n d u, I am called M a h â l a k s h m î, surrounded by the three g u ṇ a s. When R a j a s becomes predominant, I become the great P a r a- m e ş v a r î. My form filled with T a m a s is known as M a h â M â y â; aud my form of S a t t v a is known as M a h â V i d y â. Myself and these two women by meditation created three pairs (of beings), in accordance with our nature. Know that my own mentally-produced beautiful

pair, golden-wombed, lotus-eyed, beautiful, lotus-seated, is from a part of Pradyumna. (Of this pair), the male is Brahmâ (called also) Dhâtâ, Vidhi, Viriñcha; the woman is called Ṣrî, Padmâ, Kamlâ, Lakshmî. From a part of Saṃkarshaṇa, was mentally produced by Mahâmâyâ, a pair, three-eyed, beautiful in all limbs; the male was Rudra, Ṣaṅkara, Sthâṇu, Kapardi, three-eyed, and (the woman) Trayî, Îṣvarâ, Bhâshâ, Vidyâ, Aksharâ, Kâmadhenu, the (heavenly) Cow, Sarasvatî. From a part of Aniruddha was mentally produced by Mahâvidyâ, a pair; the male thereof was Keṣava, Vishṇu, Kṛishṇa, Hṛishîkeṣa, Vâsudeva, Janârdana, the woman being Mahagaurî, Satî. Chandrâ, Subhagâ; by my command Trayî became Brahmâ's wife, Gaurî, Rudra's wife, and the (lotus-born) Lakshmî, of Vâsudeva" (*Ib* v. 2-23). Brahmâ then created the cosmic egg; it was broken in two by Rudra and Vîshṇu protects all that is within the egg.

The supreme manifests himself in three forms, called Para, Vyûha and Vibhava; of these, the Para (supreme) form is the one described at the beginning of this section. The Vyûha comprises the four forms of Vâsudeva, Saṃkarshaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha,

whose shapes, ornaments etc. are described in detail in chapter ten of this work. They manifest themselves in each of the four states of Jâgrata, Svapna, Sushupti and Turîya (waking, dreaming and sleep and trance.) *

The vibhava constitutes the various forms in which Vishṇu manifests himself to man, *e. g.*, Padmnâbha, Ananta, Kapila, the horse-faced Hayagrîva, the various avatâras, the tortoise, etc., Dattâtreya and so on. †

From the complicated pantheon of the Agamas, the Vedic deities, Indra and Agni, Mitra and Varuṇa, Vâyu and Sûrya and the ancient Dyâvâprithvî, the lovely Ushas and the intoxicating King Soma have been entirely excluded; yet the modern Hindu devoutly believes

* The *Mâṇḍûkya upanishad* with its classification of spheres into four is so thoroughgoingly advaita in spirit that it presents a standing difficulty to Visishṭâdvaita commentators. Ranga Râmânuja identifies Viṣva, Taijasa, Iṣvara and Âtmâ referred to there with the four Vyûhas of the Vaishṇava Âgamas, but the representation of these vyûhas as being present in each state of the mind (waking, etc..) in the *Lakshmîtantra*, knocks the bottom out of Ranga Râmânuja's argument.

† Besides Para, Vyûha and Vibhava forms, other Vaishnava works add two other forms, antaryâmi, the all pervasive form (taken from the antaryâmi-brahmaṇa, *Brih Up.*) and the archa, the forms of temple idols.

his religion to be Vedic and passionately maintains it to be the Sanâtana Dharma, theeternal, never-changing religion; because the Vedas are worshipped but not read by him. Whence these Agama deities arose, when the complicated scheme of Âgama divinities was elaborated, what determined the character of their evolution is wrapped in that scarcely penetrable veil of obscurity which shrouds most Indian History.